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The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is
denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule
39.8. As the petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the
Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal
matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a)

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803) (quoting the judicial oath).
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1.
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I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to
persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will
faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as,
according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the
constitution and laws of the United States.1
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is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1.2
(citation omitted)

Introduction

10/23/2018 13:43:40

2. As this Article explains, this identical verbiage (or very similar, for petitioners seeking
writs other than certiorari) could be cited to many hundreds of dispositions; amongst the first were
Baba v. Japan Travel Bureau, 528 U.S. 1016 (1999) and In re Reidt, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999). See
also Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens and Prisoners’ Rights, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 83, 102–03 (2007).
3. See Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1 (1992) (per curiam); infra Part IV.
4. See Singleton v. C.I.R., 439 U.S. 940, 942 (1978) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of
certiorari); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 491–97 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Maryland v.
Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917–19 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., respecting denial of
certiorari).
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 182 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (calling the practice
“unseemly”).
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
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The above disposition—what might well be termed a “Martin directive”
to the clerk—appears formulaically and with regularity in the Supreme
Court’s list of orders.3 One might wonder why, given the seemingly
straightforward alternative of the Court’s simply denying the petition for
certiorari without further elaboration, as is its prerogative.4 Instead, the
Supreme Court has increasingly adopted the practice of categorically and
prospectively barring its more pestersome petitioners from proceeding in
forma pauperis—that is, without paying a filing fee.5 At a gestalt level, the
optics of closing the courtroom doors to those who cannot afford to pay are
not particularly seemly.6 Nonetheless, the Court has persevered in and
expanded this practice, to the point where such two-sentence directives
interdicting the indigent are now included by rote in the Court’s order lists.7
In the beginning, however, the Court grappled thoughtfully with the wisdom
of this practice.8 A quarter century after the Court’s final word to date, the
topic is ripe for reexamination.
This Article chronicles the emergence and evolution of Martin
directives in a series of cases featuring strident and occasionally fiery
dissents, and revisits the question of whether the Court’s present trajectory
effectively balances general principles of access to relief with judicial
efficacy. In Part I, this Article introduces the underpinnings of the American
imperative of access to the courthouse, describing the statutory measures and
constitutional prescriptions that animate the ideals of the Revolution and
Framers of the Constitution. Part II turns to the responses of lower courts to
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litigants who importune the generous admittance of the judicial system, and
the constitutionally suspect “extreme remedy” of proscribing prolific
petitioners entirely. The heart of the Article commences in Part III, which
recounts in detail the origins of, debate over, and ultimate institutionalization
of Martin directives effecting a similar remedy in the Supreme Court, leading
to the current legal regime, which is reviewed substantively and statistically
in Part IV. Part V then undertakes the reexamination of these holdings that
is so ripe, reweighing the arguments for and against in light of reason and
experience over the last twenty-five years.
Ultimately, the Article concludes that ensuring both the appearance and
reality of evenhanded treatment of rich and poor alike outweighs other
considerations, and thus that Martin directives are ill-advised at best. This
conclusion is of course contrary to the resolution reached by the Supreme
Court in Martin and its predecessor cases.9 It is noteworthy, however, that
Martin has no progeny substantively addressing its continuing cogency: this
is presumably because a litigant seeking to challenge a Martin directive
would be barred by the directive itself from filing any such challenge.10
Besides illustrating the presumably unintended consequences of Martin
directives, that paradox also commends the subject to legal scholarship, for
if scholars do not engage with Martin then no one will.11 Yet academia has
afforded scant attention to Martin directives—and no article has appeared
since a student comment by Cristina Lane some fifteen years ago.12 Given
Martin’s continuing entrenchment in that time, it would become the Court to
revisit the wisdom of this catch-22 to ensure at least that the Court itself still
believes its application of Martin to be good law.13
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 38 Side B
10/23/2018 13:43:40

9. See cases cited infra note 298.
10. See Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
11. Cf. Cristina Lane, Comment, Pay Up or Shut Up: The Supreme Court’s Prospective
Denial of In Forma Pauperis Petitions, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 335, 365–66 (2003) (noting that if the
Court does not sua sponte change direction, only Congress has the ability to supersede the practice).
12. See Lane, supra note 11; see also Stephen L. Wasby, Note, A Follow-up on Judicial
Responses to One-person “Litigation Explosions” (or Can Frequent Filers Be Made to Fly Away?),
18 JUSTICE SYS. J. 94 (1995) [hereinafter Wasby 1995] (reviewing the Supreme Court and lower
court cases prior to the advent of “Martin directives”); Stephen J. Wasby, Note, Judicial Responses
to One-Person “Litigation Explosions,” 14 JUSTICE SYS. J. 113 (1990) [hereinafter Wasby 1990]
(same). By no means is reproach intended to the quality of these works: they are excellent
treatments of the issues at stake, and this Article refers to them often. Nonetheless, the Court’s
increasing reliance on “Martin directives” has only become apparent in the intervening fifteen
years. See infra Part IV.
13. See Attwood v. Singletary, 516 U.S. 297, 298 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) (quoting Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting)), quoted
infra note 696.
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a concern
for one’s own safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the
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I. The American Imperative of Access to the Courthouse
The abrogation by the government of King George III of the nascent
American people’s right to trial by jury was one of the “injuries and
usurpations” enumerated in the Declaration of Independence.14 The
revolutionaries reckoned that the British monarchy had systematically
obstructed and corrupted the judicial system and its common law in service
of “absolute Tyranny.”15 Thus in formulating their own basic law, the
framers of the Constitution guaranteed the right to trial by jury in criminal
matters,16 and those of the Bill of Rights clarified that the right inhered in
both criminal and civil cases.17 At the dawn of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court branded the right of access to the courts as the bulwark
against Hobbesian anarchy and fundamental to the commonwealth itself:
“The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an
organized society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the
foundation of orderly government.”18 Nor is this right formalistic or

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 39 Side A
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process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to
do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have
to fly more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he
didn’t, but if he was sane, he had to fly them. If he flew them, he was crazy and
didn’t have to; but if he didn’t want to, he was sane and had to. Yossarian was
moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let
out a respectful whistle. “That’s some catch, that Catch-22,” he observed. “It’s
the best there is,” Doc Daneeka agreed.
Cf. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 at 46 (1961)
14. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries
and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute
Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid
world. . . . He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to
our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts
of pretended Legislation: . . . For depriving us in many cases, of the benefit of
Trial by Jury.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 15, 20 (U.S. 1776).
15. Id. at paras. 2, 10, 11, 22 (“He has obstructed the Administration of Justice by refusing
his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers. He has made Judges dependent on his Will
alone for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries. . . . For abolishing
the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary
government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument
for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies.”); see also Daniel Jacob Hemel & Eric
A. Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice (July 18, 2017). 106 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004876 (discussing British obstruction of American courts).
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed . . . .”).
17. U.S. CONST. amends. XI, XII.
18. Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); accord César
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Op-Ed., Keep ICE Arrests Out of Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
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nominal: American jurisprudence has long sought—indeed, demanded—
that all subject to its jurisdiction enjoy a meaningful opportunity to obtain
effective relief in its courts.19

A. Of Princes and Paupers
The objective of universal access cannot be realized when fees are
required for filings.20 Inevitably, the more impecunious of society will lack
the means to meet such fees; this may be literally true for the truly destitute,
or prudentially so for those with some income but inadequate means to
encompass court fees in addition the bare necessities of life.21 Absent some
accommodation by the judicial system,22 the natural outcome would then be
to bifurcate the body politic into moieties by their material wealth:23 Princes

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 39 Side B
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2017, at A23 (quoting Chambers); see Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1070–71
(1985); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374–377 (1971); cf. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
ch. 13 (1651) (“Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to
keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of
every man, against every man.”).
19. See, e.g., Talamini, 470 U.S. at 1070–71; Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors,
473 U.S. 305, 335 (1985); Bill Johnson’s Rest., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983); Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
20. See Robert S. Catz & Thad M. Guyer, Federal In Forma Pauperis Litigation: In Search
of Judicial Standards, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 655, 685 (1978) (“The principle of equality before the
law requires the courts to afford everyone an opportunity to be heard. Yet frequently the
meritorious claims of indigents are neither fully adjudicated nor vindicated, due to the costs and
expenses of litigation. Only by eliminating expensive and unnecessary barriers to litigation can
indigents be assured justice.”); e.g., Campbell v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 23 Wis. 490, 490-91 (1868)
(dismissing for lack of financial ability to lodge security).
21. We cannot agree with the court below that one must be absolutely destitute to enjoy
the benefit of the statute. We think an affidavit is sufficient which states that one
cannot because of his poverty “pay or give security for the costs . . . and still be able
to provide” himself and dependents “with the necessities of life.” To say that no
persons are entitled to the statute’s benefits until they have sworn to contribute to
payment of costs, the last dollar they have or can get, and thus make themselves and
their dependents wholly destitute, would be to construe the statute in a way that
would throw its beneficiaries into the category of public charges. The public would
not be profited if relieved of paying costs of a particular litigation only to have
imposed on it the expense of supporting the person thereby made an object of public
support. Nor does the result seem more desirable if the effect of this statutory
interpretation is to force a litigant to abandon what may be a meritorious claim in
order to spare himself complete destitution. We think a construction of the statute
achieving such consequences is an inadmissible one.
See Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 (1948)
22. Cf. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One’s Rights—Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1166 (1973) (“But judicial relief from
equipage costs must, most clearly for civil plaintiffs but as well for civil defendants, take the
‘affirmative’ form of requiring the state to undertake some combination of subsidizing the
indigent’s litigation costs and substantially restructuring its judicial system.”).
23. See Ben C. Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1270, 1270
(1966) (“In short, this bill presents the question whether this Government, having established courts
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who enjoy access to the legal system at their own initiative, and paupers
whose only encounter with the courts will be when they are haled in by the
government or their better-heeled compatriots.24 Although much wealthbased inequality has been accepted throughout American history—indeed,
early courts expressed moral disapprobation of indigents25—public policy
has rightly recoiled from so stark a reification of the prerogatives of
affluence.26 The Supreme Court has averred that the government may not
afford the affluent access categorically unavailable to the indigent by means
of fees or assessments,27 describing this “‘flat prohibition’ of ‘bolted doors’”
to the courthouse as being “securely established.”28
The framework of the in forma pauperis system, codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, serves as the backbone of the federal government’s accommodation
of this dilemma.29 Yet despite the centrality of the courts to American
values, Congress did not act to provide for indigent access until 1892,30
playing catch-up to the many states that had already provided the
impoverished with access to state courts.31 Fittingly, the House of
Representatives invoked lofty principles in its debate on the new law: “Will
the Government allow its courts to be practically closed to its own citizens,
who are conceded to have valid and just rights, because they happen to be

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 40 Side A
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to do justice to litigants, will admit the wealthy and deny the poor entrance to them . . . .”) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1892)).
24. Duniway, supra note 23; see also Michelman, supra note 22, at 1163. One is reminded
of an old quip about Dublin: “[T]he River Liffey . . . historically has divided the wealthy, cultivated
south side of the town from the poorer, cruder north side. While there’s plenty of culture above the
river, even today ‘the north’ is considered rougher and less safe. Dubliners joke that north-side
residents are known as ‘the accused,’ while residents on the south side are addressed as ‘your
honor.’” RICK STEVE & PAT O’CONNOR, RICK STEVE’S SNAPSHOT DUBLIN 14–15 (2014).
25. See infra notes 596–601 and accompanying text.
26. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110–12 (1996); Adkins, 335 U.S. at 338–40; Duniway,
supra note 23, at 1270–72.
27. See, e.g., M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 110–12; Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 607 (1974); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16–20 (1956).
28. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 110–112.
29. See In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he ‘In Forma Pauperis’ statute,
was enacted specifically to provide poor persons with equal access to the federal courts.”); see
generally Stephen F. Feldman, Indigents in the Federal Courts: The In Forma Pauperis Statute–
Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 413 (1985); Kenneth R. Levine, Comment, In Forma
Pauperis Litigants: Witness Fees and Expenses in Civil Actions, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461 (1984);
Catz & Guyer, supra note 20; Duniway, supra note 23.
30. Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252; see Feldman, supra note 29, at 413; Catz &
Guyer, supra note 20, at 657.
31. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 314–15 (1989) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (also quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., 1–2 (1892)).
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without the money to advance pay to the tribunals of justice?”32 Yet it took
some time for Congress to sort out the details: The in forma pauperis system
was revised repeatedly, in 1910, 1922, 1949, 1951, and 1959, to allow for
incrementally greater access to the courts, first expanding the right of access
to defendants and criminal actions, then waiving appellate fees, then the
costs of printing the record for appeal, and finally allowing any indigent
person (not merely citizens) the benefit of the system.33 Until recently,34 the
legislative history of the modern statute thus reflects its expansion to allow
ever-greater participation in the judicial system.35
As presently framed, the statute’s mandate is both expansive and
straightforward:
[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or
proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without
prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits
an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner
possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give
security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the
action, defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person is
entitled to redress.36

10/23/2018 13:43:40

32. H.R. REP. NO. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1892); see Feldman, supra note 29, at 413–
14 n.5 (quoting the House report).
33. See Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 657–59 (discussing the legislative evolution of the
in forma pauperis system); Duniway, supra note 23, at 1272–76 (same).
34. See infra Parts I-B & II-A (describing tightened provisions introduced by the Prisoner
Litigation Reform Act).
35. See Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 657 (attributing the succession of loosening
amendments to combatting restrictive interpretations of the 1892 Act’s scope).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1996).
37. Id. § 1915(d).
38. Id. § 1915(c).
39. See Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 659–61.

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 40 Side B

The statute goes on to provide that once a suit is so authorized, the
officers of the court will serve the indigent litigant’s process and “perform
all duties in such cases,”37 and that a court may direct the United States to
pay the costs of any required appellate record,38 thus accounting for
additional basic costs of participation in the legal system not strictly
characterizable as court fees or security.39
Taken literally, the statutory language is permissive rather than
obligatory, affording courts discretion to waive judicial costs and fees
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according to their best judgment.40 Yet interpreting New York’s equally
permissive in forma pauperis law only two years after the passage of its
federal counterpart, the state court of common pleas reasoned:
Is it discretionary with the court to accord or to refuse a plaintiff
the liberty of suing as a poor person when he conforms to the
prescribed conditions? True, the language of the Code is that “the
court may admit him to prosecute as a poor person;” but it is the
settled rule of construction that when, by permissive words, power
is conferred on an officer for the benefit of the public or third
persons, “may” means “must,” and power is the equivalent of
duty.41
This is consistent with the role of § 1915 as a remedial statute, passed
“for the benefit of the public.”42 Moreover, the state court’s views are
instructive because the federal statute was expressly intended “to give federal
courts the same authority to allow in forma pauperis actions that the courts
in the most progressive States exercised.”43 This formulation casts in forma
pauperis status as an entitlement or right rather than a discretionary
privilege.44 Yet federal judges have proven notably reluctant to adopt this
reading.45 The Fifth Circuit in 1935 described it as a “statute of grace,” even
whilst admitting somewhat begrudgingly that it “extends to those embraced
in it, but only to those, the privilege of prosecuting, without paying or
securing the costs, appeals which are substantially meritorious, and which,
because of the appellant’s poverty, could not be prosecuted if bond or
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 41 Side A
10/23/2018 13:43:40

40. See E. Elizabeth Summers, Proceeding in Forma Pauperis in Federal Court: Can
Corporations Be Poor “Persons”?, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 219, 225 (1974); see also Feldman, supra
note 29, at 424 (“Section 1915(a) states that a court ‘may,’ not ‘shall,’ authorize an applicant to
proceed in forma pauperis if he or she is financially eligible.”).
41. Shapiro v. Burns, 27 N.Y.S. 980 (Com. Pl. 1894).
42. Id.; see Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 663 (“Moreover, the federal courts recognized
very early that Congress intended the first federal in forma pauperis statute as a remedial measure.
Given its remedial purpose, section 1915 should be liberally construed, according to the ancient
and fundamental rule of statutory construction.”).
43. Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 314–15 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
44. See generally Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 662–63 (Part III: “The Legal Nature of In
Forma Pauperis: ‘Right versus Privilege’ Distinction”).
45. See id. at 662 (“Many courts have justified denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis
by characterizing it as a privilege rather than a right.”) (citing cases); Duniway, supra note 23, at
1277–80 (“[T]he accepted doctrine [is] that the litigant does not have a right to proceed in forma
pauperis, but only a privilege to do so.”).
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security were required.”46 Other appellate panels have expressed similar
views that in forma pauperis status is “not a right but a privilege the granting
of which is within the discretion of the court to which the application is
made” in affirming denials of in forma pauperis applications.47 Like the
Fifth Circuit, however, these cases recite the privilege-not-right rubric in
dismissing based on the applicant’s unsuitability under the statute itself, not
in arbitrarily rejecting a qualified applicant.48
The proper perspective, then, is that the privilege-not-right language
used by the lower courts is more semantic than substantive.49 In any event,
the Supreme Court had discouraged such grudgingness anent in forma
pauperis status in 1948 with Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co.50
Whilst affording a “limited judicial discretion in the grant or denial of the
right” to preclude wholly meritless filings,51 the Court repeatedly described
the statute as affording a right to the litigant that could not be gainsaid if the
statute was complied with.52 Some commentators have described Adkins as
more ambivalent,53 and the Court’s use of the word “right” hardly controls,
but its holding that § 1915 vests in the indigent an affirmative entitlement is
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46. Boggan v. Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 79 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir. 1935) (citations
omitted).
47. In re Pierce, 246 F.2d 902, 903 (9th Cir. 1957); accord, e.g., Gomez v. United States, 245
F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 1957) (“Leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is a
privilege, not a right.”); Parsell v. United States, 218 F.2d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1955) (“An appeal in
forma pauperis is a privilege and not a right. Refusing to grant one the right thus to appeal does not
offend the requirements of due process.”); Higgins v. Steele, 195 F.2d 366, 367–68 (8th Cir. 1952)
(“Leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 is a privilege, not a right. An
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court . . . .”) (citations omitted); Clough v. Hunter, 191 F.2d 516, 518 (10th Cir. 1951) (“Assuming,
as appellant contends, that he was denied the right in the sentencing court to appeal in forma
pauperis, that did not make the remedy under Section 2255 inadequate. An appeal in forma
pauperis is a privilege and not a right. Refusing to grant one the right thus to appeal does not offend
the requirements of due process.”).
48. See cases cited supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
49. See Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 662–63.
50. Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1948); see Duniway, supra note
23, at 1280 (arguing same).
51. Adkins, 335 U.S. at 337.
52. Id. at 340 (“We do not think that this petitioner can be denied a right of appeal under the
statute . . . .”; “This case illustrates that such a restrictive interpretation of this statute might wholly
deprive one of several litigants of a right of appeal, even though he had a meritorious case and even
though his poverty made it impossible for him to pay or give security for costs.”); id. at 343
(“Section 3 of the statute specifically states that litigants who make affidavits of poverty shall be
entitled to the same court processes, have the same right to the attendance of witnesses, and the
same remedies as are provided by law in other cases.”).
53. E.g., Duniway, supra note 23, at 1282.
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unmistakable.54 As the Fifth Circuit conceded along with its sister circuits,
indigent litigants who fall within the statute are indeed entitled to its
forgiveness of fees.55 Contrarily, as will be discussed below in Part II, in
forma pauperis petitioners may (indeed must) be statutorily barred from
proceeding under § 1915 should their plea of poverty be false or their claims
be patently baseless, but they cannot be barred based solely on the caprice of
the court.56 What the privilege-not-right terminology forecloses is for courts
to extrastatutorily permit indigent litigants to proceed when they violate the
law’s minimal requirements.57
This approach avoids the constitutional problems that would
occasioned by taking a wholly discretionary view.58 Time and time again,
the Supreme Court has made clear that meaningful access to the courts is
indeed a right of broad constitutional dimension, drawing from numerous
clauses.59 In the early case of Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., the
Court held that states could not discriminate against citizens of other states
in access to their courts, relying on the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause.60 Several decisions stand for the principle that “the right of access
to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the
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54. See Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 662 n.40.
55. See Boggan v. Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 79 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir. 1935).
56. See infra Section II-A.
57. See Duniway, supra note 23, at 1279 (“Despite some pre-1892 cases which indicated a
judicial power to permit in forma pauperis proceedings, it soon became established dogma that
such proceedings are purely statutory and that the statute defines the limits of the benefits conferred.
Thus the courts deprived themselves of the opportunity to remedy any deficiencies in the statute
through case-by-case precedent.”); see also infra Part II-A (discussing framework for assessing
requirements).
58. Compare Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959) (indigent prisoners must be forgiven
docketing fees in appeals and habeas), and Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961), with Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974) (finding habeas indistinguishable for right of access
purposes from other constitutional claims); see also Jody L. Sturtz, A Prisoner’s Privilege to File
In Forma Pauperis Proceedings: May It Be Numerically Restricted?, 1995 DET. C.L. REV. 1349,
1351 (1995) (“Since a vast majority of inmates are indigent, the constitutional right to access would
be meaningless without the In Forma Pauperis Statute. Without these provisions, financial
obstacles would likely prevent a prisoner from filing suit. This monetary preclusion would raise
critical constitutional issues. An inmate’s fundamental constitutional right is closely connected
with the Federal In Forma Pauperis Statute.”).
59. See, e.g., Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause); Bill Johnson’s Rest., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983)
(First Amendment Petition Clause); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305,
335 (1985) (Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557
(1987) (Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576
(1974) (Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)
(same). But see also Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376–78 (noting that “this Court has seldom been asked
to view access to the courts as an element of due process”).
60. Chambers, 207 U.S. at 148.
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Government for redress of grievances.”61 The Court has also assessed
whether a court’s “process allows a claimant to make a meaningful
presentation” and thus comports with the Due Process Clause under the Fifth
Amendment62 and Fourteenth Amendment.63 The Court has reviewed state
court access as an equal protection issue under the Fourteenth Amendment.64
And it has specifically guaranteed plaintiffs access to courts if they would
have no other forum to lodge a claim.65 Reading the in forma pauperis
statute to allow courts untrammeled discretion to deny access to those who
could not otherwise pay would contravene this well-rooted right66—indeed,
one that is foundational to American society and democratic governance.67

B. Of Prison and Paupers
In practice, a palpable portion of in forma pauperis petitioners are
prisoners, which poses particularly perplexing pragmatic policy problems.68
Commentators and courts alike have observed rightly that just as with the
general populace,69 “[t]he right to have access to the courts is viewed as the
basis of all rights possessed by prisoners.”70 But how to vindicate that right
when their access is quite literally impeded by their incarceration?71 Given

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 42 Side B
10/23/2018 13:43:40

61. Bill Johnson’s Rest., Inc., 461 U.S. at 741; accord Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) and Ex
parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941)).
62. See Walters, 473 U.S. at 335.
63. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576–80; Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376–78.
64. Finley, 481 U.S. at 557.
65. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376–77.
66. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110–12 (1996); Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376–77; Smith
v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 16–20 (1956); see also Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 337–43
(1948) (limiting court discretion in view of the statute’s creation of an entitlement); Sturtz, supra
note 58, at 1351.
67. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 153 (1992) (“[T]he right to file a court action
might be said to be [a prisoner’s] remaining ‘most fundamental political right, because preservative
of all rights.’”) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)); Talamini v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1070–71 (1985); Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375–77; Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
68. See generally Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in
Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 519 (1996); Sturtz, supra note 58; James E. Doyle, The Court’s
Responsibility to the Inmate Litigant, 56 JUDICATURE 406, 412 (1973).
69. Chambers, 207 U.S. at 148.
70. Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1353; see id. at 1350 & nn.13–14 (citing 2 MICHAEL B.
MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 11.00, at 3 (2d ed. 1993)); McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 153 (quoting
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370).
71. Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1351 (“The problem then arises as to how an indigent,
unrepresented prisoner gains access to the federal courts.”).
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the proliferation of prisoner suits,72 and the important constitutional
questions implicated, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue often.73
First, in Ex parte Hull,74 a prison had repeatedly intercepted and obstructed
an inmate’s attempts to file a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, relying
on a regulation allowing the prison to screen all claims for proper form.75
The petitioner eventually managed to smuggle out copies of his attempted
filings, and the Court reproved the prison, confirming that the fundamental
right of access trumps even reasonable correctional regulations:
The regulation is invalid. The considerations that prompted its
formulation are not without merit, but the state and its officers
may not abridge or impair petitioner’s right to apply to a federal
court for a writ of habeas corpus. Whether a petition for writ of
habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is properly drawn and
what allegations it must contain are questions for that court alone
to determine.76
More reticulated constitutional protections than the barest ability to
transmit a filing followed apace. In Johnson v. Avery,77 another species of
regulation categorically forbade any inmate from assisting another in
preparing writs or other legal matters,78 and this too was struck down by the
Court as effectively disallowing access to the court79—though the Court did
allow the prison obviously has leeway in regulating how and when prisoners
took advice.80
To be sure, the early cases of Hull and Avery cited “the fundamental
importance of the writ of habeas corpus in our constitutional scheme” above
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 43 Side A
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72. See Procup v Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (en banc)
(“Recent years have witnessed an explosion of prisoner litigation in the federal courts.”); AbdulAkbar v. McKelvie, 239 F. 3d 307, 311–12 (3d. Cir. 2001).
73. See, e.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969);
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 539 (1974); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
355 (1996).
74. Hull, 312 U.S. at 548.
75. Id. at 547–49.
76. Id. at 549.
77. Johnson, 393 U.S. at 483.
78. Id. at 484–85.
79. Id. at 486–87 (affirming and quoting the district court’s conclusion that “[f]or all practical
purposes, if such prisoners cannot have the assistance of a ‘jail-house lawyer,’ their possibly valid
constitutional claims will never be heard in any court.”).
80. Id. at 488–900.
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and apart from judicial access generally.81 But the Court unanimously
extended Avery to all civil rights actions in Wolff v. McDonnell,82 holding
that the “right of access to the courts, upon which Avery was premised, is
founded in the Due Process Clause, and assures that no person will be denied
the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations
of fundamental constitutional rights.”83 Bounds v. Smith84 held prisons must
take affirmative steps to vindicate the general right of access, by providing
stationary, writing utensils, notarial services, and postage85—along with
well-stocked law libraries!86 Finally, Lewis v. Casey extended these rights
to prisoners’ claims that “challenge the conditions of their confinement.”87
As with those concerning indigents generally, these holdings call into
question lower courts’ privilege-not-right view of in forma pauperis status:
If prisons may not constitutionally restrict prisoners’ meaningful access to
justice (including providing libraries and notaries),88 it is difficult to believe
that a law effectively forbidding the courts entirely to such indigent prisoners
by means of an unpayable fee could possibly stand.89 Some commentators,
however, have intimated as much, resting on the traditional privilege-notright terminology.90 As will be discussed later, there is significant if not
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81. Johnson, 393 U.S. at 485–86 (noting cases finding unconstitutional the imposition of
filing fees or denial of transcripts in habeas cases).
82. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974).
83. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 577–80 (The Court simply could not distinguish the two in principle:
“First, the demarcation line between civil rights actions and habeas petitions is not always clear.
The Court has already recognized instances where the same constitutional rights might be redressed
under either form of relief. Second, while it is true that only in habeas actions may relief be granted
which will shorten the term of confinement, it is more pertinent that both actions serve to protect
basic constitutional rights.”) (citations omitted).
84. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
85. Id. at 824–25.
86. Id. at 828 (“We hold, therefore, that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the
courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal
papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law.”); accord Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
87. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996).
88. See cases cited supra note 73.
89. Compare Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959) (indigent prisoners must be forgiven
docketing fees in appeals and habeas), Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (same), and Bounds,
430 U.S. 817 (citing both), with Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974) (finding habeas
indistinguishable for right of access purposes from other constitutional claims).
90. See Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1360–61 (“The right to proceed in forma pauperis is statutory
and not constitutional in nature. There is no absolute right to proceed in forma pauperis in federal
court. The benefits extended by the In Forma Pauperis Statute are granted as a privilege and not as
a matter of right. Proceeding in forma pauperis is a statutory privilege extended to persons unable
to pay filing fees when the action is not frivolous or malicious. Since the right to proceed in forma
pauperis is statutory, Congress may amend the statute with more ease than would be the case if it
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irresoluble tension between Supreme Court decisions commanding
meaningful access for all indigent plaintiffs and the many lower court
decisions barring meaningful access based on a history of frivolous filings.91
In any event, Congress initially included prisoners as much as anyone
else within the ambit of the in forma pauperis statute.92 Nonetheless, in light
of the special difficulties attending prisoner lawsuits, Congress did
eventually amend § 1915 in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) to
create a sui generis payment regime for such suits.93 The required affidavit
of poverty must be supplemented with a copy of the prisoner’s institutional
trust fund account,94 in order that the prisoner be compelled to contribute to
the necessary fees according the resources available in that account:
(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a prisoner brings a civil
action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be
required to pay the full amount of a filing fee. The court shall
assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of any
court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent
of the greater of—
(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account; or
(B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for
the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint or notice of appeal.

10/23/2018 13:43:40

were a constitutional right. Even though the In Forma Pauperis Statute affects a prisoner’s right to
access, which is a constitutional right, Congress may limit prisoner use of the statute without
completely denying such persons this constitutional right. What Congress created Congress may
limit or eliminate.”).
91. See infra Part II-B-3.
92. See Doyle, supra note 68, at 407 (discussing application to prisoners prior to PLRA);
Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1351 (same).
93. Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); see Abdul-Akbar v.
McKelvie, 239 F. 3d 307, 311–12 (3d. Cir. 2001); Joshua D. Franklin, Three Strikes and You’re
Out of Constitutional Rights—The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Three Strikes Provision and Its
Effect on Indigents, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 191 (2000).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) (West 1996).
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from the prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court each time the
amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.
(3) In no event shall the filing fee collected exceed the amount of
fees permitted by statute for the commencement of a civil action
or an appeal of a civil action or criminal judgment.
(4) In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil
action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that
the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial
partial filing fee.95

10/23/2018 13:43:40

95. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
96. See Franklin, supra note 93, at 204.
97. See supra note 89 and accompanying text; cf. Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1351. That said,
a separate provision added by the PLRA to address prolific prisoner petitioners may indeed raise
serious constitutional concerns. See infra Section II-B.
98. Newman, supra note 68.
99. Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321; see Newman, supra note 68,
at 522–23.
100. Newman, supra note 68, at 519–20 & n.2.
101. Id. at 520–22. Judge Newman also readily debunked grossly inaccurate characterizations
of “the case where a prisoner is suing New York because his prison towels are white instead of his
preferred beige; and . . . the case where an inmate sued, claiming cruel and unusual punishment
because he received one jar of chunky and one jar of creamy peanut butter after ordering two jars
of chunky from the prison canteen.” Id.
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Although this regime places a higher burden on prisoners than other
indigent litigants, the safety valve provided at § 1915(b)(4) saves the
provision from potential constitutional infirmity:96 although contributions
are required if available even from the destitute, the lack thereof cannot
prevent a litigant from filing.97
Then-chief-judge of the Second Circuit Jon O. Newman provided a
thoughtful view of the importance of prisoner litigation in 1996,98 the same
year that Congress passed the PLRA seeking to curtail prisoner lawsuits.99
Whilst acknowledging that “nearly all are filed pro se, and the vast majority
are dismissed as frivolous,” Judge Newman could recite a lengthy roll of
“serious matters that pose[d] substantial issues” and “resulted in significant
victories.”100 The judge went on to debunk sensationalist accusations by
attorneys general of rampant ridiculous claims, quoting, for example, a New
York Times description of “the inmate who sued because there were no salad
bars or brunches on weekends and holidays,” who in fact challenged
“dangerously unhealthy prison conditions, not the lack of a salad bar.”101 All
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in all, Judge Newman was optimistic about the PLRA’s schema of asking in
forma pauperis prisoners to make some financial investment in their suits
whilst keeping the courthouse doors open to those who lack funds for even
a minor contribution, concluding that in any case, “courts will continue to
have the important task of looking through the ‘haystacks’ of prisoner
lawsuits for the ‘needles’ of meritorious prisoner claims.”102
Judge Newman’s attention to these claims has been echoed by other
sitting judges as well.103 The courts’ far-reaching solicitude to preserving
prisoners’ right of access to the courthouse underlines how fundamental that
right is to the American system.104 Even those who have duly forfeited their
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty itself after criminal
conviction do not thereby surrender their right to judicial review and relief,
the wellspring of all others.105

C. Of Pro Se and Pro Bono

10/23/2018 13:43:40

102. Newman, supra note 68, at 526–27.
103. See, e.g., Doyle, supra note 68.
104. Compare, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), with Chambers v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
105. See supra notes 69-70 accompanying text; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539,
555–56 (1974) (holding rights only forfeited in prison to the extent demanded by “exigencies of
the institutional environment”).
106. See Duniway, supra note 23, at 1274–75 (“An even more glaring weakness of the act is
that it makes no provision for actual payment of the miscellaneous expenses of litigation,” including
investigation and discovery); Michelman, supra note 22, at 1163; John MacArthur Maguire,
Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362 (1923); see also generally David Medine,
The Constitutional Right of Expert Assistance for Indigents in Civil Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 281
(1990) (expert witnesses); Levine, supra note 29, at 1463–70 (witness fees).
107. Levine, supra note 29, at 1464.
108. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(d) (West 1996).
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Of course, in forma pauperis system scarcely places the indigent
(whether imprisoned or not) and affluent on level playing field. Most
fundamentally, there are numerous miscellaneous outlays associated with the
proper prosecution or defense of litigation that do not fall within the neat
confines of the statute, including the costs of investigation, discovery, and
fees payable to witnesses both lay and expert.106 To take witness fees as an
example: a note by Kenneth R. Levine observes that, absent such fees’
payment, “witnesses are not required, nor may they be able, to attend the
trial. As a result, impoverished civil litigants may be given access to the
courts by § 1915 only to have their claims dismissed because they cannot
afford to bring along their evidence.”107 This outcome is perverse given the
statute elsewhere prescribes that “witnesses shall attend as in other cases.”108
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Levine argues persuasively that some combination of that prescription and
the court’s authority to order the attendance of witnesses under the Federal
Rules allow the in forma pauperis litigant to avoid payment of fees,109 but
acknowledges that the near-universal consensus of courts is to the
contrary.110
Those poor enough to qualify as indigent will not have funds for a
lawyer either, and thus will often depend on pro bono counsel if they are to
have counsel at all.111 The in forma pauperis statute contemplates that a
judge might “request” counsel to represent the indigent litigant,112 but the
Supreme Court has squarely held that courts cannot thereby compel counsel
to serve in like manner as in other appointments.113 As the case illustrates,
lawyers who are busy or profess to lack the proper “training or temperament”
may well decline to take on indigent applicants absent compulsion,114
notwithstanding the profession’s ethical duty to provide pro bono
representation.115 Responding to this conundrum, commentators early on
opined that “Congress should provide for mandatory appointed counsel for
any in forma pauperis plaintiff—whether a prisoner or not—whose
complaint is not frivolous,” so that “an indigent plaintiff would actually have
a reasonable chance for success on the merits of a meritorious claim.”116
Congress, however, has not done so in the thirty years since the suggestion
was offered.117
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109. Levine, supra note 29, at 1470–81.
110. Id. at 1467–68 n.26 (“Courts have nearly unanimously held that the term ‘fees and costs’
does not encompass witness fees and expenses.”) (expansively citing and discussing cases); but see
id. at 1472 (discussing, as a notable exception, U.S. Marshals Serv. v. Means, 741 F.2d 1053, 1057–
60 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc)).
111. See Duniway, supra 23, at 1274 (“[T]he act made no provision for compensation of
counsel; nor does it make such a provision today.”); Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 684
(“Indigents have no monopoly on malicious or frivolous actions, although they do have a virtual
monopoly on being unrepresented by counsel.”).
112. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(1) (“The court may request an attorney to represent any person
unable to afford counsel.”).
113. Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. Of Ia., 490 U.S. 296, 301–08 (1989).
114. Id. at 299–300.
115. Id. at 310 (observing that “lawyers’ ethical obligation to volunteer their time and skills
pro bono publico is manifest”); accord id. at 310-11 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Lawyers also have
obligations by virtue of their special status as officers of the court. Accepting a court’s request to
represent the indigent is one of those traditional obligations.”).
116. Feldman, supra note 29, at 437; see also Duniway, supra note 23, at 1274 (“The provision
for counsel is less than adequate.”).
117. The four-justice dissent in Mallard, of course, was of the opinion that Congress had quite
clearly provided for compelling attorneys to serve under the in forma pauperis statute absent good
reason. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 315–16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is evident that the drafters of this
statute understood these terms to impose similar obligations and simply assumed that members of
our profession would perform their assigned tasks when requested to do so by the court.”); id. at
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Poor litigants might also find counsel to represent them on a
contingency basis (and to pay needful expenses, obviating the need for the
statute), but such representation will depend on the financial return expected
from their claims, which does not necessarily correlate with merit.118 A poor
defendant, moreover, can anticipate no judgment with which to compensate
counsel, and must choose between pro se and default if no pro bono counsel
appears.119 True, there are fee-shifting measures like those under the Equal
Access to Justice Act,120 which provide for awarding fees and costs to certain
parties prevailing against the government, allowing litigants and their
counsel to be compensated for the outlays made in demonstrably meritorious
actions.121 As the statute’s name suggests, its purpose is to provide a further
measure of equal opportunity to all litigants, regardless of their financial
means,122 in part by attracting competent counsel to deserving but unfunded
causes.123 Yet there are countervailing pitfalls as well: Counsel may be wary
of taking on an in forma pauperis matter, as the statute expressly provides
that the United States cannot be assessed for costs even under ordinary feeshifting rules.124
Needless to say, a litigant lacking pro bono or contingency counsel and
compelled to proceed pro se is at a severe disadvantage to an adversary with
experienced representation.125 Many commentators and courts have
adverted to the burdens placed on both the litigant and courts when the
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317 (“In context, I would therefore construe the word ‘request’ in § 1915([e]) as meaning
‘respectfully command.’ If that is not what Congress intended, the statute is virtually
meaningless.”).
118. See generally Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The
Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, a History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 (1998);
Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under the Equal Access to Justice Act: A Qualified Success, 11 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 458, 464 (1993); cf. Duniway, supra note 23, at 1285 (“The poor plaintiff who
has a meritorious money or property claim can nearly always find a lawyer who will take his case
because of the almost universal use of the contingent fee to finance the litigation––and even the
litigant.”).
119. Duniway, supra note 23 (“The situation of a poor defendant with a meritorious defense
(unless he also has a good money cross-claim) is different. It may be that some defendants in federal
cases simply default because they cannot afford to litigate.”).
120. Act of Aug. 5. 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985).
121. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2011); see generally Krent, supra note 118.
122. See Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 883 (1989); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424
(1983).
123. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984) (discussing Hensley, 461 U.S. 424).
124. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(f)(1) (West 1996).
125. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 437–38 (1991); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832–
34 (1975); Doyle, supra note 68, at 410; Feldman, supra note 29, at 437; see generally Jona
Goldschmidt, How Are Courts Handling Pro Se Litigants?, 82 JUDICATURE 13 (1998).
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former proceeds both in forma pauperis and pro se.126 In one of its more
famous cases, Gideon w. Wainwright, the Supreme Court noted that a
“defendant’s need for a lawyer is nowhere better stated than in the moving
words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama” in 1932:127
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is
good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because
he does not know how to establish his innocence.128

10/23/2018 13:43:40

126. See Kay, 499 U.S. at 437–38; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832–34; Goldschmidt, supra note 125;
Doyle, supra note 68, at 410 (sitting judge detailing the issues occasioned by pro se prisoner
litigants).
127. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 334, 344 (1963).
128. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)).
129. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
130. Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-317, 36 Stat. 866 (1910); see Catz & Guyer, supra
note 20, at 657–58.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
132. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
133. Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 566 (1957) (per curiam); accord Ellis v. United
States, 356 U.S. 674, 674–75 (1958); see also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963)
(citing Johnson and Ellis in constitutional context). It is questionable, however, whether these per
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Apropos of Justice Sutherland’s words, it must be noted that much of
the preceding discussion contemplates a civil case; the Sixth Amendment
guarantees that defendants in criminal actions enjoy the assistance of
counsel.129 Strikingly, however, criminal defendants were excluded from the
in forma pauperis statute until the revisions of 1910.130 Similarly remarkable
is that the Amendment’s seemingly self-executing guarantee of a defendant’s
right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence”131 was not held to
entitle the indigent to counsel in all federal criminal trials until 1938.132 The
Supreme Court did not confirm a right to counsel on appeal until 1957,133
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even though provision for in forma pauperis appellate proceedings had
similarly been added in 1910.134 Nor was it until 1963 than the same basic
right to counsel was recognized via the Fourteenth Amendment in state
criminal proceedings, original135 and appellate.136 And even though an
attorney be guaranteed, the efficacy of legal representation may suffer from
chronic governmental understaffing and underfunding, despite the best
efforts of a dedicated corps of public defenders.137
Nonetheless, under the in forma pauperis regime, impoverished
litigants at least have their “day in court,” whatever their disadvantages be
against their adversaries.138 Failing the forgiveness of required fees, many
of society’s most needy would lack even that.139 The law cannot endow
everyone with equal resources to prosecute and defend their claims in a
nation of such disparate means, but it can at least ensure the courthouse doors
themselves are open to all.140

II. Pestersome Paupers in the Lower Courts
To be sure, the right of access to judicial process and the in forma
pauperis system no more affords indigents a prerogative to bring frivolous
or malicious actions than any other litigant.141 The risks of such actions are
at least nominally heightened for indigent litigants because they will not be
retarded by the requirement of putting their money where their mouth is,
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curiam decisions implicate constitutional grounds rather than statutory interpretation of the § 1915
entitlement, though the effect is largely the same. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to
Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1246–50 (2013).
134. Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-317, 36 Stat. 866 (1910); see Catz & Guyer, supra
note 20, at 658
135. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 334, 335 (1963).
136. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356–58. (1963)
137. See generally Emily Rose, Note, Speedy Trial as a Viable Challenge to Chronic
Underfunding in Indigent-Defense Systems, 113 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2014); David A. Simon, Equal
before the Law: Toward a Restoration of Gideon’s Promise, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 581
(2008); Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J. Schwartz, The Indigent Defense Crisis Is Chronic:
Balanced Allocation of Resources Is Needed to End the Constitutional Crisis, 9 CRIM. JUST. 13
(1994).
138. See Donald H. Zeigler & Michele G. Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of
Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 179, 212, 250–51 (1972); see also
In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 14 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139. Levine, supra note 29, at 1461 n.3; Maguire, supra note 106, at 362.
140. See supra Section I-A.
141. In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1982) (“No person, however, ‘. . . rich or poor,
is entitled to abuse the judicial process.’”) (quoting Hardwick v. Brinson, 523 F.2d 798, 800 (5th
Cir. 1975)); Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A) (same); see generally
Mary Van Vort, Controlling and Deterring Frivolous In Forma Pauperis Complaints, 55
FORDHAM L. REV. 1165 (1987).
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increasing the incentives to lodge any and every claim they might dream up,
regardless of merit.142 Anticipating these concerns, the in forma pauperis
statute provides recourse for courts confronting baseless claims to dispose of
them with expedition.143 Unfortunately, the lower courts—both state and
federal—have not uncommonly confronted so-called “prolific petitioners”
who are seen to strain the gratis system afforded them by sheer volume.144
When statutory mechanisms fail, courts have turned to their inherent powers
and the expansive All Writs Act to craft novel solutions to address the claims
of their most pestersome paupers.145

A. Statutory Mechanisms for Meritless Filings In Forma
Pauperis
Meritless in forma pauperis filings may be dismissed for failure to state
a claim, the same as any case;146 indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide several mechanisms for clarifying or disposing of fundamentally
incoherent complaints.147 But Congress was aware of the unusual potential
for abuse absent fees,148 and thus the in forma pauperis statute contemplates
a unique screening mechanism for all claims, under which the presiding
judge must make a peremptory evaluation of whether the stated allegations
merit consideration:149
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may
have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines that—
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or

10/23/2018 13:43:40

142. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069,
1071–72 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam); see also Van Vort, supra note 141, at 1180–81;
Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1362.
143. See infra Section II-A.
144. See Procup, 792 F.2d at 1071–72; see generally Wasby 1995, supra note 12; Wasby 1990,
supra note 12.
145. See infra Section II-B.
146. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see Lane, supra note 11, at 342–43.
147. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b), (c), (e) & (f).
148. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); see also Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie,
239 F.3d 307, 311–12 (3d. Cir. 2001) (specifically in prisoner context).
149. See Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1358–61; Feldman, supra note 29, at 415–23; Van Vort,
supra note 141, at 1167–79.
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(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.150

10/23/2018 13:43:40

150. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2) (1996).
151. See Feldman, supra note 29, at 415–23; Van Vort, supra note 141, at 1167–79.
152. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(d) (1994).
153. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27
(9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the history of the dismissal provision).
154. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 320–29; see Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1359–60 (discussing case).
155. Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321.
156. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27 (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.
1998)); see Gomez v. USAA Federal Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999).
157. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126.
158. Compare, e.g., id. at 1126–27, with Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir.
1999).
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Despite its simplicity, the details of executing the statute’s mechanism
have proven controversial.151 Originally, the provision employed the
familiar permissive language found elsewhere in the statute, allowing that a
court “may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if
satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious,” and omitted any mention
of preemptive screening for whether the claim was properly pled.152 In
Neitzke v. Williams, the Supreme Court thus found that the provision, as then
written, did not permit courts to dismiss indigent claims for failure to state a
claim.153 This mattered because the bar for dismissal under Federal Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim was higher than that for frivolousness
under § 1915(e).154 In passing the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996,155
however, Congress both replaced the permissive construction with the
current obligatory “shall” and added the clause at § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which
the lower courts have found “clear[ly] . . . not only permits but requires a
district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a
claim.”156 In doing so, it was equally clear that Congress intended to
supersede Neitzke and thus force the courts’ hand.157
Courts, therefore, must now sua sponte assess frivolousness,
maliciousness, and baselessness, but the question of how to do so has
occasioned a great variety of doctrine throughout the statute’s history.158 On
one end of the spectrum, the Ninth Circuit cautioned that dismissal of in
forma pauperis suits on grounds of frivolousness is proper only in the same
circumstances as would warrant sua sponte dismissal of a paying litigant’s
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suit without argument159—a high standard to meet.160 Representing the
other, the Eighth Circuit admonished the lower courts anent their liberal
allowances of meritless appeals:
We realize that the serious consideration which this Court has
given to appeals in forma pauperis in hopeless cases may have led
the District Judges in this Circuit to believe that such appeals
should be allowed with extreme liberality. We are now of the
opinion that much greater care should be taken in screening such
cases, in order to separate those which are clearly without merit
from those which are meritorious or which at least present some
substantial question worthy of consideration.161
Consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s philosophical evenhandedness are a
number of decisions questioning whether in forma pauperis litigants may be
granted leave to amend given a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Multiple
circuits have agreed in principle that “a pro se plaintiff who is proceeding in
forma pauperis should be afforded the same opportunity as a pro se fee-paid
plaintiff to amend his complaint prior to its dismissal for failure to state a
claim.”162 But Congress’s clear intention to enforce rigorous standards for
indigent litigants cannot be ignored either.163 If the process and standard for
dismissal is identical regardless of in forma pauperis status, the
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159. The District Court ‘may’ authorize the commencement of a civil action in forma
pauperis, and thereafter “may dismiss the case * * * if satisfied that the action is
frivolous.” It follows that the District Court was authorized to deny leave to
proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appeared from the face of the proposed
complaint that the action was frivolous. This authority is to be exercised with great
restraint, and generally only where it would be proper to dismiss the complaint sua
sponte before service of process if it were filed by one tendering the required fees.
Reece v. Washington, 310 F.2d 139, 141 (9th Cir. 1962) (citations omitted).
160. See Harmon v. Superior Court, 307 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1962) (cited in Reece, 310 F.2d at 140).
161. Higgins v. Steele, 195 F.2d 366, 369 (8th Cir. 1952).
162. Gomez, 171 F.3d at 796; see Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806
(10th Cir. 1999); see also Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (assuming leave
to amend is available); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same).
Contra Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114
F.3d 601, 612 (6th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit in Lopez provides a thorough discussion of these
cases and, after evaluating policy considerations, aligns itself with the majority. See Lopez, 203
F.3d at 1127–30.
163. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129 n.10 (“It is true that 1915(e)(2)’s provision for dismissal for
failure to state a claim itself penalizes indigent non-prisoner plaintiffs for the alleged abuses of
prisoner plaintiffs. However, Congress inserted 1915(e)(2) into the in forma pauperis statute, and
we must follow this clear statutory direction.”).
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particularized statutory language would be largely surplusage, in defiance of
the canon against superfluities.164
As is often the case, a middle-of-the-road approach is likely the best.165
Congress has now directed that courts proactively police the claims of in
forma pauperis litigants,166 presumably to expeditiously dispose of those
unquestionably meritless.167 If a filing can be saved by amendment from a
failure to state a claim, then the court retains discretion to permit such
amendment,168 and likely will.169 But claims that are wholly frivolous or
malicious, lacking even “an arguable basis in law or in fact,”170 can and must
be weeded out to prevent unwarranted burden on the court, fulfilling
Congress’s design.171 Whilst imposing some disparate treatment upon the
poor,172 it is hard to complain that those choosing to press utterly baseless
claims without the payment of fees are afforded no more attention than
necessary.173 If courts prove more likely to dismiss in forma pauperis claims
as frivolous than to do so sua sponte of paying claims, as the Ninth Circuit
feared,174 the disparity may well be the unfortunate but unavoidable result of
indigent claimants lacking the advice of counsel or the deterrent of filing
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164. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoting 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, 1, 181–86 (rev. 6th ed. 2000)); Mkt. Co. v. Hoffman, 101
U.S. 112, 115 (1879) (describing the canon as a “cardinal rule”).
165. Cf. Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1482–84 (8th Cir. 1996) (evaluating three options
regarding privilege––a “lenient,” “strict,” and “middle of the road” approach––and finding the
“middle test is best suited to achieving a fair result”).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see supra notes 149-157 and accompanying text.
167. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27; see also Higgins v. Steele, 195 F.2d 366, 369 (8th Cir.
1952) (expressing concerns prior to PLRA about overliberal allowance of in forma pauperis
proceedings).
168. Gomez v. USAA Federal Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999); see Perkins v.
Kansas Department of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999); see Feldman, supra note
29, at 430–32.
169. See Feldman, supra note 29, at 430–32.
170. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see Feldman, supra note 29, at 431–32.
171. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127–30.
172. See Van Vort, supra note 141, at 1169–71.
173. See id.; Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1361–68.
174. See Reece v. Washington, 310 F.2d 139, 141 (9th Cir. 1962).
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fees.175 No litigant, rich or poor, is entitled to long maintain a patently
groundless claim.176

B. The Predicament Presented by Prolific Petitioners
Most in forma pauperis litigants can be and are duly accommodated by
the expedited statutory regime contemplated by § 1915(e).177 But there has
long been a distinct class of litigants sometimes denominated prolific
petitioners (or, more drolly, “frequent filers”178), who file dozens or even
hundreds of petitions with the courts seeking redress of dubious injuries, and
who pose a more perplexing predicament to the judiciary.179 In 1981, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals described one Reverend Clovis Carl Green Jr.
as “in all likelihood the most prolific prisoner litigant in recorded history,”
tallying as many as seven hundred filings amongst various state and federal
courts.180 Another circuit court of appeals named him the “instigator of
hundreds of frivolous and malicious pro se actions.”181 And the New York
Times’s doyenne of Supreme Court coverage, Linda Greenhouse,182 called
him a “specter haunting American courts.”183
1. Initial Judicial Responses to Prolific Petitioners
The varying responses of the courts importuned by Reverend Green
provide a survey of early judicial responses to the problem posed by prolific
petitioners. Given its jurisdiction over the site of Reverend Green’s

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 49 Side B
10/23/2018 13:43:40

175. See supra Section I-C; e.g., In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445–46 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting the
uniform frivolity of the petitioners’ filings dismissed theretofore); see also, e.g., In re McDonald,
489 U.S. 180, 180–82 nn.1–5 (1989) (per curiam) (noting same of petitions for certiorari and
extraordinary writs).
176. In re Oliver, 682 F.2d at 446 (“No person, however, ‘. . . rich or poor, is entitled to abuse
the judicial process.’”) (quoting Hardwick v. Brinson, 523 F.2d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 1975)); Green
v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A) (same).
177. See Lane, supra note 11, at 341–43.
178. Wasby 1995, supra note 12, at 94, 95, 97.
179. See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071–72 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per
curiam); see generally Wasby 1995, supra note 12; Wasby 1990, supra note 12.
180. In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
181. Green, 649 F.2d at 287.
182. See Linda Greenhouse, 2,691 Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at WK1.
Greenhouse covered the court for thirty years, spanning the mentioned 2,691 decisions, wrote
nearly 3000 articles, and won the Pulitzer Prize before her retirement in 2008, a celebration for
which seven of the sitting Supreme Court judges attended. See id.; Tony Mauro, A Goodbye for
Greenhouse, BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES, (June 12, 2008), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/
blt/2008/06/goodbye-to-gree.html.
183. Linda Greenhouse, Paper Siege by Prisoner Provokes Ire, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1983. The
comment on flinching, of course, is presumably artistic license.
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imprisonment, the Missouri State Penitentiary, the Eighth Circuit provides
the most thorough tour.184 In 1978, it confronted an appeal of a conviction
for criminal contempt in that Green violated an injunction against his
assisting fellow inmates in making their own frivolous filings.185 The court
of appeals recognized that Johnson v. Avery protected such conduct
generally,186 but found the injunction tailored to discipline Green as one
might any other practitioner of law,187 “an inveterate writ writer for his own
benefit and for the benefit of other convicts from whom he receives fees for
his services.”188 In entering the injunction, the district court had found that
Green “engaged in a flagrant and gross abuse of the judicial process, that he
repeatedly files frivolous and harassive lawsuits, that he has deliberately and
intentionally deceived this Court with respect to his financial status, that he
fails to follow the rules and procedures of the Court in filing actions.”189 The
Eight Circuit agreed, and affirmed the contempt conviction.190
The following year, the Eighth Circuit convened en banc to consider
what to do about Green.191 Green had filed a striking sixty-six petitions for
writ of mandamus over the course of the year, all of which had been patently
frivolous,192 and the district judge charged with addressing Green’s filings
had lodged an earnest plea to the court of appeals to afford him some relief,
explaining that the court simply could not handle the volume of Green’s
filings.193 The court of appeals barred Green from further mandamus filings
on the same subject as the sixty-six already filed, and advised the district
court to dismiss in forma pauperis claims that were facially frivolous, as well
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184. See, e.g., In re Green, 586 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Green, 598 F.2d 1126 (8th
Cir. 1979) (en banc); Green v. White (In re Green), 616 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
185. In re Green, 586 F.2d at 1247.
186. Id. at 1251.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1249.
189. In re Green, 586 F.2d at 1250 (quoting Green v. Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732, 743 (W.D.
Mo.1976)).
190. Id. at 1253.
191. Id. at 1127.
192. Id. at 1127–28.
193. Id. (“Green has continued to abuse the judicial process at all levels of the state and federal
judiciary. That abuse of the judicial process has now become critical. It is now approaching the
point that the time and resources of several judicial officers, both on the trial and appellate level,
are substantially engaged in the processing of Green’s cases. In light of the size of our criminal
and civil dockets, we cannot afford to expend this amount of judicial effort in processing the
litigation of one person. Quite frankly we do not have the judicial resources to give Green
immediate service upon the myriad of matters which he raises in this court by way of his unending
flow of paper.”).
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194. In re Green, 586 F.2d at 1128.
195. Id. at 1127.
196. Green v. White (In re Green), 616 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
197. Id. at 1055.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1056.
201. In re Green, 598 F.2d at 1127.
202. See, e.g., Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A); In re Green, 669 F.2d
779 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
203. In re Green, 669 F.2d at 780–81, 784–85.
204. Id. at 781.
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as any cumulative claims recapitulating those already filed.194 In crafting
this narrowly tailored remedy, the court reaffirmed that “[i]t is axiomatic that
no petitioner or person shall ever be denied his right to the processes of the
court.”195
But the Eighth Circuit returned to the Reverend Green yet again a year
later in 1980, as he had persisted obstinately in his importunities.196 In
desperation, the district court had entered an order under the All Writs Act
enjoining Green from filing in forma pauperis at all.197 The court of appeals
held the district court had gone too far, and thus required the “deletion of the
requirement that the petitioner pay a filing fee with every writ, petition or
complaint or motion he files and that enjoins him from ever proceeding in
forma pauperis.”198 The court did, however, “severely limit” Green’s future
in forma pauperis filings, limiting them to those that “specifically allege
constitutional deprivation by reason of physical harm or threats thereof to
petitioner’s person.”199 The other aspects of the order, requiring Green to
list any previous filings on the same subject and verify all pleadings, were
upheld.200 In the end, Green’s recognized “right to the processes of the
court” was trimmed to a narrow set of causes of action—but not wholly
eliminated.201
By 1981, other circuits too had been driven to curtail the Reverend
Green’s access to the courts in response to the deluge.202 The D.C. Circuit
confronted orders entered by similarly desperate district courts: one that had
directed its clerk not to accept any further filings at all, and another that
prohibited in forma pauperis filings and required a fee uniformly.203 Whilst
sympathizing with the need to curb Green’s “flagrant and serious abuse,” the
court of appeals nonetheless found such punitive measures to “violate
Green’s statutory and constitutional rights of access to the courts” and
vacated them.204 This was because:
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[T]he court has in effect entered a conclusive presumption that
anything Green submits to the district court will be duplicative,
frivolous or malicious. While methods that other courts have
employed to deter Green from continuing to harass them amount
in effect to rebuttable presumptions that Green is submitting
papers in bad faith, those orders have left the courthouse door ajar,
if only slightly.205
Instead, the court of appeals ordered that Green must in future seek
leave of the court to make any filing, and certify the claims lodged were
novel, on penalty of contempt if the certification proved false.206 Calling
even this lesser penalty “severe,” the court nevertheless concluded that only
the threat of further incarceration via contempt conviction could deter Green
whilst still observing his constitutional and statutory right of access via
feeless filing.207
By contrast, even whilst citing the D.C. Circuit’s measured
disposition,208 the Fifth Circuit instead mimicked the Eighth in drastically
restricting the Reverend Green’s ability to file in forma pauperis within its
jurisdiction, directing its own clerk to refuse to docket any such filings unless
they alleged “constitutional deprivation by reason of physical harm or threats
to petitioner’s person,” and allowing its district courts to do the same.209
There, however, the court relied on its “general supervisory power to control
its docket,” rather than the All Writs Act.210 Its reasoning was clear:
“Flagrant abuse of the judicial process can enable one person to preempt the
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205. In re Green, 669 F.2d at 785–86.
206. Id. at 787. The Seventh Circuit reached a very similar result when confronted with Green.
See Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 370 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring affidavit that claim is novel and
leave of court to file).
207. First, the order does not impose any financial restrictions that might operate to
preclude Green from filing a new and legitimate complaint. Green is free to seek to
proceed in the district court (and this court on appeal, if necessary) in forma
pauperis. However, Green must in each case satisfy, in addition to the terms of the
order, the requirements of section 1915. Second, Green is entitled to the processes
of the district court to file any claim upon a satisfactory demonstration of the novelty
of the claim and its bona fide nature. This condition is not at all onerous and
certainly does not interfere with Green’s right of access. In determining” whether a
claim Green wishes to raise is a new one, the district court shall employ traditional
notions of res judicata. Failure to certify that the claim has not been decided before
in any federal court or a false certification will render Green in violation of this order
and in contempt of court. Although the penalty for any further abuse of the
processes of this court is potentially substantial, the order does not preclude or even
unduly burden Green from submitting a new and nonfrivolous complaint.
In re Green, 669 F.2d at 787–88
208. Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A).
209. Id. at 287.
210. Id.
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use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider the meritorious
claims of other litigants,”211 and “others have honest claims upon our limited
capacities of time and judgment. The attention which Green’s spurious ones
have demanded insures that other claims of arguable merit must tarry.”212
Like the D.C. Circuit, however, the Fifth relied on the prospect of contempt
should Green persist in his attempts despite the injunction.213
To be sure, proscriptions have not been limited to the Reverend
Green.214 The Eleventh Circuit faced its own bête noir in the person of
prisoner Robert Procup, the proponent of over three hundred baseless
lawsuits.215 A beleaguered district court had enjoined Procup from bringing
any suits pro se, relying on the All Writs Act to require an attorney approve
a claim before the clerk would file it.216 This farfetched remedy was
ostensibly necessary because the court thought no other course—including
the precertification of the D.C. Circuit, or even drastic interdictions of the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits—could suffice.217 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
was unsparing: it found the injunction “overbroad,” noted that no other
circuit had gone so far, and concluded that the order’s:
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211. Green, 649 F.2d at 287.
212. Id. at 286.
213. Id. (“In the event that Green’s pattern continues, we commend the contempt sanction to
any panel upon which he seeks to impose.”).
214. The short survey here should not be construed to imply there have not been many other
decisions addressing prolific petitioners. E.g., In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1982); Peck v.
Hoff, 660 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1981); Gordon v. United States Department of Justice, 558 F.2d 618
(1st Cir. 1977); see, e.g., Wasby 1995, supra note 12, at 96–98 (discussing cases); Wasby 1990,
supra note 12, at 113–16 (same).
215. Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 150–151 (M.D. Fla. 1983), rev’d, 760 F.2d 1107
(11th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam).
216. Procup, 567 F. Supp. at 160–61.
217. See id. at 159–160 (considering and rejecting verification under penalty of contempt,
limitation to constitutional claims of harm, and plenary judicial preapproval).
218. Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 792
F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam).
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[U]nlimited scope denies Procup adequate, effective, and
meaningful access to the courts. Moreover, inherent in a judicial
ruling which completely forecloses an individual’s pro se access
to federal court is an ominous abandonment of judicial
responsibility, the import of which far exceeds the actual abuse
attributable even to the exceptional prisoner litigant. The efficient
operation of our judicial system does not require the issuance of
an unlimited restriction on this pro se litigant’s access to the
courts.218

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 52 Side A

10/23/2018 13:43:40

SUNSHINE_MACROED TM FINAL 10.15 (DO NOT DELETE)

Fall 2018]

10/15/2018 7:58 PM

THE PUTATIVE PROBLEM OF PESTERSOME PAUPERS

87

That was not the final word, however. The court of appeals
reconsidered the case en banc and, whilst reaching the same result, stressed
that the district court had ample options to curtail Procup’s excesses.219 True,
“courts must carefully observe the fine line between legitimate restraints and
an impermissible restriction on a prisoner’s constitutional right of access to
the courts.”220 This left the district court with much latitude, however:
“Procup can be severely restricted as to what he may file and how he must
behave in his applications for judicial relief. He just cannot be completely
foreclosed from any access to the court.”221
For like reasons, other circuits have often forborne from absolutist
prohibitions in favor of requiring lesser measures such as prescreening or
leave of court to file.222 Likewise, in Cello-Whitney v. Hoover and In re
Tyler, district courts approved novel but well-targeted remedies restricting a
claimant to a certain number of in forma pauperis filings per month or year
(as well as precertification), neatly maintaining access as well as
constraining prolificacy.223 Tyler, moreover, did so whilst also allowing a
familiar exemption from the limit on annual filings in the event of an
allegation of imminent harm.224 This thoughtful approach has been approved
on appeal as well in the Tenth Circuit in Rubins v. Roetker.225
2. Prolific Petitioners After the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act

10/23/2018 13:43:40

219. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072–73. (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam).
220. Id. at 1072.
221. Id. at 1074.
222. See Procup, 567 F. Supp. 157–60 (surveying approaches), rev’d, 760 F.2d 1107 (11th
Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam).
223. Cello-Whitney v. Hoover, 769 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (three per year);
In re Tyler, 677 F. Supp. 1410, 1414 (D. Neb. 1987) (one per year); see Sturtz, supra note 58, at
1373–76 (discussing cases).
224. In re Tyler, 677 F. Supp. at 1414.
225. Rubins v. Roetker, 737 F. Supp. 1140, 1145 (D. Colo. 1990) (one per year), aff’d, 936
F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1991).
226. See generally Sturtz, supra note 58.
227. Id. at 1368–91, 1378.
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Aside from the courts themselves, commentators had suggested the
judiciary possessed the inherent power and indeed duty to curtail access to
prolific litigants who persisted in frivolous in forma pauperis filings.226 Jody
L. Sturtz endorsed a categorical three-per-year approach as a necessary evil
to combat the alleged reality that “courts can no longer control its [sic]
management of the ever increasing number of frivolous, meritless suits.”227
Faced with these burgeoning demands, Sturtz rejected case-by-case
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adjudication as unworkable and proponed a universal rule for all prisoners.228
As in many courts,229 the predicament presented by prolific prisoners was
framed as especially acute.230
Congress evidently agreed in drafting the PLRA, under which such
prisoners are subjected to categorically stringent treatment when seeking to
proceed in forma pauperis under § 1915 and prevailing precedent.231 The
most remarkable statutory mandate is provided in subsection (g), and
parallels some of the more extreme responses of courts prior to the PLRA’s
passage:232
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a
judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the
prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of
the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of
serious physical injury.233

10/23/2018 13:43:40

228. See Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1373–74.
229. See supra Section I-B.
230. See Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1377–79.
231. 141 CONG. REC. 14,570 (1995); see supra Section I-B.
232. Franklin, supra note 93, at 192 (“One of the more controversial changes to section 1915
was the addition of subsection 1915(g) . . . .”).
233. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (1996).
234. See id.
235. Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Green v. Carlson, 649
F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)).
236. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317–18 (3d. Cir. 2001); Rivera v. Allin,
144 F. 3d 719, 723–28 (11th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1998);
Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997).
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Congress thus far exceeded Sturtz’s recommendation, by imposing a
permanent ban on all future petitions once the threshold of three dismissals
was reached.234 But courts encountering this new provision found nothing
out of ordinary, observing that courts had “routinely revoked a prisoner’s
ability to proceed [in forma pauperis] after numerous dismissals,” pointing
to the saga of Reverend Green.235 Perhaps because of this history, the courts
thus found nothing constitutionally objectionable about a statute barring civil
access to the federal judiciary almost entirely.236 Indeed, the vanishingly
slender residual exception for claims involving “danger of serious physical
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injury”237 transparently evokes the similarly absolutist regimes approved by
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits.238 Yet such a bar would seemingly contravene
firmly established Supreme Court precedent.239
The Third Circuit in Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie provided particularly
creative reasoning in defense of the PLRA.240 There, the Third Circuit read
Supreme Court precedents to hold that due process demands only there be
some avenue for a prisoner to bring his claim.241 As the prisoner in question
could avail himself of the Delaware in forma pauperis statute, the court
found that barring access to the federal courts entirely would not preclude a
judicial hearing of his § 1983 complaint,242 and thus eschewed strict scrutiny
and reviewed the PLRA’s restriction only under rational basis review, which
it could easily pass.243 The court also expressed doubt that Abdul-Akbar’s
claim was in the “narrow category” of civil claims to be guaranteed access
to the courts.244
Yet the Abdul-Akbar dissent readily illustrated the failings of the
majority’s arguments.245 The claim at issue was manifestly constitutionally
grounded, protected under Supreme Court precedent.246 And the ability to
remove a state action to federal court (where it would be promptly dismissed
for lack of a filing fee) would afford the defendant effective immunity.247
Moreover, the constitutionality of a general federal statute cannot turn on the
happenstance of state law,248 a principle the Court has long recognized:249
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237. See Franklin, supra note 93, at 193.
238. See Green, 649 F.2d at 287; Green v. White (In re Green), 616 F.2d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir.
1980) (per curiam).
239. See generally Franklin, supra note 93.
240. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 317–23.
241. Id. at 317–18 (analyzing M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) and the “seminal case” of
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 301, 371, 382–383 (1971)).
242. Id. at 318.
243. Id. at 318–19.
244. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 317–18 (quoting M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 113 (1996)); see also
Asemani v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 797 F.3d 1069, 1076–77 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(quoting M.L.B.).
245. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 325–33 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 325–28 (“That these rights are fundamental to our constitutional system cannot be
gainsaid.”).
247. Id. at 330.
248. Id. at 329–30.
249. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394–95 (1971); Wayne
A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws and the Applicability of
Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 145–46 (2009) (discussing Court
cases that condemned “permitting federal rights to depend on state laws”); see also Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 28 n.2 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Bivens). But see Carlson, 446
U.S. at 23 (majority) (“The question whether respondent’s action for violations by federal officials
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what result were Abdul-Akbar incarcerated across the Delaware River in
Pennsylvania, where the state applied a parallel “three strikes limitation” on
in forma pauperis status, and thus no avenue existed?250 Upholding §
1915(g) would then deny prisoners any forum for their claims,251 in apparent
defiance of the Supreme Court’s precedents on the right of access.252 This
result is particularly jarring because the Third Circuit, in a case involving the
same prolific petitioner, had previously held such a bar unconstitutional—
until the PLRA endorsed it.253 The preponderance of appellate courts,
however, have upheld the PLRA against constitutional challenge, even the
Eleventh and D.C. Circuits.254
3. The Case for the Constitutionality of Access
The consensus in favor of § 1915(g) thus invites closer examination of
the constitutionality of access to the courtroom.255 The Third Circuit in
Abdul-Akbar rightly noted that the Supreme Court has classified certain
species of civil claims as not implicating the constitution right of access,
including bankruptcy filings and welfare benefit determinations.256 But
equally surely, the Court has made clear that the right to lodge a
constitutional claim, writ of habeas corpus, or suit challenging conditions of
confinement is protected under the due process clauses.257 It has held more
generally that a plaintiff has a right of access if there is no other forum in
which the claim can be lodged.258 And it has found that a fee that effectively
forbids an indigent litigant from filing infringes this right, notwithstanding
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of federal constitutional rights should be left to the vagaries of the laws of the several States admits
of only a negative answer in the absence of a contrary congressional resolution.”).
250. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 329–30 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
251. Id.
252. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577–80 (1974); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 374–377 (1971); see also Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1990).
253. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 319–20 (“While not expressly repudiating our holding in
Watson, [901 F.2d 329,] the majority nonetheless essentially holds that what the District Court was
then precluded from doing by the Constitution it is now required to do by statute.”).
254. See, e.g., id.; Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1998); Carson v.
Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997); Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719 (11th Cir. 1998);
Asemani v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 797 F.3d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But see Lyon
v. Kroll, 940 F. Supp. 1433 (S.D. Iowa 1996); Franklin, supra note 93, at 205–08 (discussing Lyon).
255. See generally Franklin, supra note 93.
256. Franklin, supra note 93 (citing United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1972) and
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973)). Critically, such claims are creatures solely of
statute rather than constitutional in nature.
257. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996); Wolff, 418 U. S. at 577–80 (1974); see generally
Franklin, supra note 93, at 200–01, 219.
258. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374–77 (1971).
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the court is technically available—if only the litigant (contrafactually) had
the funds to avail.259 All of this follows straightforwardly from the Court’s
view that without a real right of access to the courts to vindicate claims, no
other rights can have substance, and civil society itself is endangered.260
Indeed, while Sturtz robustly defended the constitutionality of an
annual limit on in forma pauperis filings, she noted that this was only so
“because the prisoner could still file a limited number of in forma pauperis
lawsuits” and thus the limit “in no way closes the courthouse doors to the
indigent prisoner.”261 Several courts support this distinction.262 Absent such
a yearly allowance, Sturtz too would seemingly find the sort of “total denial
of the right to access” implicated by a perpetual ban infringes on the Petition
Clause of the First Amendment.263
Undeniably, more measured approaches to the abuses of prolific
petitioners leave some potential for further abuse: As the Procup district
court declaimed at length, litigants may perjure themselves in sworn
precertifications, deluge the court with requests for leave to file, and prove
undeterred by the threat of contempt if already set for long incarceration.264
Yet such is the price of a constitutionally sound system of justice open to all,
as evidenced by the Eleventh Circuit’s sharp reversal on constitutional
grounds,265 as well as that of the D.C. Circuit.266 Eschewing absolutist
interdictions like those of the PLRA along with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
still affords district courts plentiful tools, if not the most convenient nuclear
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259. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110–12 (1996); Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376–77; Smith
v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U. S. 12, 16–20 (1956); see also Franklin, supra note 93, at 195–201.
260. See Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); Boddie, 401 U.S.
at 374–377.
261. Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1374–76.
262. See Rubins v. Roetker, 737 F. Supp. 1140, 1145 (D. Colo. 1990), aff’d, 936 F.2d 583
(10th Cir. 1991); Cello-Whitney v. Hoover, 769 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 1991); In re
Tyler, 677 F. Supp. 1410, 1414 (D. Neb. 1987).
263. Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1374–76.
264. Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 158–160 (M.D. Fla. 1983), rev’d, 760 F.2d 1107
(11th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam).
265. See Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1111–15 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated and
remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam) (“The centerpiece of the Section
1915 procedures is the district court’s exercise of its discretion on a case-by-case basis, however
tedious this exercise of discretion may become. The statute places the responsibility of reviewing
prisoner complaints in the district court alone, and ‘any order that does not allow a district court
the appropriate exercise of discretion under § 1915 is invalid.’”) (quoting In re Green, 669 F.2d
779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981)), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per
curiam).
266. In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 785–87 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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option of permanently barring the courthouse doors to virtually all claims.267
If nothing else, the monthly or annual limits endorsed by Cello-Whitney,
Tyler, Rubins, and Sturtz provide a robust check on volume.268
To say the Fifth and Eight Circuits’ interdictions leave the courthouse
doors remain “ajar, if only slightly” is euphemistic at best:269 In fact, such
orders prejudge that “in forma pauperis claims not involving actual or
threatened physical harm are ipso facto duplicative, frivolous, or
malicious.”270 Avoiding such prejudice is of constitutional scope: It is nighimpossible to square the Eight Circuit’s en banc recognition of an
“axiomatic” right of access to the courts with a panel’s peremptory
interdiction of nearly all claims heedless of their frequency, novelty, or
merit.271 (Remarkably, the Procup district court found even the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits nigh-absolute proscriptions insufficient, on the theory that
Procup would simply insert spurious claims of physical injury into every
filing.272) Even to burden, let alone bar, a fundamental right requires the
statute be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”273
Another case from the Third Circuit, In re Oliver, provides perhaps the
best accounting of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ approval of these farreaching penalties.274 There the court confirmed the use of similar
interdictions against prolific petitioners,275 even whilst noting “any such
order is an extreme remedy, and should be used only in exigent
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267. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072–73 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam).
268. See Cello-Whitney v. Hoover, 769 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Sturtz, supra
note 58.
269. See In re Green, 669 F.2d at 785–86 (quoted supra note 207).
270. Procup, 760 F.2d at 1111–12 (questioning “whether such an injunction should ever be
employed”).
271. Compare In re Green, 598 F.2d 1126, 1127 (8th Cir. 1979) (en banc), with Green v. White
(In re Green), 616 F.2d 1054, 1055–56 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
272. Procup, 567 F. Supp. at 159 (“Likewise, the approach taken by the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits in dealing with Green––allowing Green to file suit in forma pauperis only if he alleges a
constitutional deprivation stemming from physical injury––does not appear to be a wholly
satisfactory method of curbing Procup’s abuse. While such an order would curtail Procup’s
complaints concerning the living conditions of his confinement, the Court is concerned that it would
merely ensure that Procup’s future allegations included a claim of physical harm to his person.”),
rev’d, 760 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (per curiam).
273. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982) (quoted in Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.
3d 307, 316, 325 (3d. Cir. 2001)); see Franklin, supra note 93, at 194.
274. In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1982).
275. Id. at 446 (“We agree with the First and District of Columbia Circuits, however, that a
continuous pattern of groundless and vexatious litigation can, at some point, support an order
against further filings of complaints without the permission of the court. The case before us appears
to reveal a situation sufficient to justify exercise of the court’s power, under the All Writ’s [sic]
Act, to do so.”).
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circumstances.”276 Indeed, in the same breath the court professed that
“[a]ccess to the courts is a fundamental tenet of our judicial system;
legitimate claims should receive a full and fair hearing no matter how
litigious the plaintiff may be” and that “the ‘In Forma Pauperis’ statute, was
enacted specifically to provide poor persons with equal access to the federal
courts.”277 Barring frivolous claims would not implicate the right of access
to the courts, however,278 and this distinction is critical to the Third Circuit:
The record suggests that Oliver’s claims have been not only
numerous but patently without merit—none has yet stated a claim
sufficient to require a hearing. The express language of the order
mandates that “the Clerk . . . accept no future case for filing from
Mr. Oliver, absent a specific Order from a Judge of this Court.”
In reviewing the Court’s order we understand that, Oliver’s
propensity for filing numerous frivolous suits notwithstanding, the
district court would permit the filing of any nonfrivolous claim
submitted by Oliver.279
This “understanding” is evident in circuits only requiring sworn
precertification or leave of court to file.280 And it seems to be the (unstated)
understanding of the more draconian Fifth and Eighth circuits in approving
absolutist interdictions as well.281 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit, amongst others,
has reaffirmed that in enacting the PLRA, “Congress did not intend to ‘freeze
out meritorious claims or ossify district court errors.’”282 Yet given the
unfailing frivolousness of past filings, these courts apparently presume
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 55 Side A
10/23/2018 13:43:40

276. In re Oliver, 682 F.2d at 445.
277. Id. at 446 (emphasis added).
278. Id. (“No person, however, ‘. . . rich or poor, is entitled to abuse the judicial process.’”);
see Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1377 (arguing right of access not implicated for frivolous filings);
Feldman, supra note 29, at 433–34 (same).
279. Id. at 446. (second emphasis added).
280. See, e.g., Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 370 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779,
787 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Gordon v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 558 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1977); see Procup v.
Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 1985) (discussing cases), vacated and remanded, 792
F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam).
281. See, e.g., Peck v. Hoff, 660 F.2d 371, 374 (8th Cir. 1981); Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d
285, 287 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A); Green v. White (In re Green), 616 F.2d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir.
1980) (per curiam).
282. Jennings v. Natrona County Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir.1999)
(quoting Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir.1996)); Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d
428, 432–33 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting same).
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future filings will follow suit, raising no constitutional concerns.283 If a claim
rebuts that presumption, there remains the supposition, as in Oliver, that the
claim will somehow be allowed to proceed.284 The devilish fallacy of this
happy supposition lies, as usual, in the details:285 However are judges to
even become aware of a meritorious claim if their clerks are invisibly and
automatically rejecting every filing without regard for its merit?286 (Some
panels have implied that indigent petitioners are expected to somehow
accrue the means to pay a fee in order to signal that this claim is worth
reviewing287—unless the statute of limitations expires first.288)
Commentators have split over whether such a regime can pass constitutional
muster.289 At the end of the day, however, the Supreme Court appears to
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283. See Procup, 760 F.2d at 1111 (“Imposing this type of injunction creates, in effect, a
conclusive presumption that future in forma pauperis claims not involving actual or threatened
physical harm are ipso facto duplicative, frivolous, or malicious.”) (discussing Green, 649 F.2d
285, and In re Green, 616 F.2d 1054), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (per curiam); Peck, 660 F.2d at 374 (“It had experienced a number of meritless complaints
filed by inmate Peck. When it entered its order of June 11, 1981, it had every reason to expect the
pattern to continue, as indeed it did.”); see also Feldman, supra 29, at 434–35.
284. In re Oliver only makes explicit what is implicitly so of any court: a later judge or panel
can surely enter an order expressly directing the docketing of a meritorious claim notwithstanding
a standing interdiction.
285. Cf. United States v. Villalpando, 588 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Unfortunately for
Villalpando, the devil is in the details.”); United States v. Turcotte, 405 F. 3d 515, 521 (7th Cir.
2005) (“As the old adage instructs, the devil is in the details.”).
286. The answer that the interdicted litigant in possession of a meritorious claim could write
to the issuing judge by letter to plead its worth hardly solves anything: Presumably judges issuing
interdictions of this sort are not expecting to simply transfer their review of the merits of a tidal
wave of claims from their formal docket to their inboxes, and will not accommodate prolific
petitioners who engage in such a letter-writing campaign, but rather discard letters as peremptorily
as formal filings. See Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 160 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (“The approach
taken by the First and Third Circuits and by the Western District of Missouri in dealing with
Green—prohibiting him from filing any further pleadings of any sort without leave of court—could
possibly be effective in preventing Procup from engaging in further abuse of the judicial process.
Unless Procup convinced the Court that his complaint was meritorious, he would be barred from
prosecuting any further actions. Upon closer examination, however, such a sanction does not
appear likely to alter significantly the present situation. The Court would, in all likelihood, continue
to be deluged by Procup’s frivolous filings; they would merely be accompanied by his requests to
obtain the Court’s permission to proceed with his cases. Those requests would necessitate repeated
preliminary reviews similar in form to those presently given. Therefore, in substance, the Court
would not have effectively curtailed Procup’s abusive filing practices.”).
287. See, Peck, 660 F.2d at 374 (approving interdiction in part because an indigent petitioner
can still supposedly access the court by paying the required fee).
288. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 328 (3d. Cir. 2001) (Mansmann, J., dissenting)
(“If they cannot buy entry into court, they must wait until they can; and if the wait is too long,
justice will be denied to them.”).
289. Compare, e.g., Franklin, supra note 93 (detailing constitutional problems with the
PLRA), and Michelman, supra note 22 (discussing constitutional problems in the Supreme Court
right of access decisions), with Lane, supra note 11, at 353–63 (finding no constitutional argument
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have at least obliquely sanctioned this brand of “extreme remedy”290 in citing
such cases with approval whilst fashioning its own brand of interdictions.291

III. The In Forma Pauperis Supreme Court Cases
Notwithstanding the various approaches and occasional “extreme
remedy” levied by the lower courts,292 the Supreme Court itself had managed
its caseload for the vast majority of its history without resort to proscribing
any of its petitioners.293 It was not until 1989—exactly two centuries after
the Court’s establishment294—that the putative problem of pestersome
paupers goaded the Court into action.295 But change came swiftly thereafter,
especially for such a ponderous institution: just three years later, the Court
had revised its rules and adjusted its jurisprudence to bar the courthouse
doors against what would become a lengthy roll of indigent litigants.296 Nor
was the Court unacquainted of the import of its interdict, as the first decisions
were narrow 5-4 votes, and all featured increasingly fiery dissents decrying
the cost to the Court.297 The majority, by contrast, consistently wrote without
attribution—per curiam.298 Figure 1 illustrates the shrinking dissenting
coalition over the course of the eight cases.
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against the Supreme Court’s use of the practice), and Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1374–78
(distinguishing constitutionality of various degrees of interdiction).
290. In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d. Cir. 1982).
291. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 & n.8 (1989) (citing Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d
1069 (11th Cir. 1986), Peck, 660 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1981), and Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285 (5th
Cir. 1981)); see infra Section III-B; see also Lane, supra note 11, at 355 (“As a result, it is safe to
say that a right of access for IFP litigants will not be recognized any time soon, absent an explicit
law by Congress, because the current membership of the Court is unlikely to establish one.”).
292. See supra Section II-B.
293. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184; see also id. at 185 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
294. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1st Cong., § 1, 1 Stat. 73
(Sept. 24, 1789) (“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That the supreme court of the United States shall consist of a
chief justice and five associate justices, any four of whom shall be a quorum . . . .”).
295. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180.
296. See Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1 (1992); In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S.
13 (1991).
297. See infra Figure 1.
298. See Martin, 506 U.S. 1; Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16 (1991) (per curiam); In re
Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13; In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16 (1991) (per curiam); In re Sindram,
498 U.S. 177 (1991) (per curiam); Wrenn v. Benson, 490 U.S. 89 (1989) (per curiam); In re
McDonald, 489 U.S. 180; Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U.S. 928 (1983) (per curiam).

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 56 Side B

10/23/2018 13:43:40

SUNSHINE_MACROED TM FINAL 10.15 (DO NOT DELETE)

96

10/15/2018 7:58 PM

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 46:1

Figure 1: Votes in the In Forma Pauperis Supreme Court Cases
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With Written Dissent

A. Brown v. Herald Co. 299 — October 31, 1983

10/23/2018 13:43:40

299. Brown, 464 U.S. at 928.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 928–30 (“Each year, roughly 1,000 motions supported by affidavit are made for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. These motions usually accompany a petition for a writ of
certiorari or a jurisdictional statement, and our practice heretofore has almost always been not to
pass on the in forma pauperis motion but to proceed directly to grant or deny the petition based on
the merits of the questions presented in the petition or statement.”).
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Six years earlier, the Court had undertaken a subtle change in its
practice that would herald the coming upheaval in courtroom access. In the
therefore aptly captioned Brown v. Herald Co., a two-sentence per curiam
opinion denied the petitioner leave to file in forma pauperis, reserving any
judgment on the merits of the petition until the filing fee was paid (or a
renewed motion for leave made).300 In dissent, Justice William Brennan,
joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun, observed that
“when at least some of us proclaim that we are sorely pressed for adequate
time to do our work, this treatment is both unfair and wasteful.”301
Previously, the Court evaluated whether a claim merited its plenary review
without regard for the validity of the affidavit attesting to pauper status.302
The dissent observed that this made ample sense: what possible value could
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303. Brown, 464 U.S. at 931 (“What possible justification can support the scrutiny of 1,000
affidavits in support of in forma pauperis motions each year?”).
304. Id. at 930–31.
305. Id. at 930.
306. Id. at 931 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
307. Id.
308. Id. (“That would remove any incentive a petitioner might otherwise have to seek in forma
pauperis status although ineligible for such status, without requiring the Court to assume the burden
of examining every motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. In borderline cases the petitioner
should, of course, be given an opportunity to pay the required costs before final action is taken on
his application.”).
309. Brown, 464 U.S. at 931.

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 57 Side A

there be in directing parties to resubmit their claims if they had no merit?303
Fairer and more efficient to continue as the Court always had: to deny
certiorari on the merits rather than encourage relitigation of collateral
matters.304 The imperative was only amplified by the fact that eligibility for
in forma pauperis filings lacked “an articulated set of standards” by which
the decision could even be made.305
Justice John Paul Stevens too dissented, agreeing that “we should
simply deny unmeritorious certiorari petitions without scrutinizing the
petitioner’s right to proceed in forma pauperis,” but writing separately to
address the circumstance where an in forma pauperis petition did show
merit.306 In such cases, Justice Stevens emphasized that the question of
whether the petitioner was truly indigent must then be taken up, and if the
“examination disclosed the kind of disrespect for our rules that has motivated
the Court’s unusual action in these cases, I would deny the petition even if it
would otherwise have merited review.”307 Such an approach would amply
police any abuse of the in forma pauperis system, in providing a compelling
motivation to avoid fraudulent claims by withholding the dearest gift in the
Court’s grasp: a grant of plenary review.308 By contrast, Justice Stevens
could “see no purpose . . . in insisting that these petitioners—none of whom
is represented by counsel who could advise them that their petitions stand no
chance of being granted—pay a fee for the privilege of having their petitions
denied.”309
The Supreme Court’s reversal of the order of affairs may seem
picayune, but it was not nugatory. Formerly, all petitions were assessed for
merit in the first instance, regardless of the status of the petitioner. By now
putting the proverbial cart before the horse, the Court refashioned the
petitioner’s filing status into a gatekeeper that could forbid even an initial
review of the merits. Such a reversal is all the more perplexing given that
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the new ordering would multiply the Court’s work pointlessly.310 Indeed,
Justice Stevens had previously written that “given the volume of frivolous,
illegible, and sometimes unintelligible petitions that are filed in this Court,
our work is facilitated by the practice of simply denying certiorari once a
determination is made that there is no merit to the petitioner’s claim.”311 And
in the first intimation that these kind of questions matter, Justice Brennan
also added in a footnote that “[m]otions to proceed in forma pauperis are a
special case since they will determine whether an individual gains access to
this Court.”312

B. In re McDonald 313 — February 21, 1989
The proscriptive potential of Brown’s newly fashioned gatekeeping
approach to in forma pauperis filings did not go untapped overlong. Over
the course of the 1980s, one Jessie McDonald had applied to the Supreme
Court seventy-three times; every appeal, petition, and motion had been
denied.314 His latest filing not-too-coherently sought an extraordinary writ
of habeas corpus, as well as, like his other filings, leave to proceed in forma
pauperis.315 Without reaching the merits, the Court denied leave and gave
McDonald three weeks to come up with the cash for filing fees,316 despite
the Court’s underlining that the Court had never before denied him in forma
pauperis status,317 and there being no question he was in fact
impoverished.318 (The standard court fee represented the entirety of
McDonald’s stated monthly income.319) Rather, the court viewed the statute
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310. Brown, 464 U.S. at 930 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 931 (“Our time certainly
can be spent in more productive effort than the determination of whether a petitioner or appellant
is able to pay $200 plus the cost of printing and still provide himself and his dependents with the
necessities of life.”).
311. Davis v. Jacobs, 454 U.S. 911, 914 (1981) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting denial of
certiorari) (quoted in Brown, 464 U.S. at 931).
312. Brown, 464 U.S. at 930 n.4.
313. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 (1989) (5-4) (per curiam).
314. Id. at 181–82.
315. Id. at 180.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 182 (“We have never previously denied him leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”).
318. Id. at 182 n.6.
319. Compare In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 182 (“In the affidavit in support of his present
motion to proceed in forma pauperis, petitioner states that he earns approximately $300 per
month.”) with In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13 (1991) (per curiam) (“Filings under our paid
docket require a not-insubstantial filing fee, currently $300, and compliance with our printing
requirements.”).
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prescribing in forma pauperis filings as permissive, allowing courts to deny
leave based on concerns other than lack of penury.320
But the Court went further. Noting that pro se in forma pauperis
litigants lack the deterrents of fees to penalize meritless claims, the Court
found that McDonald’s continuing drain on the Court’s limited resources
warranted a novel penalty:321 “We also direct the Clerk not to accept any
further petitions from petitioner for extraordinary writs pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1651(a), 2241, and 2254(a), unless he pays the docketing fee.”322 The
Court recognized its ban on McDonald ever again seeking an extraordinary
writ in forma pauperis was without precedent in its own jurisprudence.323
But the Court looked to precedents in the lower courts to justify its newfound
approach.324 In defense of the ban, the Court emphasized that extraordinary
writs are virtually never granted in any event, and petitioner remained free
to seek relief via the ordinary routes of certiorari or appeal.325 Tellingly, the
majority repeatedly characterized in forma pauperis status as a privilege that
could be retracted, rather than a right.326
The four dissenters from Brown again rebelled, arguing that the Court
lacked the power to preemptively deny in forma pauperis status in any and
all extraordinary petitions.327 Taking the pen once more, Justice Brennan
admitted McDonald likely abused the Court’s process, but disagreed “that
he poses such a threat to the orderly administration of justice that we should
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320. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 183–84 (“Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides that ‘[a]ny court
of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action
or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security
therefor.’ . . . Each year, we permit the vast majority of persons who wish to proceed in forma
pauperis to do so.”).
321. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184 (“But paupers filing pro se petitions are not subject to
the financial considerations filing fees and attorney’s fees that deter other litigants from filing
frivolous petitions. Every paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or
frivolous, requires some portion of the institution’s limited resources. A part of the Court’s
responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of
justice. The continual processing of petitioner’s frivolous requests for extraordinary writs does not
promote that end.”).
322. Id. at 180.
323. Id. at 184; see also id. at 185 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In the first such act in its almost
200-year history, the Court today bars its door to a litigant prospectively.”).
324. Id. (majority) (citing Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986), Peck v. Hoff,
660 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1981), and Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1981)).
325. Id. at 185.
326. See id. at 184 (“Each year, we permit the vast majority of persons who wish to proceed
in forma pauperis to do so; last Term, we afforded the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis
to about 2,300 persons.”); id. at 185 (“Petitioner remains free under the present order to file in
forma pauperis requests for relief other than an extraordinary writ, if he qualifies under this Court’s
Rule 46 and does not similarly abuse that privilege.”).
327. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 185–86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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embark on the unprecedented and dangerous course the Court charts
today.”328 Turning to the statute, Justice Brennan noted that it allowed the
court to dismiss only “if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that
the action is frivolous or malicious.”329 And that statutory language was thus
fatal to the Court’s sweeping interdiction: “Needless to say, the future
petitions McDonald is barred from filing have not been ‘found to be’
frivolous. Even a very strong and well-founded belief that McDonald’s
future filings will be frivolous cannot render a before-the-fact disposition
compatible with the individualized determination § 1915 contemplates.”330
Justice Brennan also observed that the Court’s own rules mandated that its
clerk docket properly filed papers, and the Court now placed the clerk in the
unhappy predicament of being directed to violate those very rules.331 “Of
course,” he chided, “we are free to amend our own rules should we see the
need to do so, but until we do, we are bound by them.”332
Justice Brennan’s peroration on the wisdom of the Court’s course,
which would prove prescient, bears reproduction in full:
Even if the legality of our action in ordering the Clerk to refuse
future petitions for extraordinary writs in forma pauperis from this
litigant were beyond doubt, I would still oppose it as unwise,
potentially dangerous, and a departure from the traditional
principle that the door to this courthouse is open to all. The
Court’s order purports to be motivated by this litigant’s
disproportionate consumption of the Court’s time and resources.
Yet if his filings are truly as repetitious as it appears, it hardly
takes much time to identify them as such.

In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 185–86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 186.
Id.
Id.

10/23/2018 13:43:40

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
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I find it difficult to see how the amount of time and resources
required to deal properly with McDonald’s petitions could be so
great as to justify the step we now take. Indeed, the time that has
been consumed in the preparation of the present order barring the
door to Mr. McDonald far exceeds that which would have been
necessary to process his petitions for the next several years, at
least. I continue to find puzzling the Court’s fervor in ensuring
that rights granted to the poor are not abused, even when so doing
actually increases the drain on our limited resources. Today’s
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order makes sense as an efficiency measure only if it is merely the
prelude to similar orders in regard to other litigants, or perhaps to
a generalized rule limiting the number of petitions in forma
pauperis an individual may file. Therein lies its danger.
The Court’s order itself seems to indicate that further measures, at
least in regard to this litigant, may be forthcoming. It notes that
McDonald remains free to file in forma pauperis for relief other
than extraordinary writs, if he “does not similarly abuse that
privilege.” But if we have found his 19 petitions for extraordinary
writs abusive, how long will it be until we conclude that his 33
petitions for certiorari are similarly abusive and bar that door to
him as well? I am at a loss to say why, logically, the Court’s order
is limited to extraordinary writs, and I can only conclude that this
order will serve as precedent for similar actions in the future, both
as to this litigant and to others.
I doubt—although I am not certain—that any of the petitions
Jessie McDonald is now prevented from filing would ultimately
have been found meritorious. I am most concerned, however, that,
if, as I fear, we continue on the course we chart today, we will end
by closing our doors to a litigant with a meritorious claim. It is
rare, but it does happen on occasion that we grant review and even
decide in favor of a litigant who previously had presented multiple
unsuccessful petitions on the same issue.

In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 186–88 (citations omitted).
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This Court annually receives hundreds of petitions, most but not
all of them filed in forma pauperis, which raise no colorable legal
claim whatever, much less a question worthy of the Court’s
review. Many come from individuals whose mental or emotional
stability appears questionable. It does not take us long to identify
these petitions as frivolous, and to reject them. A certain
expenditure of resources is required, but it is not great in relation
to our work as a whole. To rid itself of a small portion of this
annoyance, the Court now needlessly departs from its generous
tradition and improvidently sets sail on a journey whose landing
point is uncertain. We have long boasted that our door is open to
all. We can no longer.333
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As telling as the language of the majority opinion is that of the dissent,
speaking of the “rights granted to the poor” to make in forma pauperis
filings.334 This distinction seemingly animates the entire disagreement
between the two sides: the minority saw access to the courtroom as a vested
entitlement, whereas the majority saw it as a privilege forfeitable for
misbehavior.

C. Wrenn v. Benson 335 — April 17, 1989

In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187.
Wrenn v. Benson, 490 U.S. 89 (1989) (6-3) (per curiam).
Id. at 89.
Id. at 89–91.
Id. at 92.
Id. (quoting In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184).
Compare In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184, with Wrenn, 490 U.S. at 92.
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Less than two months later, the Court returned to the subject of prolific
in forma pauperis petitioners; Wrenn v. Benson, however, was considerably
less seismic than McDonald. Over the preceding three years, one Curtis
Wrenn had filed twenty-two petitions for certiorari, almost all of them
seeking to proceed in forma pauperis.336 In each case, the Court had
examined the required affidavits, determined Wrenn was not in fact eligible
to proceed, and denied leave, following the inverted process approved in
Brown.337 Wrenn had nonetheless continued to seek in forma pauperis
status, and having seen that the previous nineteen rejections had not curbed
Wrenn’s enthusiasm, the majority now “direct[ed] the Clerk of the Court not
to accept any further filings from petitioner in which he seeks leave to
proceed in forma pauperis under this Court’s Rule 46.1, unless the affidavit
submitted with the filing indicates that petitioner’s financial condition has
substantially changed.”338
By way of reasoning, the majority pointed to the rationale expressed in
McDonald that “[e]very paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter
how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution’s
limited resources. A part of the Court’s responsibility is to see that these
resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.”339
Unlike McDonald, however, the chastisement for Wrenn was considerably
more measured.340 In directing the clerk to evaluate future affidavits to
determine whether they stated a change of circumstance supporting a plea of
poverty, the Court was simply delegating that fundamentally ministerial
function to its clerk rather than expending its own time; it was not preventing
Wrenn from proceeding in forma pauperis if in fact he lacked the funds to
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pay.341 (Notably, Wrenn had paid the filing fee for one of his many petitions;
he apparently could not or did not want to pay the others.342)
Perhaps because of this more modest accommodation, Justice
Blackmun registered no disagreement with the per curiam decision. The
remainder of the Brown and McDonald dissenting wing remained defiant,
however, with both Justices Brennan and Stevens writing.343 Neither had
anything to add to the dialogue however: Justice Brennan simply stated his
dissent for the same reasons given in Brown and McDonald;344 Justice
Stevens did the same, reiterating only his belief that “the preparation and
enforcement of orders of this kind consume more of the Court’s valuable
time than is consumed by the routine denial of frivolous motions and
petitions.”345 This uncharacteristic brevity likely bespeaks the fact that the
majority’s remedy was not particularly problematic in terms of access to the
Court, and certainly less so than the sweeping interdiction of McDonald or
the more extreme remedies yet to come.346

D. In re Sindram 347 — January 7, 1991

10/23/2018 13:43:40

341. Wrenn, 490 U.S. at 91–92.
342. Id. at 89.
343. Wrenn, 490 U.S. at 92 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
344. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
345. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
346. See In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989); Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 3 (1992).
347. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177 (1991) (6-3) (per curiam).
348. Id. at 177–78.
349. Id. at 177–79.
350. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 179–80. Too, the Court noted its previous generosity in
permitting Sindram to proceed in forma pauperis, and that other avenues for relief remained open.
Id. at 179–80 & n.2.
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A brief hiatus followed Wrenn, but nonetheless only two more years
passed before the next advance in the Court’s move to bar its doors. Michael
Sindram had applied to the Court for relief forty-three times over three years,
and twenty-four times in that very term; all had been denied.348 Returning
now with a request for an extraordinary writ and leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, the Court denied leave, citing McDonald.349 Indeed, the opinion
of the Court closely tracked that of the earlier case, once again noting the
lack of deterrents to in forma pauperis litigants and its concern that the “goal
of fairly dispensing justice, however, is compromised when the Court is
forced to devote its limited resources to the processing of repetitious and
frivolous requests.”350 This time, however, the Court responded to one of
Justice Brennan’s prior arguments in dissent, explaining that the “risks of

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 60 Side B

10/23/2018 13:43:40

SUNSHINE_MACROED TM FINAL 10.15 (DO NOT DELETE)

104

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

10/15/2018 7:58 PM

[Vol. 46:1

abuse are particularly acute with respect to applications for extraordinary
relief, since such petitions are not subject to any time limitations and,
theoretically, could be filed at any time without limitation.”351 Perceiving
not only the ability but the “duty” to protect itself against abusive in forma
pauperis litigants, the Court once more directed its clerk to accept no further
petitions for extraordinary writs in forma pauperis.352
The same justices as McDonald yet again dissented, sans only Justice
Brennan, who had retired from the bench in the interim.353 Given the
thorough airing of the issues in McDonald, Justice Marshall was sparer, but
no less critical: serial litigants are at worst a “minor inconvenience,” and
simply denying their petitions is likely easier than those with paid counsel
given the skill of the latter at making weak claims seem meritorious.354
Singling out the frivolous filings of the poor, he opined, “in response to a
problem that cuts across all classes of litigants strikes me as unfair,
discriminatory, and petty.”355 Brief mention was given to the statutory
argument that the Court lacks the power to prescribe the poor,356 but the
gravamen of the dissent once again lay in its peroration:
Our longstanding tradition of leaving our door open to all classes
of litigants is a proud and decent one worth maintaining.

In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 180.
Id.
Id. at 180–82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 180–81.
Id. at 181.
Id.
In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (citations omitted).
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Moreover, we should not presume in advance that prolific indigent
litigants will never bring a meritorious claim. Nor should we lose
sight of the important role in forma pauperis claims have played
in shaping constitutional doctrine. As Justice Brennan warned,
“if . . . we continue on the course we chart today, we will end by
closing our doors to a litigant with a meritorious claim.” By
closing our door today to a litigant like Michael Sindram, we run
the unacceptable risk of impeding a future Clarence Earl Gideon.
This risk becomes all the more unacceptable when it is generated
by an ineffectual gesture that serves no realistic purpose other than
conveying an unseemly message of hostility to indigent
litigants.357
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Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented separately to
highlight that Sindram did not merely repeat McDonald’s sin but advanced
it.358 McDonald, it could well be argued, truly had abused the Court’s
process for extraordinary writs, having applied nearly twenty times for
patently unavailable relief; Sindram, however, had applied only twice.359
Observing that a mere two such petitions could not credibly be construed as
a serial abuse of process, Blackmun discerned a more dangerous step: that
Sindram was in fact being punished indirectly for his many frivolous filings
for certiorari.360 Such a move intimated that the Court might turn its eye to
interdictions not against the rarefied extraordinary writs seen in McDonald
and Sindram, but the ordinary backbone of the Court’s docket, petitions for
certiorari.

E. In re Demos 361 — April 29, 1991
The Court’s next foray warrants little further comment, for it mirrors
Sindram almost entirely and came but a few months later: the petitioner had
brought a great many petitions, and the Court now revoked his right to file
any future petitions for extraordinary writs because of that abuse, for the
reasons before stated.362 Justice Marshall dissented with Stevens and
Blackmun:

Two years ago, Justice Brennan sagely warned that in “needlessly
depart[ing] from its generous tradition” of leaving its doors open
to all classes of litigants, the Court “sets sail on a journey whose
landing point is uncertain.” The journey’s ominous destination is
becoming apparent. The Court appears resolved to close its doors
to increasing numbers of indigent litigants—and for increasingly

In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182–83 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 183.
Id.
In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16 (1991) (6-3) (per curiam).
Id. at 17.
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I continue to oppose this Court’s unseemly practice of banning in
forma pauperis filings by indigent litigants. As I have argued, the
Court’s assessment of the disruption that an overly energetic
litigant like Demos poses to “the orderly consideration of cases,”
is greatly exaggerated. The Court is sorely mistaken if it believes
that the solution to the problem of a crowded docket is to crack
down on a litigant like Demos.
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less justifiable reasons. I fear that the Court’s action today
portends even more Draconian restrictions on the access of
indigent litigants to this Court.
In closing its doors today to another indigent litigant, the Court
moves ever closer to the day when it leaves an indigent litigant
with a meritorious claim out in the cold. And with each barrier
that it places in the way of indigent litigants, and with each
instance in which it castigates such litigants for having “abused
the system,” the Court can only reinforce in the hearts and minds
of our society’s less fortunate members the unsettling message
that their pleas are not welcome here.363
Even more so than Sindram, the dissent foreshadowed—indeed
predicted—the Court’s forthcoming expansion of its interdiction
jurisprudence to writs of certiorari.364

F. In re Amendment to Rule 39 365 — April 29, 1991

In re Demos, 500 U.S. at 18–19 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Compare id. at 18 n.*, with id. at 183 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13 (1991) (6-3) (per curiam).
In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186 (1989) (per curiam); supra note 332.
In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 13–14.
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First, however, there was the matter of Justice Brennan’s irksome
observation that the Court was violating its own rules its zeal to prune its in
forma pauperis docket.366 But as he had noted, the Court could always
change its rules, and so it had done on the same day as Demos, amending
Rule 39 to add an eighth clause: “If satisfied that a petition for a writ of
certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ, as
the case may be, is frivolous or malicious, the Court may deny a motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”367 Retreading its traditional arguments,
the majority explained the change was necessary to permit the Court to police
its in forma pauperis docket, which was not susceptible to control by the
ordinary application of damages and costs as sanctions, to ensure that “the
right to file in forma pauperis not be encumbered by those who would abuse
the integrity of our process by frivolous filings, particularly those few
persons whose filings are repetitive with the obvious effect of burdening the
office of the Clerk and other members of the Court staff.”368 It is ironic that
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the Court only referred at last to a “right” to in forma pauperis filings in the
course of restricting it.369
Not unexpectedly, Justices Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun dissented.
Justice Marshall, writing for himself, was pithy in his final word on the
subject:
This Court’s rules now embrace an invidious distinction. Under
the amendment adopted today, an indigent litigant may be denied
a disposition on the merits of a petition for certiorari, jurisdictional
statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ following a
determination that the filing “is frivolous or malicious.”
Strikingly absent from this Court’s rules is any similar provision
permitting dismissal of “frivolous or malicious” filings by paying
litigants, even though paying litigants are a substantial source of
these filings.
This Court once had a great tradition: “All men and women are
entitled to their day in Court.” That guarantee has now been
conditioned on monetary worth. It now will read: “All men and
women are entitled to their day in Court only if they have the
means and the money.”370
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369. Cf. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I continue to find puzzling
the Court’s fervor in ensuring that rights granted to the poor are not abused.”).
370. In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 14–15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
371. Id. at n.* (citations omitted).
372. Id. at 15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
373. Id.
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Pointedly, these symbolic losses transcended whatever clerical
concerns animated the measure: “Our inviolable obligation to treat rich and
poor alike is echoed in the oath taken by each Justice prior to assuming
office. ‘I . . . do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect
to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich . . . .’”371
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, was more measured,
though not by much.372 He reaffirmed that he saw no great crisis in the
Court’s workload and that the Court’s new rule was thus a step in the wrong
direction, as it was generally easier to simply deny a petition, and
symbolically erected distinctions between the rich and poor, to the detriment
of the Court’s mission.373
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G. Zatko v. California374 — November 4, 1991

10/23/2018 13:43:40

374. Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16 (1991) (7-2) (per curiam).
375. Id. at 17 (“Today, we invoke Rule 39.8 for the first time . . . .”).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. See In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 179–80 & n.2 (1991) (per curiam); In re McDonald,
489 U.S. 180, 185 (1989) (per curiam).
380. Zatko, 502 U.S. at 18.
381. See id. at 16–17 (“Because in forma pauperis petitioners lack the financial disincentives–
filing fees and attorney’s fees–that help to deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions, we
felt such a [r]ule change was necessary to provide us some control over the in forma pauperis
docket.”); id. at 17 (“We conclude that the pattern of repetitious filing on the part of Zatko and
Martin has resulted in an extreme abuse of the system.”).
382. Id. at 18.
383. Id. at 18–20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The first use of the new Rule 39.8 came soon enough: only a few
months later, in the ensuing October term.375 Petitioners Vladimir Zatko and
James L. Martin had filed seventy-three and forty-five petitions respectively
over the last decade in forma pauperis, and all were denied without
dissent.376 Now, the court invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Zatko and Martin leave
to file in forma pauperis for their latest petitions for certiorari, expressing
the “the hope that our action will deter future similar frivolous practices.”377
Although citing Sindram, Zatko represented the first time that leave to file
ordinary petition for certiorari rather than for an extraordinary writ was
blocked as frivolous.378 The majority did not address how such a step
squared with its explanation in McDonald and Sindram that the extreme
measures taken were justified by the continued availability of the ordinary
writ of certiorari to indigent defendants.379
Rather, noting the numerous other in forma pauperis petitioners it
afforded the traditional opportunity of review, the Court reemphasized the
symbolic purpose of its denial, a “limited step of censuring two petitioners
who are unique—not merely among those who seek to file in forma pauperis,
but also among those who have paid the required filing fees—because they
have repeatedly made totally frivolous demands on the Court’s limited
resources.”380 Given such language of censure, the Court clearly viewed
Rule 39.8 as a parallel form of sanctions only to be levelled against the poor
by denying them in forma pauperis status.381 Ominously, the majority
concluded by noting that “[f]uture similar filings from these petitioners will
merit additional measures.”382
Justice Marshall had retired, reducing the dissenting wing of the Court
to two, for whom Justice Stevens wrote.383 Justice Stevens turned his latest
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opinion to the practical logistics, observing that nearly one thousand
petitions by paupers had already been denied per the usual process that
year—well over half frivolous—without any appreciable impact on the
integrity of the Court’s process.384 Questioning the purpose of Rule 39.8, he
went on to note the “practical effect of such an order is the same as a simple
denial,” but that “the symbolic effect of the Court’s effort to draw
distinctions among the multitude of frivolous petitions—none of which will
be granted in any event—is powerful,” for different reasons that the majority
thought.385 To wit: It may communicate that the poor have less entitlement
to justice than the rich, and assessing petitions of the rich and poor under
different standards risks the latter not receiving due attention.386 In the
balance, Justice Stevens concluded, “the Court has little to gain and much to
lose by applying Rule 39.8 as it does today.”387

H. Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals 388 —
November 2, 1992

Zatko, 502 U.S. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 20.
Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1 (1992) (7-2) (per curiam).
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 2.
Cf. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 181 (1991) (quoted supra note 355).
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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The majority’s threat in Zatko of “additional measures” did not prove
idle. One year later, the Court decided Martin v. District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, after the same James L. Martin filed another eleven petitions for
certiorari in the interim.389 Adverting again to the deleterious effect of
voluminous frivolous filings, the Court levelled its most severe penalty yet
on Martin: no future noncriminal petitions for certiorari would be
accepted.390 (In fairness, Martin’s escalation rather than acquiescence
following his censure in Zatko seems at best petty and at worst gallingly
provocative;391 Justice Felix Frankfurter’s admonition four decades earlier is
apt: “The old saw that hard cases make bad law has its basis in experience.
But petty cases are even more calculated to make bad law. The impact of a
sordid little case is apt to obscure the implications of the generalization to
which the case gives rise.”392)
Martin represented a dramatic expansion of McDonald and Sindram.
Both had prospectively interdicted indigent petitioners only from filing for

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 63 Side B

10/23/2018 13:43:40

SUNSHINE_MACROED TM FINAL 10.15 (DO NOT DELETE)

110

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

10/15/2018 7:58 PM

[Vol. 46:1

extraordinary writs.393 Indeed, the rationale for those interdictions rested
critically on the role of extraordinary writs on the Supreme Court’s docket.
In defense of its holding, McDonald had explained that “we have not granted
the sort of extraordinary writ relentlessly sought by petitioner to any
litigant—paid or in forma pauperis—for at least a decade,” and that
“extraordinary writs are, not surprisingly, ‘drastic and extraordinary
remedies,’ to be ‘reserved for really extraordinary causes,’ in which ‘appeal
is clearly an inadequate remedy.’”394 Sindram had added that the “risks of
abuse are particularly acute with respect to applications for extraordinary
relief, since such petitions are not subject to any time limitations and,
theoretically, could be filed at any time, without limitation.”395 And both
had justified their holding on the basis that relief could readily be sought via
certiorari for any meritorious claim.396
Now, however, despite its reliance on those two decisions, the Court
expanded the scope of interdictions to the ordinary writ of certiorari that had
purportedly provided a crucial safety valve in its previous decisions.397
Ironically, one of Martin’s intervening petitions for certiorari had not even
been frivolous.398 Yet the Court provided no defense of the expansion other
than Martin’s serial abuse, professing sorrow in the ostensibly compelled
result:

We regret the necessity of taking this step, but Martin’s refusal to
heed our earlier warning leaves us no choice.399
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393. See In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 184; In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 180 (1989) (per
curiam).
394. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184–85 (citations omitted).
395. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 180.
396. Id.; In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 185.
397. Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1 ,3 (1992) (7-2) (per curiam).
398. Id. (“With the arguable exception of one of these petitions, see Martin v. Knox, 502 U.S.
999 (1991) (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., respecting denial of certiorari), all of Martin’s
filings, including those before us today, have been demonstrably frivolous.”).
399. Id.
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Although this case does not involve abuse of an extraordinary
writ, but rather the writ of certiorari, Martin’s pattern of abuse has
had a similarly deleterious effect on this Court’s “fair allocation
of judicial resources.” (citation omitted). As a result, the same
concerns which led us to enter the orders barring prospective
filings in Sindram and McDonald require such action here.
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Still standing at two members, the minority had little more to add after
all the rhetoric of yesteryear: They had already written all they had to say in
predicting this ultimate result.400 In what would prove to be the last major
dissent on the subject, Justice Stevens only pointed to his own prior opinions
and those of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, concluding that
“[t]he theoretical administrative benefit the Court may derive from an order
of this kind is far outweighed by the shadow it casts on the great tradition of
open access that characterized the Court’s history prior to its unprecedented
decisions.”401

IV. Trends and Tendencies in Supreme Court Cases After
Martin
With Martin, the Supreme Court’s evolution was complete. Thereafter,
the Court could and has referred straightforwardly to that holding in issuing
directives to its clerk to enforce the reasoning of the Martin decision and
refuse to accept any civil petitions from litigants absent payment.402 From
1992 to October 1999, the Court cited Martin twenty-six times to bar
litigants from future filings.403 Notably, these later dispositions no longer
included the thoughtful dialectics between majority and dissent that had
characterized the cases up to and including Martin; the issue was evidently
settled in the eyes of the justices.404 Early on, Justice Stevens announced that
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400. See, e.g., In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 18–19 & n.* (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re
Sindram, 498 U.S. at 183 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187–88 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
401. Martin, 506 U.S. at 4 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
402. Lane, supra note 11, at 350.
403. Demos v. Storrie, 507 U.S. 290 (1993) (52 filings); Day v. Day, 510 U.S. 1 (1993) (35
frivolous filings); In re Sassower, 510 U.S. 4 (1993) (21 filings); Whitaker v. Super. Ct. of Cal.
S.F. Cty, 514 U.S. 208 (1995) (24 filings); Attwood v. Singletary, 516 U.S. 297 (1996) (9 frivolous
filings); Jones v. ABC-TV, 516 U.S. 363 (1996) (32 filings); Shieh v. Kakita, 517 U.S. 343 (1996)
(10 filings); In re Gaydos, 519 U.S. 59 (1996) (19 filings); In re Vey, 520 U.S. 303 (1997) (26
filings); Vey v. Clinton, 520 U.S. 937 (1997) (27 filings); Brown v. Williams, 522 U.S. 1 (1997)
(8 filings); Arteaga v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 522 U.S. 446 (1998) (21 filings);
Glendora v. Porzio, 523 U.S. 206 (1998) (15 filings); In re Kennedy, 525 U.S. 153 (1998) (12
filings); Schwarz v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 526 U.S. 122 (1999) (35 filings); Rivera v. Fla. Dep’t of
Corrs., 526 U.S 135 (1999) (14 filings); Lowe v. Pogue, 526 U.S. 273 (1999) (33 filings); Cross v.
Pelican Bay State Prison, 526 U.S. 811 (1999) (16 filings); Ferstel-Rust v. Milwaukee Cty. Mental
Health Ctr., 527 U.S. 469 (1999) (8 filings); Whitfield v. Texas, 527 U.S. 885, reconsideration
denied, 528 U.S. 805 (1999) (9 filings); Antonelli v. Caridine, 528 U.S. 3 (1999) (19 filings);
Dempsey v. Martin, 528 U.S. 7 (1999) (10 filings); Prunty v. Brooks, 528 U.S. 9 (1999) (57 filings);
Brancato v. Gunn, 528 U.S. 1 (1999) (8 filings); Judd v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W.D. Tex., 528 U.S. 5
(1999) (12 filings); In re Bauer, 528 U.S. 16 (1999) (12 filings).
404. E.g., Demos, 507 U.S. at 291 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I continue to adhere to my
previously stated views on this issue . . . .”); Jones, 516 U.S. at 364 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“For
the reasons I have previously expressed, I respectfully dissent.”).
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“I shall not encumber the record by noting my dissent from similar orders
denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis, absent exceptional
circumstances.”405 (In reality, Justice Stevens continued to register his
dissent like clockwork, even absent any noted egregiousness to the case.406)
As for the majority, the cases briefly recited the same litany: the
petitioner had filed many meritless claims; the petitioner had been warned;
addressing meritless claims impedes the Court’s business; the petitioner was
now prospectively banned from future such filings absent a fee.407 Yet of
the twenty-six cases, there seems little rhyme or reason as to why the
proscribed petitioners had been singled out: on the same day in October
1999, one petitioner was barred for a lifetime total of fifty-seven meritless
petitions,408 whilst another received the same punishment for eight.409 Figure
2 illustrates the general randomness of result, though there is a very weak
trend downward, reflecting that the Court was overall requiring fewer and
fewer frivolous filings to justify an interdiction.
Figure 2: Meritless Petitions at Time of Ban, by Year, From Martin
Through Oct 1999
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A few of these cases warrant further comment. The first to cite Martin
was Demos v. Storie, where the Court used its newly-minted precedent to

10/23/2018 13:43:40

405. Day, 510 U.S. at 3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
406. See cases cited supra note 403.
407. E.g., Glendora, 523 U.S. at 206; In re Kennedy, 525 U.S. 153; Schwarz, 526 U.S. at 122;
Lowe, 526 U.S. at 273.
408. Prunty v. Brooks, 528 U.S. 9 (1999).
409. Brancato v. Gunn, 528 U.S. 1 (1999).
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withdraw the right to petition for certiorari from John R. Demos Jr., the
litigant who had previously been barred from filing extraordinary writs in in
the 1991 Demos case.410 Most jurisprudentially noteworthy is Whitaker v.
Superior Court of California, where the majority noted a further reason why
proscription of certiorari filings was required: The petitioner, having already
been barred from filing in forma pauperis for extraordinary writs, had taken
to labelling such petitions as if they were for certiorari.411 Much like the
petitioner’s pettiness in Martin, such inane subterfuge sheds light on why the
Court felt goaded into action.412 On the other side, Justice Stevens only
became more convinced of the wastefulness of the Martin process over time,
observing in 1996 that “experience with the administration of orders like the
one the Court is entering in this case today has merely reinforced my
conviction that our ‘limited resources’ would be used more effectively by
simply denying petitions that are manifestly frivolous.”413
But even such minor elaborations on Martin cases were soon to end,
perhaps driven by the annus horribilis of 1999, when the Court issued no
less than twelve prospective proscriptions through October, nearly as many
as it had issued in all prior years.414 In November, the Court formulated the
shorthand “Martin directive” quoted at the start of the Article, which could
be applied summarily to any case barring indigent petitioners, thus allowing
the incidence of such dispositions to be tracked mechanically (and making it
easier for cases to be disposed of mechanically).415 Tabulating that incidence
demonstrates unequivocally that, armed with such a time-saving device, the
Supreme Court has resorted to the expedient of Martin directives ever more
frequently over time, with the total number verging on five hundred by
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410. Demos v. Storrie, 507 U.S. 290 (1993); see supra Section III-D.
411. Whitaker v. Super. Ct. of Cal. S.F. Cty, 514 U.S. 208, 209–09 (1995).
412. See supra Section III-H.
413. Attwood v. Singletary, 516 U.S. 297, 298 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Demos, 507 U.S. at 291 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
414. Schwarz v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 526 U.S. 122 (1999); Rivera v. Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 526
U.S 135 (1999); Lowe v. Pogue, 526 U.S. 273 (1999); Cross v. Pelican Bay State Prison, 526 U.S.
811 (1999); Ferstel-Rust v. Milwaukee Cty. Mental Health Ctr., 527 U.S. 469 (1999); Whitfield v.
Texas, 527 U.S. 885, reconsideration denied, 528 U.S. 805 (1999); Antonelli v. Caridine, 528 U.S.
3 (1999); Dempsey v. Martin, 528 U.S. 7 (1999); Prunty v. Brooks, 528 U.S. 9 (1999); Brancato,
528 U.S. 1; Judd v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W.D. Tex., 528 U.S. 5 (1999); In re Bauer, 528 U.S. 16
(1999).
415. See Lane, supra note 11, at 350. The first two such cases were Baba v. Japan Travel
Bureau, 528 U.S. 1016 (1999), and In re Reidt, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999), both issued on November
29, 1999. Confirming the regularity of the new practice, the next such disposition, Cunningham v.
Moreno, 528 U.S. 1059 (1999), appeared only two weeks later, on December 13, 1999. Two
precursors may be found earlier in November in In re Tyler, 528 U.S. 983 (1999), and In re Tyler,
528 U.S. 984 (1999), where the language differed only by a few articles and punctuation.
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2015.416 Figure 3 illustrates the number of Martin directives issued in each
year, as well as a linear regression line demonstrating a robust upward trend;
Figure 4 presents the annual and total number of Martin directives.
Figure 3: Martin Directives Issued by Year from 1999, with Least-Square
Linear Regression
70
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Figure 4: Historical Annual and Total Martin Directives
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416. The many pages necessary to provide citation to well over five hundred cases is not
recommended here, given the expedient of a simple text search on Westlaw or Lexis. E.g., Lane,
supra note11, at 351. However, the data set from which these figures are derived, current through
calendar 2016, is on file with the author and is available to interested academics or researchers upon
request via the editorial board of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly.
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Taken together, these figures paint a picture starkly different from that
intimated in the in forma pauperis Supreme Court decisions of Part III.
Whereas one might have imagined that only some minuscule number of
long-term troublemakers would warrant banishment, and that these would be
swiftly identified and disposed of, the reality has not borne out that optimistic
presumption.417
The initial cases targeted petitioners who had importuned the Court
many dozens of times;418 with Martin on the books, troublemakers were
banned after as few as eight filings.419 And once the formulaic Martin
directive was put into practice, the Court has not even quantified the degree
of abuse that justified its ultimate punishment being meted out to hundreds
of indigent litigants.420 Thus rather than one or two, dozens more paupers
are being added the rolls of the proscribed every year—permanently—
yielding a rapidly growing list of litigants denied access to the highest
court.421 What was intended as an “extreme remedy” for “exigent
circumstances” to be deployed “with particular caution” has become rote.422
If the Court has not found and banned the vast majority of pestersome
paupers over the last two decades, one must be skeptical that its mission will
ever be complete.423 Rather, Martin directives and concomitant barring of
the courtroom doors seem set to continue indefinitely into the future, as a
ceaseless supply of paupers commend themselves to the attention of the
Court’s censorial tendencies.424
And of course Martin directives have no effect on those who can afford
to subsidize their filings, as those of means are ineligible for in forma
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417. See, e.g., Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16, 18 (1991) (“For that reason we take the limited
step of censuring two petitioners who are unique—not merely among those who seek to file in
forma pauperis, but also among those who have paid the required filing fees—because they have
repeatedly made totally frivolous demands on the Court’s limited resources.”).
418. E.g., Zatko, 502 U.S. at 176 (73 and 45 filings); In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16 (1991) (32
filings); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 177–78 (1991) (42 filings); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180,
181–82 (1989) (73 filings).
419. E.g., Ferstel-Rust, 527 U.S. at 470 (8 filings); Whitfield, 527 U.S. at 886 reconsideration
denied, (9 filings); Brancato, 528 U.S. at 2 (8 filings).
420. See, e.g., Baba, 528 U.S. 1016 and In re Reidt, 528 U.S. 1018.
421. See supra figs. 3 & 4. Eventually, one imagines, the list will begin to see some diminution
as banned litigants perish.
422. In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075,
1079 (1st Cir. 1980)).
423. See Lane, supra note 11, at 351 (quoting ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE § 8.2 (8th ed. 2002)).
424. Id.
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pauperis status in the first place.425 The result: of those petitioners, past and
future, that the Supreme Court deems sufficiently pestersome to act, the
wealthy may freely continue their importunities to the Court by paying for
the right to do so, whilst the impoverished are increasingly categorically
barred, whatever the merits of their claims.426 The key to the highest
courtroom can be bought.427

V. Reassessing the Arguments For and Against Martin
Directives
Given the Court’s increasingly rote use of Martin directives, a
reassessment of the merits of the practice is timely. There is a broad
difference between, on the one hand, Martin’s vision of proscribing a
singularly wayward petitioner as an example to all, and on the other hand,
the present trajectory of perfunctorily banishing an ever-growing list of
indigent petitioners. In the following part, the arguments raised by the two
sides in the Court’s in forma pauperis dialectic are addressed roughly in
order of their cogency, resulting in a chiastic structure that begins with the
dissent’s weakest arguments, proceeds through the majority’s more or less
legitimate concerns, and finally returns to what this Article concludes to be
the strongest argument, by the minority.

A. Minority — Prospective Proscription Exceeds the Court’s
Power

10/23/2018 13:43:40

425. See Smith, supra note 2, at 103 (observing that “the rule only applied to petitioners—
such as prisoners—who are too poor to pay the $300 filing fee”); Franklin, supra note 93, at 202.
426. Cf. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F. 3d 307, 327–30 (3d. Cir. 2001) (Mansmann, J.,
dissenting).
427. See id. (“If they cannot buy entry into court, they must wait until they can; and if the wait
is too long, justice will be denied to them.”).
428. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to an earlier
version of the Supreme Court Rules in which the operative rule was numbered 46); see Sup. Ct. R.
39.4 (“When the documents required by paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Rule are presented to the Clerk,
accompanied by proof of service as required by Rule 29, they will be placed on the docket without
the payment of a docket fee or any other fee.”).
429. In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13 (1991) (per curiam).
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The most straightforward argument the minority musters is also the
weakest: that the Court lacks the power to prospectively proscribe its
petitioners. This argument came in two flavors, the first of which was that
the Court’s own Rule 39.4 disallowed the clerk from doing what the Court
had directed: refusing to docket a properly filed in forma pauperis petition.428
The Court ostensibly corrected this oversight when it altered its rules to allow
for dismissals in In re Amendment to Rule 39.429 Oddly, although the
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majority there apparently believed that its amendment would now empower
the clerk to refuse any interdicted claims, there is nothing in the amendment
that perceptibly effectuates that goal.430 This is underscored by the fact that
Martin directives expressly depend on Rule 39.8 only for the dismissal of
the petition sub judice—which Rule 39.8 clearly does permit; authority for
the prospective ban relies only on Martin.431 Whether the Court’s clerk may
properly refuse to file a petition under the unmodified Rule 39.4 is not
resolved by the text of Rule 39.8.432 Nonetheless, this argument fails more
fundamentally because, whatever its rules seem to say, the Court surely has
the power to reinterpret them as it sees fit.433
Similarly, the dissent argued that the federal statute governing in forma
pauperis filings, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, did not permit prospective denials,
because the court’s discretion to dismiss was limited to complaints “found to
be frivolous or malicious.”434 A hypothetical as-yet-unfiled claim, of course,
could not be found to be anything.435 This is a rather pretty argument, but is
undercut by the permissive language in the statute, to which the majority
adverted pointedly: A court “may” allow filing in forma pauperis, but it is
not required to.436 The dissent admits this almost parenthetically, but then
moves beyond the text itself in favor of inferring a statutory mandate
incumbent on the Court from the “comprehensive scheme” laid out, which
is hardly conclusive.437 True, courts have read § 1915 to at least require
access to trial courts and an appeal of right when the statute’s requirements
are complied with, avoiding potential constitutional infirmity.438 But the
Supreme Court has elsewhere reserved the question of whether discretionary
appeals enjoy the same constitutional position as those of right.439 Whatever
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430. Lane, supra note 11, at 360.
431. See, e.g., Baba v. Japan Travel Bureau, 528 U.S. 1016 (1999); In re Reidt, 528 U.S. 1018
(1999).
432. Lane, supra note 11, at 360.
433. Id. (“As a practical matter, however, the technical language of Rule 39.8 is irrelevant
because the Court promulgates its own rules and, thus, the Court’s intent behind or interpretation
of those rules is all that matters.”). But cf. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 186 (“Of course, we are
free to amend our own rules should we see the need to do so, but until we do we are bound by them.”).
434. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 185–86.
435. Id.; see also In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 181–82 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
436. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 183 (per curiam).
437. Id. at 185 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
438. See Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 337–40 (1948); see also
supra Section I-A. But see Shapiro v. Burns, 7 Misc. 418, 420, 27 N.Y.S. 980 (N.Y. Ct. Com. Pl.
Mar. 1, 1984) (employing statutory construction to find an analogous statute should be read as
obligatory rather than permissive).
439. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963) (“We are not here concerned with
problems that might arise from the denial of counsel for the preparation of a petition for
discretionary or mandatory review beyond the stage in the appellate process at which the claims
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the mandate for in forma pauperis filings, the statute’s text does not clearly
answer the question as to the Supreme Court.
In any event, to advance a rules-based or statutory argument to delimit
the Court’s authority is likely futile. It is well established that all courts have
the inherent power under Article III of the Constitution to protect their
process against abuse by litigants and maintain the efficiency of their
docket.440 Similarly, the expansive All Writs Act provides a basis for courts
to issue any orders needful to their function, including the sanctioning of
petitioners:441
It is well within the broad scope of the All Writs Act for a district
court to issue an order restricting the filing of meritless cases by a
litigant whose manifold complaints raise claims identical or
similar to those that already have been adjudicated. The interests
of repose, finality of judgments, protection of defendants from
unwarranted harassment, and concern for maintaining order in the
court’s dockets have been deemed sufficient by a number of courts
to warrant such a prohibition against relitigation of claims. . . .
We agree with the First and District of Columbia Circuits,
however, that a continuous pattern of groundless and vexatious
litigation can, at some point, support an order against further
filings of complaints without the permission of the court. The case
before us appears to reveal a situation sufficient to justify exercise
of the court’s power, under the All Writ’s [sic] Act, to do so.442

10/23/2018 13:43:40

have once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate court. We are dealing only
with the first appeal, granted as a matter of right to rich and poor alike from a criminal conviction.”)
(citiation omitted).
440. See Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Joseph C. Anclien, Broader Is
Better: The Inherent Power of Federal Courts, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37, 44–49 (2008);
Robert J. Martineau, Frivolous Appeals: The Uncertain Federal Response, 1984 DUKE L.J. 845,
861–62 (1984).
441. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
442. In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445–46 (3d Cir. 1982).
443. See id.; Anclien, supra note 440, at 37–41 (inherent powers).
444. See Anclien, supra note 440, at 47–48 (noting that “one of the most common and
important roles of inherent powers is to allow courts to craft flexible sticks to sanction
contumacious parties” and providing examples); see, e.g., In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 780–81 &
784–85 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (entering order sanctioning prolific petitioner under the All Writs Act);
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Such power is not cabined by procedural rules or statute, and is by its
nature malleable to the circumstances demanding its deployment.443 Even if
the Court’s rules and the in forma pauperis statute prescribe different forms,
therefore, the Court may resort to unique measures if the standard framework
proves lacking and the integrity of the judicial function itself is threatened.444
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(Whether pestersome paupers pose such a threat is a factual question distinct
from that of the Court’s inherent power.445) To borrow an idiom, judicial
procedural rules are not a suicide pact.446 Justice Brennan recognized as
much in conceding arguendo that his statutory objections to Martin
directives were less than dispositive.447 The minority’s repeated reproach
that the majority had identified no “statute or rule giving it the extraordinary
authority” for its practice gained no greater cogency with repetition.448 The
judiciary’s inherent power, and the breadth of the All Writs Act, are
extraordinary.449

B. Minority — Proscription Offends Due Process by Prejudging
a Petitioner’s Claims
A related argument is that a prospective proscription improperly
adjudicates a petitioner’s future claims to be meritless before they are even
filed (or, in all likelihood, even conceived). Rather than couch this
observation as violating a court rule or statute, this stronger argument implies
that such prejudice would offend a petitioner’s right to due process.
Curiously, however, the dissents only adumbrated this idea, perhaps best
expressed in Sindram when Justice Marshall opined that “we should not
presume in advance that prolific indigent litigants will never bring a
meritorious claim.”450 Yet having posed that provocative point, Marshall
pivoted directly to a more generalized argument about the effects that

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 68 Side A
10/23/2018 13:43:40

Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A) (same but citing inherent powers);
Oliver, 682 F.2d at 445–46 (same).
445. See, e.g., infra Sections V-C, V-D.
446. Cf., e.g., Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The Constitution is
not a suicide pact.”).
447. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Even if the legality
of our action in ordering the Clerk to refuse future petitions for extraordinary writs in forma
pauperis from this litigant were beyond doubt . . . .”).
448. E.g., In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 17 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see In re Sindram,
498 U.S. 177, 181–82 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
449. United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904 (2009) (discussing “the All Writs Act and the
extraordinary relief the statute authorizes” via the coram nobis writ); Penn. Bureau of Corr’s v.
U.S. Marshall Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985) (observing that “the Act empowers federal courts to
fashion extraordinary remedies when the need arises”); ITT Comm. Development Corp. v. Barton,
569 F.2d 1351, 1358 (5th Cir. 1978) (referring to “[t]he authority of a district court to invoke the
extraordinary powers conferred by the All Writs Act and the inherent powers doctrine”). N.b.:
Whilst a court’s inherent power and the All Writs Act may well allow it to supersede rules or
statutes that inadequately address a problem, they presumably would not permit transgression of a
discrete constitutional dictate.
450. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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discouraging in forma pauperis claims might have on the justice system.451
But the proposition that the judiciary injures the individual petitioner by
prejudging a hypothetical future claim warrants more attention that the cases
explicitly afford.
After all, lower courts had repeatedly rejected overly sweeping bans on
indigent litigants as violating due process and the constitutional right of
access to the courts.452 Although Martin directives leave open the possibility
of a proscribed petitioner objecting to a criminal penalty, their complete ban
on pursuing any civil matter whatsoever cannot be characterized as
interdicting only matters on which a petitioner has already clearly
demonstrated that no valid claim inheres; such a ban preemptively cuts off
scrutiny of even wholly novel claims.453 The lower courts have stated that
this brand of prejudice offends due process: “It is axiomatic that no petitioner
or person shall ever be denied his right to the processes of the court.”454 And
the Supreme Court exceeded even the most extreme remedies of the PLRA
and Fifth and Eight Circuits: Whereas all had permitted narrow exemptions
for cases alleging corporal jeopardy, a Martin directive’s interdiction of civil
petitioners is absolute and unqualified.455 Even the Eighth Circuit expressly
rejected such a remedy as transgressing due process,456 and the Fifth Circuit
followed the Eight Circuit’s precedent.457
It is problematic to fault the Supreme Court in this regard, however—
perhaps this is why the minority never emphasized the point. The circuit
courts of appeals differ crucially from the Supreme Court: Whilst the direct
appellate court must consider appeals as a matter of right,458 the Court’s
certiorari docket is purely discretionary.459 No petitioner has any entitlement
to a writ of certiorari from the Court,460 and thus even its peremptory denial
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 68 Side B
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451. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (“Nor should we lose sight of the important role in forma
pauperis claims have played in shaping constitutional doctrine.”); see also infra Section V-E.
452. E.g., Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc); In re Green,
669 F.2d 779, 785–87 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Green, 598 F.2d 1126, 1127 (8th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
453. See Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180,
187–88 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
454. In re Green, 598 F.2d at 1127.
455. Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
456. See Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 1980).
457. See Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285, 286–87 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Green, 616 F.2d 1054
and In re Green, 598 F.2d 1126).
458. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for Descretionary Review in Federal
Courts of Appeals, 34 SW. L.J. 1151, 1151 & n.2 (1980) (“Federal litigants in both civil and criminal
cases have been given the right of appellate review in the courts of appeals since the Act of 1891
creating the federal courts of appeals.”); Lane, supra note 11, at 363.
459. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 491–97 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Kapral v.
United States, 166 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 1999); Lane, supra note 11, at 363.
460. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 491–93.
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has not abridged any process due a litigant.461 In short, if the Court may deny
certiorari for any reason (or no reason at all), the method of its denial cannot
implicate due process as such.462 It is for this very reason that the Court has
long stated that its denial of certiorari expresses no opinion on the merits of
a petition.463 The Court’s peremptorily denying certiorari on a litigant’s
future petitions similarly does not call into question their merit; it invokes
the Court’s unquestioned power to grant—or not grant—review as a matter
of grace, not obligation.464 Due process demands no more.465

C. Majority — Absent Proscription, a Prolific Petitioner
Imperils the Court’s Efficacy
Leaving aside the minority’s initial arguments, the Supreme Court’s
majority originally fastened on a singular argument in defense of the logic
behind Martin directives: that proscription was necessary to prevent a
prolific petitioner from diminishing the Court’s ability to effectuate its
mission. This was expressed in some form in each of the earlier cases,
beginning with McDonald:
Every paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how
repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution’s
limited resources. A part of the Court’s responsibility is to see
that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the
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461. See also Peck v. Hoff, 660 F.2d 371, 373 (8th Cir. 1981) (“We also find no basis for a
due process claim. It is well settled that in order to be entitled due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, there must be some legal entitlement, right or liberty interest that is protected under
state or federal law.”) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1976), and Montanye v.
Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)).
462. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917–19 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari).
463. E.g., id.; Singleton v. C.I.R., 439 U.S. 940, 942 (1978) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of
certiorari); House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42, 48 (1945); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. &
Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916).
464. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 491–97 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Maryland, 338 U.S. at
917–19; Singleton, 439 U.S. at 942.
465. It might be argued that––analogous to precedent on peremptory strikes that require no
justification––a court’s ability to deny a petition for no reason at all does not confer a concomitant
right to deny a petition for an invidious reason. Cf., e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Whether discrimination based on wealth constitutes such an invidious purpose, whether Martin
directives do discriminate in a constitutional sense, and indeed whether such an analogy is cogent
in the context of the Supreme Court’s plenary discretion, went undiscussed in the Supreme Court
cases, and are questions for another scholar. Given serious difficulties with such an argument given
precedent that indigence is not a “suspect” classification, see sources cited infra note 630, and the
Court’s pretermitting any such consideration in its dialectic, this Article rests on prudential rather
than constitutional reasons for the Court to reverse course. See also Lane, supra note 11, at 335–
58 (considering and rejecting a constitutional argument against Martin directives).
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interests of justice. The continual processing of petitioner’s
frivolous requests for extraordinary writs does not promote that
end.466

10/23/2018 13:43:40

466. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (per curiam).
467. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 179–80 (1991) (per curiam).
468. In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 16–17 (1991) (per curiam).
469. E.g., Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A); In re Green, 598 F.2d
1126, 1127 (8th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
470. See supra notes 458–464 and accompanying text; Lane, supra note 11, at 363; see
generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959).
471. E.g., In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is usually much
easier to decide that a petition should be denied than to decide whether or not it is frivolous.”); In
re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 180–81 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Wrenn v. Benson, 490 U.S. 89, 92 (1989)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); In re McDonald, 489 U.S.at 188 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Brown v. Herald
Co., 464 U.S. 928, 928–930 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
472. Hart, supra note 470, at 88, 90.

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 69 Side B

Sindram and Demos would echo the same logic, whilst amplifying it.
Sindram opined that “the goal of fairly dispensing justice” was
“compromised” and “the fair administration of justice” was “unsettl[ed]” by
addressing the petitioner’s serially meritless requests, and therefrom
discerned a duty to deny Sindram further feeless access to its courtroom.467
Demos went even further, espying malice in its petitioner, whose “method of
seeking relief . . . could only be calculated to disrupt the orderly
consideration of cases.”468 In all of these early cases, the concern of the
Court was squarely aimed at the potential of the prolific litigant sub judice
to substantively impede the business of the Court if not prospectively
proscribed.
But the Court’s fear cannot be credited as stated. Inferior courts too
have adverted to the possibility of a single prolific petitioner clogging their
clerks with demands for attention, and more importantly, demanding the
plenary review of the Court time and time again.469 But as the discussion of
due process highlighted, whilst a lower court bound to hear an appeal must
substantively do so, the discretionary docket of the Supreme Court mandates
no such dedication of time.470 The dissenting justices observed recurrently
that the denial of a frivolous petition for certiorari requires almost no time
and is a most efficient way to address such a petition.471 The eminent Henry
M. Hart, Jr. estimated that time at a mere five minutes.472 True, an interdicted
petitioner will never again waste that scintilla of attention, but even a lifetime
vaingloriously dedicated to tilting at the windmills of futile claims, spanning
many hundreds of petitions, could never have an appreciable effect on the
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Court’s ability to function.473 Such petitions may be minor if inconvenient
wastes of time, but they cannot imperil the Court.474 No one person has the
capacity for such mischief.475
The example of the Reverend Clovis Carl Green Jr. discussed above in
Section II-B is instructive. Even this paragon of prolific petitioners could
not so encumber the judiciary as to merit an absolute proscription: The D.C.
Circuit affirmed that Green had a “right of access to federal courts” and
struck down an order interdicting Reverend Green,476 and even the Eighth
and Fifth Circuits left the courtroom doors slightly ajar.477 By 1983,
Reverend Green had targeted the Supreme Court with no less than sixty-six
petitions and motions, to the point that justices “flinch[ed] at the sound of
his name.”478 Notwithstanding such provocation, the Court was “content . . .
to simply deny Mr. Green’s petitions without comment,”479 only departing
from that practice when Green omitted the required affidavit for leave to file
in forma pauperis.480 Critically, even then its order denying leave “applie[d]
only to the current petition, and did not bar Mr. Green from filing unpaid
petitions in future cases.”481 And once Reverend Green submitted the
affidavit, the Court granted him in forma pauperis status without cavil.482 If
the indefatigable Reverend Green—“the most prolific prison litigant in
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473. See Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16, 19 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that
despite the Court’s processing of one thousand in forma pauperis petitions in a single term, of
which over half were likely frivolous, “[t]he ‘integrity of our process’ was not compromised in the
slightest . . . .”).
474. See, e.g., In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 180–81 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing
petitioner as a “minor inconvenience” and opining that “the Court’s worries about the threats that
hyperactive in forma pauperis litigants like Sindram pose to our ability to manage our docket are
greatly exaggerated”).
475. It must be said that in a day of electronic filing (or perhaps even in the days of
photocopiers), one could imagine a litigant who files hundreds or thousands of petitions every day—
perhaps millions over a lifetime—and who could actually present a logistical hazard to the
machinery of a court. Such legal tsunamis are purely conjectural, however, with the most prolific
litigants tallying lifetime totals in the hundreds, not millions. See Linda Greenhouse, Paper Siege
by Prisoner Provokes Ire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 1983), https://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/07/us/pa
per-siege-by-prisoner-provokes-ire.html. The machinery of the Court can surely handle the
equivalent of denying an average of one extra petition a week, which far exceeds the upper
threshold of temerity of any known real-world litigant.
476. In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 785–87 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
477. Green v. White (In re Green), 616 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); In re Green,
598 F.2d 1126, 1127 (8th Cir. 1979) (en banc); Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Unit A).
478. Greenhouse, supra note 475.
479. Id.
480. Green v. White, 460 U.S. 1067 (1983), vacated, 462 U.S. 1111 (1983).
481. Greenhouse, supra note 475.
482. Green v. White, 462 U.S. 1111.
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recorded history,” in the words of the D.C. Circuit483—could not bring the
wheels of justice to a halt, it is implausible that anyone could.

D. Majority — Proscriptions Are Required to Deter Meritless
Petitions Generally from Impeding the Court

10/23/2018 13:43:40

483. In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
484. See Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 3 (1992) (per curiam).
485. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see id. at 188.
486. See In re Demos, 500 U.S. at 18–19 (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re Sindram, 498 U.S.
177, 182 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
487. See In re Demos, 500 U.S. at 18–19 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Two years ago, Justice
Brennan sagely warned that in ‘needlessly depart[ing] from its generous tradition’ of leaving its
doors open to all classes of litigants, the Court ‘sets sail on a journey whose landing point is
uncertain.’ In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 188 (dissenting opinion). The journey’s ominous
destination is becoming apparent. The Court appears resolved to close its doors to increasing
numbers of indigent litigants–and for increasingly less justifiable reasons. I fear that the Court’s action
today portends even more Draconian restrictions on the access of indigent litigants to this Court.”).
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Although the initial cases ostensibly aimed at redressing a single
petitioner’s abuses, the majority made its reasoning more clear (and more
creditable) in the later cases. Even if one petitioner cannot wreak havoc on
the Court by superfluity, if numerous petitioners were to do so, the Court
might indeed be overwhelmed. Those that were particularly prolific in their
frivolous filings, therefore, must be censured and potentially interdicted to
serve as a deterrent to such behavior. Whilst any single miscreant—even a
Reverend Green—poses a scant threat, interdicting that egregious example
could serve to forestall numerous other potential meritless claims whose
proponents might fear similar treatment. If meritless petitioners considered
in the aggregate threatened the Court’s function, then singling out the most
egregious to prevent even greater numbers from swamping the Court might
well be necessary, however distasteful.484
Indeed, the minority discerned early on that this was the majority’s true
trajectory. Justice Brennan recognized in McDonald that the majority’s
“order makes sense as an efficiency measure only if it is merely the prelude
to similar orders in regard to other litigants, or perhaps to a generalized rule
limiting the number of petitions in forma pauperis an individual may file.
Therein lies its danger.”485 Subsequent cases in the following months and
years only confirmed and reconfirmed these suspicions.486 By the time Zatko
and Martin arrived, the Court’s ultimate destination had become something
of a foregone conclusion.487
By the majority’s lights, only by meeting exceptional abuse with
rejoinder in kind could the Court’s docket as a whole be properly
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constrained.488 Or as Zatko put it, “[i]n the hope that our action will deter
future similar frivolous practices, we deny Zatko and Martin leave to proceed
in forma pauperis in these cases.”489 Such sanctions, under that theory,
would be rare indeed: “we take the limited step of censuring two petitioners
who are unique—not merely among those who seek to file in forma paupers,
but also among those who have paid the required filing fees—because they
have repeatedly made totally frivolous demands on the Court’s limited
resources.”490 And as Zatko taught by limiting its sanction to a single rather
than prospective denial of leave, lesser abuses would merit lesser
sanctions491—but as Martin would teach, obdurate persistence would
necessitate more extreme measures as an example to discourage such
recalcitrance by all petitioners.492
1. The Problem of Judgment-Proof Paupers and Prisoners
As for why that extremity meant interdiction rather than more
traditional remedies, the majority found it followed straightforwardly from
the unique position of in forma pauperis petitioners.493 A typical plaintiff’s
responsibility for filing fees and costs dissuade frivolous filings.494 True, a
wealthier petitioner intent on serially abusing the Court’s time could pay the
filing fee to continue to do so.495 But, reasoned the Court, payment of the
filing fee acts as a real deterrent to all but the very rich:496 Although $300
may seem a relatively small sum, a petitioner considering a barrage of filings
might think twice before expending, for example, the $21,900 necessary to
file the seventy-three hopeless petitions that Vladimir Zatko had been able
to submit gratis.497
Petitioners of means may be further deterred by the ordinary function
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 71 Side A
10/23/2018 13:43:40

488. See Martin, 506 U.S. at 2–3; see Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16, 17-18 (1991) (per
curiam).
489. Zatko, 502 U.S. at 17.
490. Zatko, 502 U.S. at 18.
491. Id.
492. Martin, 506 U.S. at 2–3; see also Zatko, 502 U.S. at 18 (“Future similar filings from these
petitioners will merit additional measures.”).
493. See In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 13 (1991) (per curiam); In re Sindram, 498
U.S. 177, 180 (1991) (per curiam); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (per curiam).
494. See In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 13; In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 180; In re
McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184.
495. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F. 3d 307, 328 (3d. Cir. 2001) (Mansmann, J.,
dissenting).
496. See In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 13 (“Filings under our paid docket require a notinsubstantial filing fee.”); Sindram, 498 U.S. at 180; McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184.
497. See Zatko, 502 U.S. at 17 (per curiam).
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of the Court’s system of assessing punitive damages under Rule 42.2.498
Historically, however, such power had been employed very rarely,499 and the
Court had hesitated to fine litigants even for obtusely frivolous petitions.500
In the 1985 case of Talimini v. Allstate Insurance Co., moreover, the dividing
line between the in forma pauperis majority and minority factions was
vividly on display.501 There, the Court declined to sanction the filer of an
appeal whose defect “competent counsel should readily recognize.”502
Justice Stevens and his usual co-dissenters concluded that denial of certiorari
was so painless that there was no more reason for monetary sanctions than
they would see for interdiction.503 Accordingly, the threat of onerous
sanctions would imperil the tradition of “open access to all levels of the
judicial system” that would animate the in forma pauperis cases.504 Chief
Justice Burger, writing for himself and Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor,
made an impassioned plea for more liberal use of sanctions to patrol the
Court’s docket.505 Still, given a choice between sanctions and interdiction,
even the minority should agree monetary sanctions are better targeted and
suited to punish serially bad-faith filings whilst still allowing through the
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498. In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 13; see Sup. Ct. R. 42.2 (“When a petition for a writ
of certiorari, an appeal, or an application for other relief is frivolous, the Court may award the
respondent or appellee just damages, and single or double costs under Rule 43. Damages or costs
may be awarded against the petitioner, appellant, or applicant, against the party’s counsel, or against
both party and counsel.”).
499. See Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1069, n.7 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
500. See id. at 1072–73 (Burger, J., dissenting).
501. Compare id. at 1068–72 (Stevens, J., concurring) with id. at 1072–73 (Burger, J.,
dissenting). Because Justice Powell was recused from the case, and Justice White discerned no
jurisdiction and would thus dismiss, Justice Stevens’s concurrence for four justices was the
controlling plurality of the Court.
502. Id. at 1069 (Stevens, J., concurring).
503. Id. (“Because of the large number of applications for review that are regularly filed in this
Court, the public interest in the efficient administration of our docket requires that we minimize the
time devoted to the disposition of applications that are plainly without merit. Any evenhanded
attempt to determine which of the unmeritorious applications should give rise to sanctions, and
which should merely be denied summarily, would be a time-consuming and unrewarding task.”).
504. Id. at 1070–72.
505. Id. at 1072–74 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“Rule 49.2 [then providing for sanctions] has a
purpose which has too long been ignored; it is time we applied it. I would apply it here.”).
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potentially meritorious,506 as have commentators.507
In forma pauperis petitioners, especially prisoners, are crucially
different. Some may be able to afford some partial pittances,508 but the truly
destitute are insusceptible of filing fees and functionally immune from
financial sanctions.509 Courts have accordingly declined to fruitlessly assess
such costs or sanctions against in forma pauperis litigants,510
notwithstanding their sure authority to do so.511 Nor can the threat of
contempt always serve as an effective deterrent.512 A litigant at liberty, to be
sure, will likely see the threat of incarceration as a “potent discourager”; it
may be the “only one, in the case of prisoners.”513 But prisoners serving long
or life sentences may quite rationally be less docile.514 Indeed, even
prisoners serving shorter terms may not adhere to their own self-interest,
becoming their “own worst enemy” in racking up avoidable contempt
sentences.515 The prolific Reverend Green would have been freed in 1980
were it not for such sentences, but instead found himself still in jail a year
later, persevering at his trade of jailhouse lawyering and frivolous
petitioning.516
Though there remain other remedies such as self-certification and a
requirement for leave of court, these inevitably leave some opening for abuse
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506. See Talamini, 470 U.S. at 1071 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“This is not, of course, to
suggest that courts should tolerate gross abuses of the judicial process. . . . [I]f it appears that
unmeritorious litigation has been prolonged merely for the purposes of delay, with no legitimate
prospect of success, an award of double costs and damages occasioned by the delay may be
appropriate.”).
507. See Van Vort, supra note 141, at 1179–90 (discussing how to balance limited versions of
monetary assessments against in forma pauperis litigants with the need to ensure access for
meritorious claims).
508. See id.
509. Van Vort, supra note 141, at 1165 (“Some courts attempt to deter non-indigent frivolous
lawsuits by assessing monetary sanctions against plaintiffs or their attorneys. Such measures,
however, cannot be applied practically against either indigents.”).
510. Id. at 1165 n.6 (citing cases); id. at 1188 & n.146 (same).
511. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); see Von Vort, supra note 141, at 1188–90.
512. See Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 159–60 (M.D. Fla. 1983), rev’d, 760 F.2d 1107
(11th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam).
513. Duniway, supra note 23, at 1286.
514. Procup, 567 F. Supp. at 159 (“Procup is presently serving a term of life imprisonment.
The threat of receiving additional periods of incarceration for being held in contempt of court does
not appear likely to deter Procup from his abusive practices.”).
515. In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
516. Id.
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by malicious litigants.517 Some will do so.518 Even annual limits foresee a
regular stream of continuing litigation.519 Only proscription guarantees that
a prolific in forma pauperis petitioner will petition no more.520 The question
is whether the aggregate detriment to the Court from undeterred frivolous
filings is sufficiently grave to justify deployment of the sole sure deterrent
the Court can bring to bear against those without means.521 And answering
that question requires taking a closer look at the demands on the Court’s time
and thus at the numbers behind its docket itself.
2. The Supreme Court’s “Incredible Shrinking Plenary Docket”522
That the volume of cases taken by the Supreme Court has declined
steadily over time has been the subject of much scholarly literature spanning
decades.523 Some of the brightest luminaries in the legal firmament have
written of the phenomenon.524 And this shrinking docket coincides with a
steady increase in the number of petitions being filed, with the
mathematically inexorable result that an ever-smaller percentage of cases are
deemed worthy of review.525 As a function of time, petitioners—indigent or
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517. See Procup, 567 F. Supp. at 158–160 (discussing potential for abuse of various remedies),
rev’d, 760 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072–73 (11th Cir.
1986) (en banc) (per curiam) (outlining various options).
518. See Green, 669 F.2d at 782–84.
519. See sources cited supra notes 223-25.
520. See Procup, 567 F. Supp. at 158–60.
521. Compare, e.g., Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 2–4 (1992) (per curiam), with id. at
4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
522. David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the Supreme
Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 779 (1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
523. See id. (“The ‘incredible shrinking’ plenary docket of the Supreme Court has drawn
considerable attention.”); e.g., Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s
Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012); David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s
Declining Plenary Docket: A Membership-Based Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151 (2010);
Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard
Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363 (2005); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The
Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737 (2001); Arthur D. Hellman, The
Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403 (1996); Arthur D. Hellman, The
Supreme Court, the National Law, and the Selection of Cases for the Plenary Docket, 44 U. PITT.
L. REV. 521 (1983); Gerhard Casper & Richard A. Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court’s
Caseload, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (1974); William O. Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case
Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401, 404–07 (1960) (“During the last two decades, there has been a marked
decline in the number of opinions written each term.”).
524. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 523; Casper & Posner, supra note 523; Douglas, supra note 523.
525. See O’Brien, supra note 522, at 779–80 & fig.1.
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not—have faced longer and longer odds that the Court will deem their claims
worthy of plenary review.526 Figure 5 illustrates these trends.527
Figure 5: Supreme Court Petitions and Grants, OT 1970-2015
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526. See Casper & Posner, supra note 523, at 349–52; O’Brien, supra note 522, at 779–80 & fig.1.
527. The data for this and further discussion of Supreme Court caseload statistics is drawn
from that presented in the annual Journal of the Supreme Court of the United States, as published
from 1970 to 2015. Petitions and grants include cases in certiorari and direct appeal stances, but
not original cases.
528. See Casper & Posner, supra note 523, at 352–60.
529. See generally Stras, supra note 523 (“The decline in the Supreme Court’s plenary docket
over the past thirty years has puzzled commentators.”).
530. See sources cited supra note 523.

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 73 Side A

The burgeoning number of petitions is facially explicable: there is only
one Supreme Court, and ever more litigants whose claims therefore filter up
the highest court eventually.528 Why the Court has responded by steadily
decreasing the absolute number of cases accepted, rather than increasing it,
is a more confounding question; such a response only exacerbates the
systemic numerical disparity.529 Legal scholars have sought to solve this
puzzle in various ways.530
Some have adverted to the Court’s varying willingness to revisit and
reinterpret constitutional issues and a greater call for such cases when law
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and society are rapidly evolving;531 others have pointed to personnel: the
strong influence of different chief justices in setting expectations for the
Court’s docket,532 the impact of individual justices’ views,533 or ideological
polarization in the Court’s makeup correlating to fewer grants.534
Commenting on the phenomenon, Justice Souter adverted to extrinsic
influences, such as lower rates of legislation, antitrust enforcement, and civil
rights litigation, as well as internal factors like fewer jurisprudential
disagreements with lower courts, and less division within the Court calling
for resolution.535 But whatever the ultimate causes, as early as 1959, Hart
summed up the problem succinctly: “the fact [is] that the Court has more
work to do than it is able to do in the way in which the work ought to be
done.”536 Justice Douglas agreed then,537 and the problem has clearly only
aggravated since.538
Focusing on whether a petitioner is paying or has in forma pauperis
status offers further insight. It is unmistakable and remarkable that both
trajectories—the increase in petitions, and the decrease in granted cases—
advanced precipitously between 1988 and 1992.539 One commentator
suggested this “extraordinary” decline may be attributed to the “high
turnover” of justices between 1986 and 1993.540 But this is also the very
lustrum during which the Supreme Court was likewise precipitously revising
its jurisprudence on in forma pauperis proscriptions.541 Perhaps there might
be some common factor that explains these contemporaneous phenomena?
Critically, by distinguishing between filing statuses, one can see that there
were actually two trends at play during this pivotal lustrum, as illustrated in
Figure 6.
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531. Casper & Posner, supra note 523, at 352–53, 357–59.
532. See O’Brien, supra 522, at 782.
533. See Stras, supra note 523.
534. See Owens & Simon, supra note 523.
535. See O’Brien, supra note 522, at 780–82 (discussing Shannon Duffy, Inside the Highest
Court: Souter Describes Justices’ Relationship, Caseload Trend, PA. LAW WKLY., April 17, 1995,
at 11).
536. Hart, supra note 470, at 84.
537. Douglas, supra note 523.
538. See supra Figure 5; Owens & Simon, supra note 523, at 1229 & fig.1; Stras, supra note
523, at 152–53 & fig.1.
539. See supra Figure 5; Stras, supra note 523, at 152–53 & fig.1; O’Brien, supra note 522, at
780 & fig.1; id. at 782 (observing that “the plenary docket gradually declined and, then, fell sharply
in the early 1990s.”).
540. Stras, supra note 523, at 152–161.
541. See supra Part III.
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Figure 6: Supreme Court Petitions and Grants, by Filing Status, OT 19702015
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From roughly 1970 to 1988, petitioners were divided equally between
in forma pauperis and paying filings. Notably, however, a dramatically
higher proportion of paying filers were granted review: usually between 125
and 175, versus between ten to thirty indigent claims. The first set of trends
from 1988-1992 shows that even as the number of in forma pauperis cases
ballooned, the Supreme Court maintained its practice of accepting roughly
the same number every year. The result, of course, is that the portion of
paupers received a hearing plummeted: from 0.93% in the period from 1970
to 1980 to 0.15% in the period from 2005 to 2015, a sixfold decrease. Paying
petitioners did not fare markedly better. Although the Court did not see any
real increase in such petitions annually, the number granted fell, with the
result that the portion of paying petitioners receiving hearings similarly fell
by half, from 6.8% from 1970-1980 to 3.7% in 2005-2015. In the era of the
Court’s incredible shrinking docket, all petitioners have suffered.
Yet the suffering is not in the same degree or for the same reason.
Despite the drastic increase in in forma pauperis petitions, the Court has not
granted more; if anything, the number granted has dwindled slightly over the
last fifty years. This suggests that the increase does not represent the sudden
outpouring of theretofore unfiled meritorious claims, but a proliferation of
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frivolous or at least less worthy filings that do not garner grants.542 This may
also be evidenced by the proportion of in forma pauperis claims grants
dropping more than those of paying petitioners.543 On the other hand, there
is little reason to think that the more constant influx of paid claims suddenly
became less cogent between 1988 and 1992.544 Thus the sharp decline in
their grants likely represents the Court declining review to a higher
percentage of meritorious claims.545 This development, correlating with the
dramatic increase in in forma pauperis filings, lends credence to the
majority’s view in the critical lustrum that worthy cases were not receiving
the attention they deserved.546
With these understandings, a credible causal inference thus emerges as
to the hidden factor underlying all of these trends. As the majority argued,
the explosion of in forma pauperis claims seems to have indeed reduced the
Supreme Court’s ability to discern and grant review to meritorious claims.547
The majority couched this concern specifically in terms of unworthy paupers
crowding out the worthy claims of their colleagues, impeding earnest in
forma pauperis petitioners.548 There is some small evidence of this in a mild
decline in in forma pauperis grants.549 Interestingly, however, the primary
victims of the Court’s distraction have been paying litigants. The Court, its
time ever more consumed with the volume of frivolous claims, appears
unable or unwilling to grant review to what would have, in an earlier era,
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542. See Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1362 (writing in 1995 of the rampant abuse of in forma
pauperis filings).
543. See Lane, supra note 11, at 344 (reviewing potential reasons for the plummeting
percentage of in forma pauperis petitions granted).
544. Cf. Casper & Posner, supra note 523, at 367 (“The decline in the proportion of cases
accepted for review revealed by these tables would have little significance if one believed that it
reflected a decline in the average merit of applications for review. But there is no basis for such a
belief after the correction for the presumed lesser merit of the average indigent case made in Table
17. On the contrary, theory suggests that the average merit of the applications for review has
increased over the period covered by our study.”).
545. See id. at 369 (“A more serious consequence of the caseload increase, we said, was the
probable reduction in the number of meritorious cases accepted for review.”); see also Owens &
Simon, supra note 523, at 1252–54 (discussing issue of meritorious cases being overlooked as
grants decrease).
546. E.g., Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1992) (per curiam); Zatko v. California,
502 U.S. 16, 17–18 (1991) (per curiam); In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 13–14 (1991) (per
curiam); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180 (1991) (per curiam); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180,
184. (1989) (per curiam).
547. Zatko, 502 U.S. at 17; In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 14; In re Sindram, 498 U.S.
at 180; In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184.
548. In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 14.
549. See Lane, supra note 11, at 344.
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been a paid claim meritorious enough to warrant plenary review.550 The
Court’s shrinking docket thus credibly derives at least in part from the
modern influx of pestersome paupers, as the majority feared.551 Yet the
litigants predominantly harmed are not fellow paupers, parlous few of which
have ever gained review, but paid filers.
3. Lessons from the Court’s Dwindling Docket

10/23/2018 13:43:40

550. See Zatko, 502 U.S. at 17–18; In re Amend. To Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 14; In re McDonald,
489 U.S. at 184; see also Casper & Posner, supra note 523, at 369.
551. Zatko, 502 U.S. at 17–18.
552. Cf. Owens & Simon, supra note 523, at 1251–63 (discussing several potential negative
results of a diminished docket).
553. RONALD K. L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE JUDGE 39 (Oxford Univ. Press 2017).
554. See Lane, supra note 11, at 362.
555. See, e.g., Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). But see Lane, supra
note 11, at 364 (noting that through 2003, Martin “managed to file over fifteen cases with the Court
despite being blacklisted”).
556. That said, it is interesting to note that the decline in in forma pauperis numbers since
2006 coincides roughly with unprecedented levels of Martin interdictions: It is possible the portion
of these “missing” petitions attributable to interdicted prolific petitioners is relatively substantial.
557. See Lane, supra note 11, at 363–64 (arguing there is little deterrent effect).
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Whatever the cause of the decline, the Supreme Court’s dwindling
capacity for review suggests that its concerns for preserving its ability to
manage its docket must be given substantial credence.552 One modern
treatise glibly quipped: “With the 10,000 or so petitions presented to the nine
justices every year, it is amazing that they have the time to do much of
anything. Consequently, it is easy to become careless and overlook
things.”553
The question remains, however, whether prospective
proscriptions actually effect meaningful relief of the Court’s burden.554 A
portion of the burden may be directly relieved, when highly prolific
petitioners are banned and thus can no longer add their importunities to the
totals of the future.555 This factor, however, can only represent a minority of
the many thousands of petitions the Court must consider annually.556 Of
critical import is whether such proscriptions in fact deter in forma pauperis
litigants at large from submitting frivolous claims.557
On this point the evidence is more equivocal, but there is tantalizing
support for the majority’s view. True, in forma pauperis petitions continued
to rise sharply well after Martin in 1992, and after the formulation of Martin
directives in 1999, reaching their peak volume to date in 2006 with just over
8000 petitions (totaling over 10,000 when combined with those of paying
litigants). But since 2006, in forma pauperis petitions have trended notably
downwards, falling to roughly 5700 by 2015. Indeed, by 2015, the volume
of the indigent docket had returned to nearly where it stood in 1992, wiping
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558. Cf. Franklin, supra note 93, at 203 (quoting Michelman, supra note 22, at 559)
(discussing differential potentiality for deterrence from access fees).
559. See Lane, supra note 11, at 364.
560. See Casper & Posner, supra note 523, at 366 (“In many cases, perhaps, the benefits to the
applicant for review if he obtains a reversal of the lower court’s judgment are so great, or the costs
of applying for Supreme Court review so small, that even a substantial decline in the probability of
obtaining review will not deter the application. A good example is provided by applications
submitted by prisoners. The benefits to the applicant if his case is accepted for review and the
judgment reversed may be very great—his liberty—and the cost of seeking review, which consists
primarily of the opportunity costs of the prisoner’s time, may be very low.”); Sturtz, supra note 58,
at 1362–63.
561. See supra Section II-B-1.
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out the towering heights of the early twenty-first century. It is entirely
plausible that the ever-increasing list of proscribed petitioners have had the
concomitant effect of deterring some litigants who might otherwise have
indulged frivolous claims; it is plausible as well that this deterrent effect
might be somewhat delayed as litigants become more familiar with the
Court’s willingness to ban transgressors.558 (Of course, it is also the case that
it may deter litigants with worthy claims as well.559) This is the case even if
one may expect in forma pauperis prisoners to be highly resilient to
deterrence in the first place—the threat of being denied any further access to
the Supreme Court may be the only thing that can deter someone with
essentially unlimited time and motivation to challenge their incarceration.560
The majority thus presents a facially powerful argument, but there
remain countervailing considerations. In the first place, it is indeterminate
whether lesser penalties such as annual limits, precertifications, or requiring
leave of court might have a comparable deterrent value, or indeed
comparable value in directly relieving petitions. If meritless in forma
pauperis filings could be reduced and attention to worthier claims increased
with less infringement on the right of access to the courts, interdictions
would be far less justifiable. As the Supreme Court never essayed such lesser
penalties, there are no statistics upon which to undertake such an analysis,
even if the degree of deterrence could somehow be detected from the raw
data. The experience of the lower courts suggests that such regimes can
prove effective: although spurned by the Eighth and Fifth Circuits, other
courts facing prolific petitions have relied on these lesser measures.561
More damningly, the reduction in in forma pauperis filings from its
peak in 2006 has not had the desired effect. That is, even if the Supreme
Court’s regime of Martin directives has dissuaded frivolous filings, the
Supreme Court has—for whatever reason—not responded by increasing the
number of cases on which it grants plenary review. To the contrary, from
2005 to 2015, that number has not changed appreciably. The Court and its
petitioners are hardly injured by baseless filings if worthy petitioners are no
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more likely to gain an opportunity for relief.562 Reduction of in forma
pauperis filings is not an end in and of itself, notwithstanding certain
comments implying as much by the majority;563 it is defensible only insofar
as it permits the Court to focus on meritorious work.564 Because this has not
demonstrably happened, the majority’s best argument remains potent but
unproven (though hardly disproven), reducing its weight. This is doubly so
given the many alternative explanations provided by eminent scholars for the
Court’s reduced plenary docket and concomitant pretermitting of more
meritorious claims.565

E. Minority — Proscriptions Will Improperly Impede an
Indigent’s Meritorious Claims
The majority and dissent both expressed concern about frivolous claims
impeding the claims of meritorious in forma pauperis litigants.566 As has
been noted, the data indicate that the victims of the Court’s increasing
caseload have been predominantly paying rather than indigent litigants,567
contrary to the majority’s fretting about the rights of the indigent.568 On the
other hand, interdicting an indigent claimant ipso facto impedes all future
claims from that claimant, an argument that the dissent raised several
times.569 On its face, this is a potent protestation: surely the Court cannot
know with certainty that all of a prolific petitioner’s future output will be as
frivolous as the past.570 Or as Justice Marshall put it lyrically:
[W]e should not presume in advance that prolific indigent litigants
will never bring a meritorious claim. Nor should we lose sight of
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 76 Side A
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562. See Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16, 17–18 (1991) (per curiam) (explaining the rationale
for its decision as preserving Court resources for petitioners who did not abuse the Court’s process);
In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 13–14 (1991) (per curiam) (similar); In re Sindram, 498
U.S. 177, 179–80 (1991) (per curiam) (similar); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (per
curiam) (similar).
563. E.g., In re Demos, 500 U.S. at 17–18 (per curiam) (proscribing petitioner for abuse
without reference to ensuring access to other petitioners).
564. See Zatko, 502 U.S. at 17–18; Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 13–14; In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184.
565. See supra notes 523-528 and accompanying text.
566. See, e.g., In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 13–14; In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
567. See supra Section V-D-2 & V-D-3
568. See In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 13–14; cf. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I continue to find puzzling the Court’s fervor in ensuring that rights
granted to the poor are not abused.”).
569. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at
187–88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
570. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the important role in forma pauperis claims have played in shaping
constitutional doctrine. (citation omitted). As Justice Brennan
warned, “if . . . we continue on the course we chart today, we will
end by closing our doors to a litigant with a meritorious claim.”
(citation omitted). By closing our door today to a litigant like
Michael Sindram, we run the unacceptable risk of impeding a
future Clarence Earl Gideon.571
Yet there is less here than meets the eye. True, there is some chance
that a petitioner whose past behavior had been so irresponsible as to merit
proscription might have mended his ways in the future, given the chance.572
But though the past is no guarantee of the future, it is certainly a fair basis
for prediction.573 Petitioners who have demonstrated an inability to restrain
themselves from frivolous claims are more likely to reoffend in the future.574
Justice Brennan readily admitted that he thought it highly unlikely that Jessie
McDonald would ever come up with a meritorious claim—rather, he
objected on principle to even a vanishingly small possibility being
foreclosed.575 Even blessed with a claim more than frivolous, it remains
highly improbable that the Court will grant review:576 Innumerable
meritorious petitions are denied every year for lack of time to hear them
all.577 In short, there is only a fleeting chance of a serially frivolous petitioner
actually rather than notionally being injured, as all on the Court agreed.578
And the loss of that chance is in many ways a self-inflicted injury.
Nothing compels litigants to present their every imagined claim to the Court
other than their own obstinacy,579 and those who opt to make numerous
frivolous filings can object but faintly when their demonstrated lack of
discernment is used as a basis to predict that they will continue to exhibit
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 76 Side B
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571. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
572. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187–88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
573. See, e.g., In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 180–82, 184 (per curiam) (noting the volume of
past frivolous petitions and barring the “continual processing of petitioner’s frivolous requests”);
In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1982).
574. Cf. In re Oliver, 682 F.2d at 446; Wasby 1990, supra note 12, at 114–16.
575. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187–88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
576. Cf. id. at 184 (per curiam) (“It is perhaps worth noting that we have not granted the sort
of extraordinary writ relentlessly sought by petitioner to any litigant–paid or in forma pauperis–for
at least a decade.”).
577. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 491–97 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Kapral v.
United States, 166 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding 0.45% chance of review being granted).
578. Compare In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 183–84 (per curiam), with id. at 187–88 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
579. See Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1362–63; Lane, supra note 11, at 363–64.
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that failing.580 Should a petitioner wish to avoid such a fate, there is a simple
solution: forebear from bringing tenuous claims so that the Court may view
the meritorious ones more favorably when presented.581 It is not without
reason that “the boy who cried wolf” is a cautionary tale as old as Æsop’s
Fables.582 No petitioner has the right to be heard by the Supreme Court,583
and denying those that have demonstrated themselves chronically unable to
frame a claim does relatively little actual harm to the petitioner in propria
persona.584 (Clarence Earl Gideon, after all, was no prolific petitioner.585)
Thus it is the majority that narrowly has the better of the argument here:
as the data suggest, dockets flooded with the frivolous petitions of
pestersome paupers would indeed make it more likely that any given
meritorious petition will be overlooked.586 Those petitioning sparely and
wisely are more likely to present a proper claim, and thus more likely to
suffer harm if their claim is overlooked.587 By contrast, a court’s deliberately
pretermitting the likely frivolities of its most prolific petitioners occasions a
lower chance that the court will in fact deny a meritorious petition in error.588
If errors are to be made—as inevitably they will by any human decisor,589
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580. See In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187–88 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (distinguishing
between barring the petitioner, whom Brennan doubted would ever file a meritorious claim, from
the more abstract question of whether issuing such order might one day bar another petitioner with
a worthy claim).
581. Cf. In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 17 (1991) (per curiam) (“Petitioner remains free under the
present order to file in forma pauperis requests for relief other than an extraordinary writ, if he
qualifies under this Court’s Rule 39 and does not similarly abuse that privilege.”); In re Sindram,
498 U.S. 177, 184 (1991) (per curiam) (similar); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 185 (per curiam)
(similar).
582. Æsop, ÆSOP’S FABLES 9–11 (Jan Fields trans. 2012) (“When you are known as a liar, no
one believes you even when you speak the truth.”).
583. See supra notes 459-464 and accompanying text.
584. See In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S 13, 14 (1991) (per curiam) (“The Rule applies only
to those filings that the Court determines would be denied in any event, and permits a disposition
of the matter without the Court issuing an order granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”).
585. See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 28–41 (Vintage 1964).
586. See Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1992) (per curiam) (“But it will free this
Court’s limited resources to consider the claims of those petitioners who have not abused our
certiorari process.”); supra Sections V-D-2 & V-D-3.
587. See Casper & Posner, supra note 523, at 366–69; cf. Duniway, supra note 23, at 1285–
86 (“My objections to the statute are twofold. First, it does not do enough for the litigant with a
meritorious cause.”); Feldman, supra note 29, at 437.
588. See, e.g., Duniway, supra note 23, at 1285 (“The fourth group is made up of in propria
persona litigants—a few of whom plague every court—who have an imaginary grievance and a
compulsion to litigate continually. The man involved in meritorious litigation who uses the statute
is a rara avis.”).
589. I. J. Good & Gordon Tullock, Judicial Errors and a Proposal for Reform, 13 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 289 (1984) (“[W]e argue that it is possible for a judge or court, specifically the Supreme
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especially one beset with as many supplicants as the Supreme Court590—then
better they be made in circumstances that minimize the damage done.591
There are few more likely circumstances than cases proponed by serially
frivolous prolific petitioners.592

F. Minority — Proscriptions Institutionalize Unseemly
Discrimination on the Basis of Wealth
But even if pestersome paupers are losing little real opportunity to be
heard, and diverting some quantum of attention from more meritorious cases,
nonetheless the Supreme Court’s ballooning use of Martin directives may
compromise the Court in a most crucial way: By undermining public
confidence in the equal and evenhanded administration to justice to all
Americans, be they rich or poor.593 Of late, the Court has repeatedly returned
to the importance of such public confidence in other postures: Avoiding even
the appearance of impropriety in cases where judges might be accused of
improper bias, and extirpating any insinuation of invidious racial
considerations infecting the judicial system.594 These laudable programs to
promote both the appearance and actuality of fairness generally shed
clarifying light on how the Court should approach divisions based on
wealth.595
This concern is amplified by the unhappy reality that early civil society
expressed rather benighted biases against the impoverished.596 Courts
associated poverty with moral degradation or improbity,597 up to and
including the Supreme Court, which infamously held in 1837 in City of New
York v. Miln that it is “as competent and necessary for a state to provide
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 77 Side B
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Court of the United States, to be wrong.”); cf. ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM 31
(Floating Press 2010) (“To err is human . . .”).
590. See Collins & Skover, supra note 553; supra Section V-D-2.
591. Cf. Good & Tullock, supra note 589, at 294–97 (proposing the Court reserve close
decisions for a second review in order to minimize the chance of error).
592. See Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1992) (per curiam); In re Amend. to Rule
39, 500 U.S. 13, 14 (1991) (per curiam).
593. See Feldman, supra 29, at 437 (“Moreover, any appearance of judicial impropriety would
be undermined. The initial screening of frivolous complaints would not appear merely as a means
for district courts to sweep the poor from their dockets. Rather, the screening would be a means of
identifying those complaints worthy of further serious consideration. Only then would the federal
courts be truly open to the poor.”); Lane, supra note 11, at 363.
594. See infra Section V-F-1.
595. See infra Section V-F-2.
596. See Albert M. Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, 54 CAL. L. REV. 407,
416–17 (1966); Feldman, supra note 29, at 413; Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 657.
597. See Bendich, supra note 596, at 416–27; Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 657 (citing
Stefan A. Reisenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 CALIF. L. REV.
175, 175–200 (1955)).
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precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds,
and convicts, as it is to guard against the physical pestilence may arise from
unsound and infectious articles imported.”598 Thankfully, the Court has
since repudiated such language and philosophy in firm terms—albeit after
the lapse of over a century, in 1941.599 Nonetheless, remnants of such
prejudices have persisted even into the relatively recent past, including the
familiar rhetoric that advocates for the poor were “using dilatory tactics or
raising frivolous points.”600 Even the Court has at times inspired more
modern dissents pointing to the persistence of class bias in its own
holdings.601 As other contexts indicate, such a history underscores the
importance of affirmatively rebutting any hint of bias or discriminatory
treatment to ensure public confidence in the judicial system.602
1. Avoiding the Appearance of Bias and Preserving Public Confidence
Most fundamentally, public confidence in the judicial system is fatally
compromised when litigation is presided over by judges whose impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.603 The Supreme Court gave this doctrine
greater constitutional ambit in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,604 in which
a justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court cast the decisive vote reversing
a $50 million judgment against his largest campaign contributor.605 Four
times, the justice had refused to recuse himself after conducting “a probing
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598. City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142 (1837) (cited in Catz & Guyer,
supra note 20, at 657 n.12); accord The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 457 (1849) (Grier,
J., concurring).
599. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (“Whatever may have been the notion
then prevailing, we do not think that it will now be seriously contended that because a person is
without employment and without funds he constitutes a ‘moral pestilence.’ Poverty and immorality
are not synonymous.”).
600. Robert D. McFadden, Some Judges Held Hostile to Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 1970),
at 52.
601. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 323 n.9 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting the
relevant passage from Miln and “regretfully conclud[ing] that today’s decision is ideologically of
the same vintage”); see also Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252, 256–57 (1966) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
602. See infra Section V-F-1.
603. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009) (“The Conference
of the Chief Justices has underscored that the codes are ‘[t]he principal safeguard against judicial
campaign abuses’ that threaten to imperil ‘public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the
nation’s elected judges.’”).
604. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889.
605. This greatly simplifies the situation; the reader interested in the political arcana of judicial
elections in West Virginia is best directed to the thorough recapitulation in the case itself. Id. at
872–76.

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 78 Side B

10/23/2018 13:43:40

SUNSHINE_MACROED TM FINAL 10.15 (DO NOT DELETE)

140

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

10/15/2018 7:58 PM

[Vol. 46:1

search into his actual motives and inclinations” and finding no fault.606 The
Court, however, ruled that subjective inquiry was not sufficient; an objective
assessment of whether the “probability” or “risk” of bias was too great was
also required.607 This holding accorded with prior cases finding that actual
bias was unnecessary; what mattered was whether an “average judge”
similarly situated had a “unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”608 The Court
subsequently reaffirmed this rule in Williams v. Pennsylvania only seven
years later.609
To be sure, there is no evidence that the modern Supreme Court is
operating under some institutional animus against the poor in promulgating
Martin directives; the mandate against actual judicial bias is not at play.610
However, the Court’s insistence on recusal even when no actual bias has
been shown to avoid any possible appearance thereof teaches an important
lesson: ultimately, the lodestar is objective public perception of impropriety,
not the existence thereof.611 Such a broad brushstroke emphasizes how
vitally important confidence in the fairness of the judicial system really is.612
Especially when the past reveals invidious preconceptions by yesteryear’s
judges against a particular group, it is all the more important for the modern
bench to extirpate any sense that such a bias might linger.613
Closer to home is a slightly different sort of failing of the judicial
system: when litigants’ cases are adjudicated not on their merits, but on the
basis of some invidious outside factor irrelevant to the claims at issue. The
most archetypal of such invidious factors, given aspects of the nation’s
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606. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882.
607. Id. at 882–87.
608. Id. at 881 (discussing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) and Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971)); see id. at 878–79 (discussing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie,
475 U.S. 813 (1986), Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927).)
609. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (2016) (“The Court asks not whether a
judge harbors an actual, subjective bias, but instead whether, as an objective matter, ‘the average
judge in his position is “likely” to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional “potential for
bias.”’”) (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881).
610. Some of the more fiery dissents in the in forma pauperis cases, however, at least approach
such an accusation; see, e.g., In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180–82 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
but that is likely best put down to rhetoric than a serious accusation. But see cases cited supra note
601.
611. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1908–09 (“This risk so endangered the appearance of neutrality
that his participation in the case ‘must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
adequately implemented’”) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)); Caperton, 556
U.S. at 889; Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (quoted by Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889).
612. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1908–09; Caperton, 556 U.S. at 888–89; White, 536 U.S. at 793.
613. See supra notes 596–601 and accompanying text.
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history, has been race.614 The Court has long denounced any use of race as
a judicially cognizable consideration, perhaps most famously in Batson v.
Kentucky.615 There, as need hardly be recounted, the Court overturned the
contrary Swain v. Alabama616 and declared that exclusion of jury members
on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause.617 This marked a
culmination of the Court’s self-described “unceasing efforts to eradicate
racial discrimination in the procedures used to select the venire from which
individual jurors are drawn.”618 Of particular importance, the Court
recognized that “procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from
juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.
Discrimination within the judicial system is most pernicious . . . .”619
The passage of time has not diminished the Court’s concern with this
public confidence. In 2016, Chief Justice John Roberts reaffirmed Batson
and its progeny for a near-unanimous Court and reversed the petitioner’s
conviction based on two racially-motivated peremptory strikes;620 Justice
Alito added in concurrence that “[c]ompliance with Batson is essential to
ensure that defendants receive a fair trial and to preserve the public
confidence upon which our system of criminal justice depends.”621 A year
later, Chief Justice Roberts again wrote to reverse the death sentence
rendered by a jury informed by an expert that the defendant “was more likely
to act violently because he is black.”622 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
once more decried discrimination in terms of public confidence in the
judiciary, relying on considerable authority:
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614. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, No.
17–965, slip. op. at 38 (U.S. June 26, 2018), as recognized id. at 28 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting);
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347
U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
615. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
616. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson, 476 U.S. 79.
617. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 & n.25.
618. Id. at 85.
619. Id. at 86–87 (citations omitted).
620. Foster v. Chapman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016). Only Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.
See id. at 1761–67 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
621. Id. at 1760 (Alito, J., concurring).
622. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 767 (2017).
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especially pernicious in the administration of justice.” Rose v.
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injures not just the defendant, but “the law as an institution, . . .
the community at large, and . . . the democratic ideal reflected in
the processes of our courts.” Rose, 443 U.S. at 556.623
And only a month later, the Court ruled that even the hallowed
inviolability of jury deliberations could be penetrated if racial discrimination
was credibly alleged.624 Yet again, the Court found allowing such bias to
stand would “risk systemic injury to the administration of justice,”625 and
redressing it even after a verdict was “necessary to prevent a systemic loss
of confidence in jury verdicts, a confidence that is a central premise of the
Sixth Amendment trial right.”626 In short, discrimination not only does harm
to its target, but also to the judicial system, and to the society at large that
depends upon its scrupulousness—and is thus to be avoided at all costs.627
2. Equal Access to Justice as a Right Rather Than a Privilege
Discrimination on the basis of wealth is not the same as that on the basis
of race;628 jurisprudentially, race is a “suspect” classification entailing the
strictest scrutiny,629 and wealth is not.630 Moreover, the in forma pauperis
regime cannot and does not afford all litigants equal means to pursue and
prove their claims; it serves the far more modest goal of affording everyone
the opportunity to be heard.631 Given already pervasive disparities between
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623. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 778 (parallel citations omitted).
624. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 866–69 (2017).
625. Id. at 868.
626. Id. at 869.
627. E.g., id. at 871; Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 767.
628. See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868 (“The same cannot be said about racial bias, a
familiar and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the administration
of justice. This Court’s decisions demonstrate that racial bias implicates unique historical,
constitutional, and institutional concerns.”); see also Feldman, supra note 29, at 436 (“Had the
Court recognized indigency as a suspect classification, different treatment of in forma pauperis
plaintiffs would probably violate equal protection, and the problem of how to define a fundamental
right of access to the courts would be bypassed. But because indigency is not recognized as a
suspect classification, the search for equality focuses on the identification of fundamental rights,
whether under equal protection or substantive due process.”).
629. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 US 200, 215–227 (1995) (discussing history of
race as a “suspect” classification requiring strict scrutiny and overturning theory of intermediate
scrutiny for “benign” discrimination); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect . . .
[and] courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”).
630. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1988); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 323 (1980); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); accord
Feldman, supra note 29, at 435 (citing Harris and San Antonio in stating that “indigency is not a
suspect classification”).
631. See supra Section I-C.
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the resources enjoyed by litigants, therefore, one might argue that closing the
courthouse doors against those who putatively abuse the judicial system is
small offense.632 (Others might call it adding insult to injury.633) After all,
those of meager means who have serially presented frivolous and thus
unwinnable claims are vanishingly unlikely to prevail; regardless of any
Martin directive, not only can they expect no hearing from the Court, they
can also expect no redress on meritless petitions.634
Nevertheless, the wound to public confidence remains dire when
discrimination of any sort is afoot.635 This message of bias was the most
recurrent theme of the dissent’s objections, and the most puissant: Justice
Brennan said so in McDonald,636 and Justice Marshall said so in Sindram,
Demos, and Rule 39.637 Justice Stevens too wrote in Rule 39 that
“[t]ranscending the clerical interest that supports the Rule is the symbolic
interest in preserving equal access to the Court for both the rich and the poor.
I believe the Court makes a serious mistake when it discounts the importance
of that interest.”638 In Zatko, he amplified this concern: “[T]he symbolic
effect of the Court’s effort to draw distinctions among the multitude of
frivolous petitions . . . is powerfulFalse[T]he message that it actually
conveys is that the Court does not have an overriding concern about equal
access to justice for both the rich and the poor.”639 And in Martin, he
concluded that whatever “theoretical administrative benefit the Court may
derive from an order of this kind is far outweighed by the shadow it casts on
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632. Michelman, supra note 22, at 1163–64; cf. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19–25 (considering
“whether the relative––rather than absolute––nature of the asserted deprivation is of significant
consequence” and finding it is).
633. See In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 181 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. cases cited
infra note 661 (discussing liberal treatment of pro se litigants).
634. See Michelman, supra note 22, at 1163–64. This is essentially the in propria persona
argument presented in Section V-E.
635. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (extending Batson to
gender-motivated strikes); Smith Kline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 486 (9th
Cir. 2014) (extending Batson to strikes based on sexual orientation). But see United States v.
Blaylock, 421 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 2005) (expressing doubt Batson would apply to strikes based on
sexual orientation).
636. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186, 188 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
637. In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 15 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re
Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 19 (1991) (finding the Court’s action could “only reinforce in the hearts and
minds of our society’s less fortunate members the unsettling message that their pleas are not
welcome here”); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 182 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding the
Court was “conveying an unseemly message of hostility to indigent litigants”).
638. In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
639. Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16, 19–20 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the great tradition of open access that characterized the Court’s history prior
to its unprecedented decisions.”640
So it is. To preemptively bar the courthouse doors prejudges
pestersome petitioners’ future claims based on their past and does so only
when they lack the means to pay filing fees.641 Such institutionalized
prejudice does injury to a judicial system premised on the idea that all have
the right to have their claims adjudicated exclusively on their own merits.642
Courts surely have the inherent right to protect themselves and their process
against abuse643—but the generally accepted recourse for courts against
litigants who abuse their process include prescreening measures, sanctions,
and contempt, not everlasting exile from judicial process.644 In the end, a
prolific petitioner’s sin is only a flurry of frivolous filings.645 Especially on
account of so petty an offense, to banish anyone—rich or poor—from ever
petitioning a court again seems contrary to basic American values.646 Indeed,
banishment has not been meted out as a penalty for even threats of violence
to the judiciary.647 Perhaps most ominously, paupers barred from the legal
system will have no recourse for redress but extralegal “self-help.”648
The Court has sought to justify this banishment because the payment of
filing fees deters frivolous claims, and therefore those excused from that
requirement warrant greater oversight.649 Properly viewed, goes this
reasoning, nobody has been banished: The privilege of feeless filing has
simply been withdrawn because of serial abuse, and abusers remain free to
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640. Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
641. See In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 785–86 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Feldman, supra note 29, at 437.
642. See Feldman, supra note 29, at 437.
643. See Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1071 (1985) (“This is not, of course, to
suggest that courts should tolerate gross abuses of the judicial process.”); supra notes 440-449 and
accompanying text.
644. See Talamini, 470 U.S. at 1071; Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072–73 (11th Cir.
1986) (en banc) (per curiam).
645. See Wasby 1995, supra note 12; Wasby 1990, supra note 12.
646. See supra Part I.
647. See, e.g., Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding the gagging of
defendant after, inter alia, threatening the judge); cf., e.g., Commonwealth v. McPherson, No.
1450-WDA-2013, 2014 WL 10790341, at *7–-*8 (Penn. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2014) (reversing trial
court that banned appellant from entering a town because of threats to town officials) (“THE
COURT: . . . I don’t know if it is legal to ban him from a community. Is it legal? [Appellant’s
counsel:] I don’t think so, Your Honor. THE COURT: . . . I don’t think it is. I don’t think it is either,
but I think I’m going to do it anyway. I think I’m going to make it illegal under the unique
circumstances in this case . . . .”).
648. See Talamini, 470 U.S. at 107071; Lane, supra note 11, at 335; Michelman, supra note
22, at 1194, 1198.
649. See In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S 13 (1991) (per curiam); In re Sindram, 498
U.S. 177, 180 (1991) (per curiam); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (per curiam); see
also Lane, supra note 11, at 359–60.
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file whatever they wish as long as they are willing to pay for it.650 But that
very reasoning lays bare the flaw in the argument: To insist that those who
cannot pay must pay is to forbid them, whatever the semantics.651 In forma
pauperis filings vindicate the foundational American project of allowing all
to access the courthouse;652 it is not a privilege that can (or rather should, as
Martin illustrates) be blithely retracted, but the quintessential necessity of an
equitable justice system.653 The judicial system has a monopoly on statesanctioned compulsory relief.654 If the price of a system open to all is that a
tiny minority will misuse that openness, then that is a price the system must
pay unless it faces an insuperable and existential threat.655 Pestersome
paupers do not pose such a threat, singly or collectively.656
Moreover, and perhaps more damning, the Court’s rule only poorly
serves its avowed purpose of reducing the frivolous filings it must consider:
a nominal filing fee is unlikely to deter the wealthy, and therefore imposing
such a requirement serves only to categorically bar the destitute (however
worthy their claim) rather than deter meritless petitions by anyone else.657
The Court itself has said “again and again” that a large proportion of
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650. Peck v. Hoff, 600 F.2d 371, 374 (8th Cir. 1981) (explaining that “the court’s order does
not bar Peck from bringing civil rights actions but rather limits his use of the cost free privileges of
filing under 28 U.S.C. § 1915”); see In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 17 (1991) (per curiam) (“If
petitioner wishes to have one or both of these petitions considered on its merits, he must pay the
docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) . . .”); see also Lane, supra note 11, at 358.
651. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110–112 (1996); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
374–377 (1971); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 16–20 (1956).
652. Talamini, 470 U.S. at 1070–71 (“Freedom of access to the courts is a cherished value in
our democratic society. . . . This Court, above all, should uphold the principle of open access.”);
see supra Part I.
653. See Franklin, supra note 93; Lane, supra note 11; e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S.
140, 153 (1992) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)); Talamani, 470 U.S. at
1070–71; Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374–377; Chambers, v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142,
1488 (1907). To be clear, the Article does not argue that the Court’s Martin directives are
unconstitutional, but rather than the essential goal of establishing public confidence in the judicial
system is crucially undermined by their existence and thus makes for bad policy. Nonetheless, the
constitutionality of such bars against the indigent is not assured either—there are legitimate
concerns about a system that prejudges the claims of the indigent as unworthy, but not those of the
wealthy. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. at102, 110–112 (1996); compare Lane, supra note 11, at
335–58 (considering and rejecting a constitutional argument against Martin directives), with
Franklin, supra note 93 (opining that the PLRA “three strikes” provision is unconstitutional).
654. See Michelman, supra note 22, at 1178–85, 1198; see also Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374–77
(1971).
655. See, e.g., In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180–182 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re
McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186–188 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
656. See supra Sections V-C & V-D.
657. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 302, 331 (3d Cir. 2001) (Mansmann, J.,
dissenting); Franklin, supra note 93, at 202.
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certiorari petitions (of every ilk) are “wholly frivolous and ought never to
have been filed.”658 As Justice Marshall observed repeatedly, the Court’s
paying customers manage plenty of frivolous filings themselves, despite the
fact that they can presumably afford counsel to advise against such waste.659
Instead, counsel for the rich can often disguise meritless claims more
effectively by artful pleading, thus increasing the challenge for the
justices.660 It is precisely because pro se litigants lack counsel that their
filings are read more indulgently to winkle out a poorly pled but persuasive
claim.661 If the Court truly wishes to prune back frivolous filings whilst
entertaining the worthy, it must cut with a sharper scalpel than simply
silencing the impoverished662—for example, by denying them on their (lack
of) merit as was its long tradition,663 or limiting annual filings.664
Meanwhile, the proposition that public confidence in the justice system
has been compromised by a perception that money can buy results is hardly
speculative. Much scholarship has been expended in documenting disparate
treatment of the rich and poor in American courts.665 Polls regularly show
that Americans believe that courts afford the wealthy a different brand of
justice than the poor.666 One metaanalysis summarized that “[o]ver twenty
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658. Hart, supra note 470, at 88.
659. In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 14 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re Sindram,
498 U.S. at 181 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
660. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 181.
661. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to
be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Hart, supra note 470, at 90 (referring to “ferreting out the occasional
points of merit” in in forma pauperis petitions).
662. See In re Demos, 500 U.S. at 17–18 (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at
181 (“To single out Sindram in response to a problem that cuts across all classes of litigants strikes
me as unfair, discriminatory, and petty.”).
663. See In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 15 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wrenn v. Benson,
490 U.S. 89, 92 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186–87 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
664. See, e.g., Rubins v. Roetker, 737 F. Supp. 1140, 1145 (D. Colo. 1990) (one per year),
aff’d, 936 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1991); Cello-Whitney v. Hoover, 769 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D.
Wash. 1991) (three per year); In re Tyler, 677 F. Supp. 1410, 1414 (D. Neb. 1987) (one per month).
665. See generally, e.g., JEFFREY H. REIMAN & PAUL LEIGHTON, THE RICH GET RICHER AND
THE POOR GET PRISON (10th ed. 2012); JEFFREY H. REIMAN, . . . AND THE POOR GET PRISON:
ECONOMIC BIAS IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Allyn & Bacon 1996); John R. Lott, Jr., Should
the Wealthy Be Able to “Buy Justice”?, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1307 (1987).
666. E.g., Matt Murphy, ACLU Poll: Mass. criminal justice system ‘biased’, NEWBURYPORT
NEWS, July 13, 2017 (“It clearly shows that Massachusetts voters feel the criminal justice system
is broken and biased. For far too long, the system has given preference to the connected and
wealthy”); Rodney Ellis, Texas still has a way to go for fair justice, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Nov. 1, 2013; David B. Rottman & Alan Tomkin, Public Trust and Confidence in the Courts: What
Public Opinion Surveys Mean to Judges, COURT REV., Fall 1999, at 24; David B. Rottman, On
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years of surveys, the same negative and positive images of the judiciary
recurred with varying degrees of forcefulness across all of the national and
state surveys,” and noted the ubiquitous “concern that the courts are biased
in favor of the wealthy and corporations. Indeed, the perception of
economic-based unfairness in civil cases seemed to rival the perception of
judicial leniency in criminal cases as a source of public dissatisfaction.”667
And the issue transcends politics: A bipartisan editorial in July 2017 by
Senators Kamala Harris and Rand Paul decried the dysfunctional and
discriminatory effects of the prevailing approach to bail on those of little
means, concluding that reform “would help restore Americans’ faith in our
justice system.”668
To be heard by the Supreme Court is an honor afforded only to a few—
and ever fewer over time—but it must be a honor granted on the merits of
petitioners’ claims, not on the balance in petitioners’ bank accounts.669 The
Court has been admirably dogged in rooting out any hint of other sorts of
bias throughout the judicial system—and long may that remain.670 But that
doggedness only underscores the anomaly of its willingness to treat the
destitute differently when they seek redress.671 All must have a right of
access to the courts; that access is not a privilege but the foundation of civil
society, and thus denying access on the basis of wealth is wrong, whatever a
petitioner’s past sins.672 The Supreme Court is the forum to which eyes turn
as a bellwether of equity, probity, and impartiality,673 and thus it is the Court
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Public Trust and Confidence: Does Experience with the Courts Promote or Diminish It?, COURT
REV., Winter 1998, at 14.
667. Rottman & Tomkin, supra note 666, at 25.
668. Kamala D. Harris & Rand Paul, Op-Ed., To Shrink Our Jails, Let’s Reform Bail, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2017, at A27.
669. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110–112 (1996); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 16–
20 (1956); Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 302, 331 (3d Cir. 2001) (Mansmann, J., dissenting);
cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 491–97 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (explaining the
Court’s process for granting certiorari and its meaning); O’Brien, supra note 522 (same).
670. See supra Section V-F-1.
671. See McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186–88 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
672. See Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1070–71 (1985); Franklin, supra note
93; Lane, supra note 11, see generally supra Part I.
673. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865–66 (1992) (“The Court must take
care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims
for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures
having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the
Court’s legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which
their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.”); Republican Party
of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoted by Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009)); see also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504
U.S. 655, 687 (1992) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“The way that we perform that duty in a case of this
kind sets an example that other tribunals in other countries are sure to emulate.”).
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and nation even more than the individual petitioner that lose most when the
highest court institutionalizes divisions between Americans based on their
means,674 abjuring the judicial oath unchanged since before Marbury v.
Madison to “do equal right to the poor and to the rich . . . .”675

Conclusion
All in all, the Supreme Court has seemingly been dismayingly highhanded in rebuking its most troublesome supplicants. To be pretermitted
with no more process than a rubber stamp of an order based on past sins is
an unkind cut to those least able to bear it.676 But perhaps some context is in
order: the Bible provides the response of an even more Supreme Authority
to pestersome petitions of questionable quality:
Then the LORD answered Job out of the whirlwind, and said, Who
is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge? Gird
up now thy loins like a man; for I will demand of thee, and answer
thou me. Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the
earth? declare, if thou hast understanding. Who hath laid the
measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who hath stretched the line
upon it? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who
laid the corner stone thereof; When the morning stars sang
together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy? Or who shut up
the sea with doors, when it brake forth, as if it had issued out of
the womb? When I made the cloud the garment thereof, and thick
darkness a swaddlingband for it, And brake up for it my decreed
place, and set bars and doors, And said, Hitherto shalt thou come,
but no further: and here shall thy proud waves be stayed?677
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674. See cases cited supra notes 636-640.
675. Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803), with In re Amend.to
Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 15, n.* (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Doyle, supra note 68, at
407 (sitting judge quoting the oath and then stating: “Upon a showing of financial inability to
prepay these fees and costs, prepayment may be dispensed with, and any indigent non-prisoner can
sue anyone else (28 U.S.C. §1915(a).) Within the time fixed by the rules, the defendant is obliged
to respond. There is a lawsuit. So must it be with prisoners. No less.”).
676. Though perhaps not “the most unkindest cut of all.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE
TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. ii.
677. Job 38:1–11 (King James).
678. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 491–97 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing
Court’s approach to certiorari); e.g., Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 1999)
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So too the experience of the average petitioner to the Supreme Court,
who will be afforded no further adjudication than a reasonless denial of
certiorari: there shall their proud claims be stayed.678 Fair enough, so long

40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 83 Side A

10/23/2018 13:43:40

SUNSHINE_MACROED TM FINAL 10.15 (DO NOT DELETE)

Fall 2018]

10/15/2018 7:58 PM

THE PUTATIVE PROBLEM OF PESTERSOME PAUPERS

149

as all petitioners’ cases are treated equally.679 But why should the disfavored
poor be categorically afforded a lesser opportunity—even a marginally lesser
one—than the wealthy for lack of a filing fee?680
True, the Supreme Court has infinitely fewer resources to decide
appeals than the Supreme Judge of the world appealed to in the Declaration
of Independence.681 The Court is not misguided in attempting to ensure that
the greater body politic enjoys the most effective exercise of its judicial
oversight.682 But the Court’s increasing issuances of Martin directives are
disproportionate, seeking to swat mosquitos with cannonades.683 The
dissents in the cases leading through Martin make the convincing argument
that such extreme measures are more convenient than compulsory to the
Court’s good function, and that convenience should not shut the courthouse
doors against the poor.684 The evidence that the average petition—especially
the average frivolous pro se petition—occupies only a few minutes of
institutional effort means that whatever extra time is occasioned by the
Court’s most pestersome, that time remains de minimis in the ocean of its
overall workload.685
Notwithstanding the gravamen of the previous discussion, the Court’s
present approach does injure the petitioner directly, not just society: it is
possible that some of those pestersome paupers might be the victims of some
grave miscarriage of justice crying out for relief, only to be mechanically
barred from even filing for certiorari because of their penury and past
peccadillos.686 And that risk increases with every interdiction.687 In the end,
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(adverting to a mere 0.45% chance of review being granted in assessing whether courts of appeals
decisions are effectively final).
679. See Lane, supra note 11, at 361–66
680. See id.; Feldman, supra note 29, at 437.
681. We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General
Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the
rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People
of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these united Colonies are,
and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States . . . .
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32
682. See, e.g., In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1991) (per curiam); In re McDonald, 489
U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (per curiam); see also Lane, supra note 11, at 365.
683. See Lane, supra note 11, at 361–63.
684. See supra Part III.
685. See In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 15 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); In re
McDonald, 489 U.S. at 188 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Hart, supra note 470, at 88–91; see also Lane,
supra note 11, at 361–63.
686. See In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1991) (Douglas, J., dissenting); In re Sindram, 498
U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187–88.
687. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (an “unacceptable risk”); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at
187–88 (“I am most concerned, however, that, if, as I fear, we continue on the course we chart
today, we will end by closing our doors to a litigant with a meritorious claim.”).
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after all, we learn that the beleaguered Job did get the relief he was looking
for (and much more):
[T]he LORD gave Job twice as much as he had before. Then came
there unto him all his brethren, and all his sisters, and all they that
had been of his acquaintance before, and did eat bread with him
in his house: and they bemoaned him, and comforted him over all
the evil that the LORD had brought upon him: every man also gave
him a piece of money, and every one an earring of gold. So the
LORD blessed the latter end of Job more than his beginning: for he
had fourteen thousand sheep, and six thousand camels, and a
thousand yoke of oxen, and a thousand she asses. He had also
seven sons and three daughters. And he called the name of the
first, Jemima; and the name of the second, Kezia; and the name of
the third, Kerenhappuch. And in all the land were no women
found so fair as the daughters of Job: and their father gave them
inheritance among their brethren. After this lived Job an hundred
and forty years, and saw his sons, and his sons’ sons, even four
generations. So Job died, being old and full of days.688
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688. Job 42:10–17 (King James).
689. Compare Douglas, supra note 523, at 406–08 (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment
of in forma pauperis petitions from a uniquely personal perspective), with In re Demos, 500 U.S.
at 18–19 (Douglas, J., dissenting), and In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
690. See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 1999).
691. In re Demos, 500 U.S. at 18–19; In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182.
692. See supra Section V-F-2.
693. Id.
694. Id.
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Paupers petitioning the Supreme Court should be so fortunate!689
Indeed, much fortune is required for those not interdicted to obtain a hearing,
let alone such bounteous relief.690 And those on the proscribed list lack even
that faint hope at winning the judicial lottery of a hearing at the highest
court.691
Yet ultimately, the greatest injury is to a society expecting the judiciary
to be a model of evenhanded fairness.692 What the Supreme Court loses in
institutional gravitas and public confidence surely outweighs the mild cost
occasioned by the briefest review of serially frivolous claims.693 Setting
aside whether Martin directives are constitutional or not, they make for
powerfully poor public policy.694 The Court would be better served in
weaning itself off of such practices and returning to its prior practice of
permitting even the most pestersome paupers a few minutes of its clerks’
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time.695 As Justice Stevens mused hopefully in his last substantive comment
on the subject: “Perhaps one day reflection will persuade my colleagues to
return to ‘the great tradition of open access that characterized the Court’s
history prior to its unprecedented decisions in In re McDonald and In re
Sindram.’”696 If not, Lane’s recommendation, now fifteen years old, that
Congress supersede the Court’s practice of proscription by statute may be
the only remedy.697
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695. See supra Section V-F-2; see Lane, supra note 11, at 361–65.
696. Attwood v. Singletary, 516 U.S. 297, 298 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) (quoting Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
697. See Lane, supra note 11, at 335.
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